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 Abstract 
This dissertation focuses on a spatial analysis of the cultural memories of Harbin, 
a city in Northeast China, a former (semi)colony of Russia and Japan, and a habitat of 
more than forty nationalities from across the world in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Harbin’s history, determined in great part by a large foreign presence, is still 
a matter of contention in China and elsewhere. By adopting Pierre Nora’s concept of 
“lieux de mémoire (places of memory),” Henri Lefebvre’s notion of “the social 
production of space,” and concepts and theories of many others, this dissertation 
investigates the contested memories of Harbin through the lens of architecture, 
literature, film, and television drama. It conducts interdisciplinary and inter-medial 
examinations of Harbin as an encompassing lieu de mémoire, where various practices 
demonstrate, individually and collectively, differently yet consistently, the social 
signification of the city’s pasts in the present, enriching the city with ambivalent and 
contradictory meanings, and contributing to the social production of the memorial 
space and spatial memory of the city. This dissertation examines Harbin as a contact 
zone amongst Russia, Japan, and China, and as a periphery of the cultural heartland of 
China. It attaches importance to memories as an arena for the contemporary Harbiners 
to negotiate the divergent ideologies, power contests, and economic and cultural 
concerns. The city itself is a palimpsest, a text which has experienced, and is 
experiencing, a process of being effaced and “rewritten,” translated, and resignified. 
The city’s contested past overlaps with its present, persistently haunting and shaping 
iii 
 
the city, while experiencing metamorphosis and resurrection. Overshadowed by the 
real-and-imagined ghosts of the past, Harbin continues to function as a contested 
contact zone and frontier that de-territorializes China’s homogeneous cultural identity 
from the periphery. In this way, Harbin describes a local particularism by evoking a 
future-oriented reinvigoration of its cosmopolitan past in the current context of 
globalization. In this process, contemporary Harbiners demonstrate ambivalence and 
paradox in promoting the city’s exoticism as much as complying with the state’s 
construction of nationalism. 
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Introduction 
This dissertation focuses on a spatial analysis of the cultural memories of Harbin, a 
city in Northeast China, adjacent to Russia on land and across the sea from Japan. 
Harbin’s history, determined in great part by a large foreign presence, is still a matter 
of contention in China, and elsewhere. This contestation is seen in the contemporary 
Chinese preservation, representation, and imagination of the city’s past. Investigating 
it through the lens of architecture, literature, film, and television drama, this 
dissertation addresses the question of how the local officials, professionals, artists and 
residents of Harbin and elsewhere “reconfigure time by remaking space,”1 
(re)construct and (re)signify the various places of memory, and develop the 
interpretive rationales they employ. Special attention is given to Harbin as a contact 
zone amongst Russia, Japan, and China, and as a periphery of the cultural heartland of 
China. I explore the ambivalence and paradox of contemporary Harbiners in 
promoting the city’s exoticism, as much as complying with the state’s construction of 
nationalism.2 I argue that the city constructs local particularism and local 
internationalism by reinvigorating its cosmopolitan (and colonial) past, in order to 
adapt to and confront the homogenization of globalization and market economy. 
My analysis is situated in the temporal-spatial matrix of here, now, there, and 
then, which features continuity and discontinuity, and an obsession with the foreign 
past and oblivion of some part of it. The contemporary Harbin is characterized by a 
                                                                 
1 Abidin Kusno, The Appearances of Memory: Mnemonic Practices of Architecture and Urban Form 
in Indonesia (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 5. 
2 I use “Harbiner” to refer to Harbin people. Harbiners are comprised of both the local Chinese as well 
as the multi-ethnic diaspora around the world. The latter’s publishing efforts are crucial for the world to 
know the special history of Harbin. However, due to the limited length of this dissertation, I focus on 
the Chinese Harbiners. 
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culture of reappearance and disappearance:3 on the one hand, the haunted past 
manifests itself in the imitation of many demolished European-style buildings, and in 
the “new remembering” of Japanese imperialist atrocities in museums and cultural 
productions;4 on the other hand, the culture of disappearance is illustrated by 
downplaying the pre-war economic and cultural contributions of Japanese immigrants 
to Harbin, and by gentrifying the lived space of memory in the Chinese Baroque 
neighborhood, transforming it into a tourist and business site for consumption. 
Moreover, many locals do not have any clear awareness whether someone is Pole, 
Jew, Georgian, or Tartar, et al. They are prone to call all the foreign residents 
laomaozi (the old hairy ones), which literally refers to the Russians. The 
homogeneous memorialization of all White foreign Harbiners as Russians constitutes 
another layer of the culture of disappearance.  
The (un)intentional promoting, transforming, or downplaying of particular 
memories of Old Harbin is partially due to a discontinuity between the cosmopolitan 
Harbin, under Russian colonization a century ago, and the present Harbin, as a 
provincial city of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Harbin was a cosmopolitan 
and immigrant city, starting with the Russian imperial project of constructing the 
Chinese Eastern Railway (the CER) across Manchuria in 1898. The Russians and the 
                                                                 
3 According to Ackbar Abbas, one connotation of “disappearance” is misrecognition or refusal to see 
what is there. “Disappearance,” in the case of Hong Kong culture, also refers to the fact that “the way 
the city has been made to appear in many representations in fact works to make it disappear.” Ackbar 
Abbas, Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 1997), 7-8. 
4 Parks M. Coble, “China’s ‘New Remembering’ of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937-
1945,” The China Quarterly, no. 190 (June 2007): 398. Arthur Waldron, “China’s New 
Remembering of World War II: The Case of Zhang Zizhong,” Modern Asian Studies30, no. 4 
(October 1996): 945-978. 
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Chinese accounted for the majority of Harbin’s population before the Japanese 
colonial state, Manchukuo, was established in 1932. Immigrants from other parts of 
China and across the world were pioneers who established the city from scratch. The 
scarcity of an entrenched cultural tradition made this place an inclusive haven for 
dozens of nationalities, who escaped totalitarian regimes and wars and who craved 
chances of earning money. People shared more empathy for than hostility against 
each other.5 Against the backdrop of the search for a better life, the Chinese residents 
barely had a clear sense of nationalism until the 1920s.6 In contrast, today Harbin is a 
provincial city where 99% of the population is Chinese and no longer reflects the 
cosmopolitan aspects caused by Russian colonialism and Japanese occupation. 
Chinese history has been reinscribed to legitimize the communist party’s rule over 
Harbin.  
This discontinuity makes inevitable the contestation over the city’s identity. A 
fundamental question is “What cultures does Harbin embody?” To some extent, the 
modern city of Harbin is comparable to a child born of a Russian mother, with a 
cosmopolitan gene, changed later to a Chinese citizen. I argue that Harbin’s 
membership within the Chinese national boundaries is not enough to account for the 
                                                                 
5 Sugiyama Kimiko was a Japanese born in Harbin in 1928. In her memoir, she recalls that “During a 
tension of the Manchurian Incident, a Chinese man helped her father; both men were so far from their 
native places that neither had a clear idea what a country or an ethnicity really was.” Joshua A. Fogel, 
“Integrating into Chinese Society: A Comparison of the Japanese Communities of Shanghai and 
Harbin,” in Japan Competing Modernism: Issues in Culture and Democracy, 1900-1930, ed. Sharon 
Minichiello (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1998), 62; Kimiko Sugiyama, “Harubin no ki: 
watakushi ga doko de mita koto, kangaeta koto (The aura of Harbin: where I saw, what I thought 
about),” Manshuu to Nihonjin (The Manchu and the Japanese), 7 (November 1979): 3-20.  
6 James Carter argues that Chinese nationalism in Harbin grew out of simultaneous opposition to and 
cooperation with the large foreign presence. One illustration he provided is the Donghua School found 
by Harbin’s early nationalists in 1916. See James Carter, Creating a Chinese Harbin, Nationalism in an 
International City 1916-1932 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002), 3. 
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complexity of its identity, given the spectral nature of its international past. To some 
extent, the cultural identity of Harbin is both/neither Chinese, Russian, and 
cosmopolitan.7 It is characterized by a liminal and floating identity, like the culture of 
the postcolonial Hong Kong, which is both/neither British, Chinese, and 
cosmopolitan.8 In the contemporary national agenda of China, memories of the 
cosmopolitan Harbin become secondary. As Wolff argues, “In the borderland, the 
nation-state’s urge to write its own history is revealed at its starkest, battling with 
other national and local narratives.”9 In contrast, the local officials have been using 
the cosmopolitan past to promote its profile since the 1980s. The locals’ submission to 
and rebellion against the national agenda coexist with each other. The examination of 
the locals’ paradoxical perceptions of the city’s identity provides a chance to 
understand the peripheral status of Harbin in relation to the heartland of China, and as 
a cultural and political frontier in relation to Russia and Japan. 
Moreover, the fact that Harbin was the habitat of ethnic minorities of Nüzhen 
and Manchu complicates the understanding of the city’s identity. The current 
promotion of Sinification, together with Europeanization, of Harbin is more than a 
postcolonial reconstruction of its indigenous tradition, because the city’s cultural root 
is by no means Chinese. The Manchu culture is downplayed; only the umbrella term, 
                                                                 
7 Carter argues that “Harbin has never been typically Russian or Chinese at any point in its history. Yet,  
to deny its Russian, or Chinese, or Japanese (or Polish, Korean, Jewish) characteristics is to omit entire 
dimensions of this unique metropolis . Ibid, 4. 
8 See Abbas, Hong Kong, 1-15. Moreover, Yue Meng argues that “The cultural identity of Shanghai is 
found somewhere between semi-colonialism and cosmopolitanism.” This might also be applicable to 
the case of Harbin. Yue Meng, Shanghai and the Edges of Empires (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2006), xi. 
9 Wolff, To the Harbin Station, 3. 
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“Chinese,” is emphasized in the PRC. This dissertation aims to de-territorialize the 
center from the periphery and to deconstruct a homogeneous narrative of Chineseness 
by using the “minor language” of Harbin to “erode the major language” of China.10 
The increasing memorialization of the cosmopolitan and colonial Harbin since 
the 1980s has economic, political, and cultural motives. While each of the three 
aspects are equally important and could not be separated in addressing a memory 
study of Harbin, I give more attention to the political symbolism because it reveals the 
convoluted meanings of the city as both physical and imagined space. I aim to explore 
the power relations involved in the memorialization and representation of the city’s 
past, and the means by which the foreign past of Harbin confronts and redefines 
nation-building in China. 
 
Theoretical Framework: Memory and Space 
“Cultural memory” and “social space” constitute two major concepts of my 
                                                                 
10 Following Deleuze and Guattari, and Manuel Martin-Rodriguez, Lugo argues that the border region 
and border theory can erode the hegemony of the privileged center by de-nationalizing and de-
territorializing the nation/state and culture theory. Alejandro Lugo, “Reflections on Border Theory, 
Culture, and the Nation,” Border Theory: the Limits of Cultural Politics, ed. Scott Michaelsen and 
David E. Johnson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 45; also see Manuel M. Martin-
Rodriguez, “The Global Border: Transnationalism and Cultural Hybridism in Alejandro Morales’s The 
Rag Doll Plagues,” in Alejandro Morales: Fiction Past, Present, Future Perfect , ed. José Antonio 
Gurpegui. (Tempe: Bilingual Review Press, 1996), 86. Moreover, Derrida’s theory of reading and his 
concept of “deconstruction” are also relevant. Derrida tracks “syntactic and semantic ambiguities to 
generate multiple, often conflicting, meanings out of a single utterance… [and sees] signifying force in 
the gaps, margins, digressions, discontinuities, contradictions and ambiguities of a text.” Barbara 
Johnson, “Writing,” in The Princeton Sourcebook in Comparative Literature: from the European 
Enlightenment to the Global, ed. David Damrosch, Natalie Melas, and Mbongiseni Buthelezi 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 236.  
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theoretical framework. This approach is partly inspired by Edward Soja’s notion of 
“the trialectics of spatiality-historicality-sociality.”11 Soja pinpoints “a persistent 
tendency during at least the past century to over-privilege the dynamic relations 
between the ‘making’ of Historicality and the ‘constitution’ of social practices or 
Sociality.”12 Moving from the assumption that spatiality had been peripheralized, 
Soja proposes a method of “thirding-as-Othering” to reassert the importance of 
spatiality. Differing from Soja’s trialectics, the trialectics to be examined in this 
dissertation is that of spatiality-sociality-and-mnemohistoricality, because the term 
“history” as discussed in this dissertation refers to Jan Assmann’s concept of 
“mnemohistory,”13 which is not concerned with the past as such, but only with the 
past as it is remembered. In other words, “history” is “a demand for desire,” in 
Meaghan Morris’s terms.14 Morris argues that “The uncovering of new facts, the 
endless reordering of the immense detail that makes the historian’s map of the past 
may not be quite what I want…Wanting history, I read for the theory and skip the 
facts.”15 Taking these arguments into consideration, this dissertation addresses the 
interconnection between mnemohistory (or simply memory) and space, especially the 
social production of memory in relation to that of space. Due to the fact the former 
                                                                 
11 Edward W. Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places 
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), 10. 
12 Ibid, 71. 
13 Jan Assmann, Moses the Egyptian: the Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1997. 
14 Meaghan Morris, Too Soon Too Late: History in Popular Culture (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1998), 5. Emphasis original. 
15 Morris, Too Soon Too Late, 5; also see Carolyn Steedman, “Culture, Cultural Studies, and the 
Historians,” in Cultural Studies, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler (London: 
Routledge, 1992), 614. 
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scholarship has given more attention to the commercialization of historical legacies in 
contemporary Harbin,16 and that there is a lack of political critique of the city’s past 
in relation to the present, in this dissertation I attach importance to the power 
relations, political symbolisms, and ideologies involved in the social production of 
memorial space and spatial memory in Harbin. 
 
The Theoretical Framework of Memory  
This dissertation adapts Pierre Nora’s concept of les lieux de mémoire (the places of 
memory) as the main theoretical perspective, complemented by Jan Assmann’s notion 
of cultural memory, steering towards a spatialization and culturation of memory in the 
context of a study of Harbin. But before providing a thorough introduction of these 
two concepts, a brief literature review of memory studies since the 19th century is in 
order. This will help situate my discussion of Nora, Assmann, and the memory study 
of Harbin in a conversation with scholars who have addressed similar themes.17 The 
early scholarship devoted to memory reveals a trend of a dialectical understanding of 
its nature: there were debates about memory as collective or individual, as reflection 
of the past or construction of the present, and about the connection or opposition 
                                                                 
16 See Yukiko Koga, “The Double Inheritance: The Afterlife of Colonial Modernity in the Cities of 
Former ‘Manchuria’” PhD diss., Columbia University, 2008; Yukiko Koga, Inheritance of Loss: China, 
Japan, and the Political Economy of Redemption after Empire . Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2016.  
17 For literature review of memory studies in earlier times, see Raphael Samuel, Theaters of Memory: 
Past and Present in Contemporary Culture Vol.1 (London: Verso, 1994), vii. Moreover, Li Li’s book 
has a thorough literature review of memory studies. Li Li, Memory, Fluid Identity, and the Politics of 
Remembering: the Representations of the Chinese (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 2-7. 
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between memory and history. By figuring out the limit of such a dialectical 
understanding of memory, this dissertation examines les lieux de mémoire of Harbin 
as overlapping territories in terms of time, space, individuality and sociality. It 
proposes breaking the dialectical understanding of memory by foregrounding the 
approach of thirding-as-Othering, in order to interrogate the liminality of memory.  
  In his erudite work On Collective Memory, Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945) 
highlights the importance of social contexts in shaping memory. He argues that “it is 
in society that people normally acquire memories. It is also in society that people 
recall, recognize, and localize their memories.”18 In contrast, Henri Bergson (1859-
1941) thought of memory as a purely subjective phenomenon,19 grounded in the 
particularities of personal experience.20 David Gross criticizes Halbwachs for his 
overstatement of social memory, “as if the memories of any particular individual were 
nothing more than an extension of social memory.”21 Andreas Huyssen argues that 
Halbwachs’s sociological approach to memory is not adequate to come to “grasp the 
current dynamic of media and temporality, memory, lived time, and forgetting.”22 On 
the other hand, Jeffrey Olick’s notions of mnemonic products and practices provide an 
                                                                 
18 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 38. 
19 Lawrence D. Kritzman, “In Remembrance of Things French,” in Realms of Memory: Rethinking the 
French Past, by Pierre Nora. Trans. Arthur Goldhammer. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), xi. 
20 David Middleton and Steven D. Brown, The Social Psychology of Experience: Studies in 
Remembering and Forgetting (London: Sage, 2005), 7. 
21 David Gross, Lost Time: On Remembering and Forgetting in Late Modern Culture  (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts, 2000), 84. 
22 Andreas Huyssen, Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 17. 
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alternative approach to eschew the opposition between collective memory and 
individual memory. According to Olick,  
Mnemonic products include stories, rituals, books, statues, speeches, 
images, et cetera, and mnemonic practices incorporate recall, 
representation, celebration, renunciation, disavowal, and many others. 
Mnemonic practices are always simultaneously individual and social. 
Mnemonic products gain their reality only by being used, interpreted, 
and reproduced or changed. To focus on collective memory as a variety 
of products and practices is thus to reframe the antagonism between 
individualist and collectivist approaches to memory more productively 
as a matter of moments in a dynamic process.23 
Astrid Erll’s notion of cultural memory is also helpful to reassess the relationship 
between collective memory and individual memory. She defines cultural memory as 
an umbrella term that comprises “social memory,” “material or media memory,” and 
“mental or cognitive memory.”24 All three aspects are interconnected and mutually 
influenced; they are practiced both individually and collectively.  
Susannah Radstone pinpoints the difference in understanding memory between 
modern and late modern times. She argues that “memory’s late modern associations 
with fantasy, subjectivity, invention, the present, representation and fabrication appear 
to outweigh its modern associations with history, community, tradition, the past, 
reflection and authenticity.”25 Memory is now understood as actively produced.26 
According to Radstone, “equivocations and liminality” are the main features of 
contemporary research on memory. Memory work occupies the liminal space 
                                                                 
23 Jeffrey Olick, “From Collective Memory to the Sociology of Mnemonic Practice and Products,” 
Cultural Memory Studies, ed. Astrid Erll, Ansgar Nünning and Sara Young (Berlin: De Gruyter, Inc., 
2008), 158; also see Li Li, Memory, Fluid Identity, and the Politics of Remembering , 7. 
24 Astrid Erll, Ansgar Nünning, and Sara Young, eds. Cultural Memory Studies (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
Inc., 2008), 4. 
25 Susannah Radstone, Memory and Methodology (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 9. 
26 Ibid.,7. Emphasis original. 
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“between forgetting and transformation,” “between identity and its transformation or 
‘re-membering’.”27 In this sense, memory entails more reproduction than reflection. 
The transformation of remembering into “re-membering” involves power control and 
resistance. It is the construction, if not manipulation, of “re-membering” by those in 
power that endows collective memory with a political bent, and offers chances for 
collective memory to become an arena of power and ideological contest.  
In regard to the relationship between history and memory, Halbwachs conceives 
of history as abstract, totalizing, and “dead,” and of memory as particular, meaningful, 
and “lived.”28 Similarly, Nora suggests that history and memory are opposed to each 
other, as the former is mediated, and the latter experienced.29 History considers the 
past to be past— something unrelated to the present. Only memory keeps the past 
alive.30 Erll proposes to dissolve the opposition between history and memory in favor 
of a notion of different “modes of remembering” in culture, considering that the past 
is not given, but continually re-constructed and re-presented.31 How to remember is 
as important as what to remember. Walter Benjamin addresses the question of “how” 
by highlighting memory as an affective experience. He argues that “Memory is not an 
instrument that we use to explore the static past. Instead, it is a theater of the past, a 
dynamic medium of experience imbued with drama and feeling, and invigorated by 
                                                                 
27 Ibid., 12-13. 
28 Erll, Nünning, and Young, Cultural Memory Studies, 6. 
29 Marc Andre Matten, ed., Places of Memory in Modern China: History, Politics, and Identity 
(Leiden: Brill, 2012), 2-3. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Erll, Nünning, and Young, Cultural Memory Studies, 7. 
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the inherently human capacity for narrative creation.”32 In this sense, memory and 
history are not in a dialectical opposition between subject and object, the dynamic and 
the static, the alive and the dead. They are in constant interaction and mutual 
construction.  
Les Lieux de mémoire is a seven-volume work edited by the French historian 
Pierre Nora. The contributors articulated a nationalist concern over the rapid 
disappearance of French national memory and proposed a pluralist understanding of 
memory.33 In the Grand Robert Dictionary, lieu de mémoire means “a significant 
unit, either material or ideal, which the will of people or the effect of time have turned 
into a symbolic element of a given community.”34 Les lieux de mémoire do not have 
to be physical places; they could be historical figures, monuments and buildings, 
literary and artistic objects, emblems, commemorations and symbols.35 Les lieu de 
mémoire are expected to meet two conditions: they should be symbols and they 
should show a will to remember. For instance, “An archive is a material site that 
becomes a lieu de mémoire only if imagination invests it with a symbolic aura; a 
textbook, will, or veteran’s group is a purely functional object that becomes a lieu de 
mémoire only when it becomes part of a ritual.”36 A will to remember is 
                                                                 
32 Yiwei Chen, “Reconstructing the Reality: Unwanted Memory in the Courtroom,” in  
Memory and Representation: Constructed Truths and Competing Realities, ed. Dena Elisabeth Eber 
and Arthur G. Neal (Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 2001), 87; also 
see Steven Jay Lynn and David G. Payne, “Memory as the Theater of the Past: the Psychology of False 
Memories,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 6, no.3 (1997): 55. 
33 Li Li, Memory, Fluid Identity, and the Politics of Remembering , 5. 
34 Peter Carrier, “Places, Politics and the Archiving of Contemporary Memory in Pierre Nora’s Les 
Lieux de mémoire,” in Memory and Methodology, ed. Susannah Radstone (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 41. 
35 Lawrence D. Kritzman, “In Remembrance of Things French,”  x. 
36 Ibid., 14. 
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indispensable, for “without an intent to remember, lieux de mémoire would be lieux 
d’histoire.”37 
Nora insists that the significance of places of memory lies in “the presence of the 
past within the present”38 or that of memory itself as “the administration of the past in 
the present.”39 Nora’s approach is characterized less by an interest in “‘what actually 
happened’ than in its perpetual reuse and misuse, its influence on successive 
presents.”40 “A history is neither a resurrection nor a reconstruction…but a 
‘rememoration,’ history of the second degree.”41 Raphael Samuel criticizes Nora’s 
approach as an expression of a coercive national memory of France.42 Gérard Namer 
defends Nora by claiming that “the French national memory conveyed by Les Lieux 
de mémoire does not imply homogeneity or coercion, but openness to new 
configurations and combinations of coexisting memories.”43 Les lieux de mémoire 
embody contradictory features of totality and fragmentation in representing national 
and regional memories. 
According to Jan Assmann, communicative memory and cultural memory are 
two important components of collective memory.44 Communicative memory is 
                                                                 
37 Ibid., 15. 
38 Carrier, “Places, Politics and the Archiving,” 42; Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les 
Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations26, (Spring 1989):20; Pierre Nora, “Entre mémoire et histoire. La 
Problématique des lieux,” Les Lieux de mémoire, I. LaRépublique (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), XXXVII. 
39 Carrier, “Places, Politics and the Archiving,” 42; Pierre Nora, “Comment écrire l'histoire de 
France?” Les Lieux de mémoire, III. Les France 1 (Paris, Gallimard, 1993), 25. Nora’s concept here is 
similar to Assmann’s “mnemohistory.” 
40 Nora, Realms of Memory, XXIV. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Carrier, “Places, Politics and the Archiving,” 39; Raphael Samuel, Theaters of Memory: Past and 
Present in Contemporary British Culture (London: Verso, 1994), 11. 
43 Carrier, “Places, Politics and the Archiving,” 40; Gérard Namer, Mémoire et société (Paris: 
Klincksieck, 1987), 26.  
44 Irmy Schweiger, “chuangshang lishi yu jiti jiyi—zuowei jiaoliuxing jiyi he wenhua jiyide wenxue, 
(Traumatic history and collective memory – communicative and cultural memory in literature),” 
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characterized by “its proximity to everyday life, thematic instability, 
disorganization,…lasting no more than four generations.”45 In contrast, cultural 
memory is “a fixed point, referring to fateful events of the past, whose memory is 
maintained through cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional 
communication (recitation, practice, observance).”46 Assmann calls these means of 
constructing cultural memory “figures of memory.”47 Although cultural memory is a 
fixed point, “every contemporary context relates to it differently, sometimes by 
appropriation, sometimes by criticism, sometimes by preservation or by 
transformation.”48 Assmann suggests that “cultural memory exists in two modes: 
first, in the mode of potentiality of the archive whose accumulated texts, images, and 
rules of conduct act as a total horizon; and second, in the mode of actuality, whereby 
each contemporary context puts the objectivized meaning into its own perspective, 
giving its own relevance.”49 
Regarding Nora and Assmann’s fundamental concepts, I attach importance to les 
lieux de mémoire as a symbol and a will to remember. Among the major questions to 
be examined are “whose will to remember (or forget) what, and why?” and “who 
endows the place of memory with what symbolic meaning?” The lieu de mémoire 
used in this dissertation, is a hybrid and liminal space, “compounded of the temporal 
                                                                 
Tsinghua Journal of Chinese Literature 13 (June 2015): 288; also see Jan Assmann, “Collective 
Memory and Cultural Identity,” trans. John Czaplicka, New German Critique, no.65 (Spring - Summer 
1995): 132. 
45 Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,”126-128.  
46 Ibid., 129. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 130. 
49 Ibid. 
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and the eternal, the collective and the individual,”50 “neither simply sentimental nor 
ethnological,” creating “the possibility for intervention,” transformation and “re-
membrance.”51 By examining different places of memory, including architecture, 
literature, film, and television drama, I aim to address how tangible, written, and 
visual memories perform, individually and collectively, fragmentally yet consistently, 
in defining “the imagined community” of Harbin.52 
 I explore how les lieux de mémoire evoke heterogeneous memories within “the 
all-encompassing (though elusive) banner of” Harbiness,53 and how it redefines a 
stereotypical hypothesis of a homogeneous Chineseness. As Xudong Zhang argues, 
“It remains an unchallenged habit – both inside and outside China – to view 
everything in the PRC through the imagined totality of the government and its official 
politics and rhetoric.”54 It is important to problematize this habit and unravel the 
complexity of Chineseness. Among the scholarship that has addressed this issue is 
that of Lin Chun, Rey Chow, and Yingjin Zhang. In The Transformation of Chinese 
Socialism, Lin Chun dispels the illusions that “The labels ‘China’ and ‘Chinese’ 
signify static, uniform entities.” Instead, he examines the “unevenness, fragmentation, 
and diversities” of China.55 Rey Chow points out the inadequacy of “the act of 
pluralizing,” and “the poststructuralist theoretical move of splitting and multiplying a 
                                                                 
50 Nora, Realms of Memory, 15. 
51 Radstone, Memory and Methodology, 15. 
52 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
London: Verso, 1991. 
53 Carrier, “Places, Politics and the Archiving,” 37; Li, Memory, Fluid Identity, and the Politics of 
Remembering, 5. 
54 Xudong Zhang, Postsocialism and Cultural Politics: China in the Last Decade of the Twentieth 
Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 27. 
55 Lin Chun, The Transformation of Chinese Socialism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 16.  
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monolithic identity from within.”56 Yingjin Zhang, in his examination of Chinese 
national cinema, proposes examining “the ‘national’ as historically constructed, 
circulated, and contested.”57 By adopting Zhang’s and others’ approaches, this 
dissertation examines the memories of Harbin in relation to China in a historical 
process of evolution. This method also trumps the criticism that Ann Rigney made 
against Nora’s notion of lieu de mémoire. Rigney argues that le lieu de mémoire is 
rigid and static; she stresses the shift from “memory sites as such to the cultural 
dynamics in which they function.”58 By adopting a chronological approach, this 
dissertation reveals the memory sites of Harbin in a process of (re)construction, 
continuation, and transformation. 
Secondly, this dissertation applies Assmann’s notion of cultural memory existing 
in the mode of actuality. His approach of contextualizing memory inspires me to 
explore not memory per se, but how and why particular memory is provoked or 
erased. Examining the historical, political, and cultural contexts, in which the places 
of memory come into being, opens the way to understanding how these places relate 
to the creation of Harbin’s collective identity; and, further, to revealing the various 
power relations and ideological significations that contribute to the construction of the 
                                                                 
56 Yingjin Zhang, Chinese National Cinema (New York: Routledge, 2004), 4; Rey Chow, 
“Introduction: On Chineseness as a Theoretical Problem,” Boundary 2 25, no.3 (1998): 24. 
57 Zhang, Chinese National Cinema, 5. 
58 Mihaela Irimia, Dragoș Manea, and Andreea Paris, Literature and Cultural Memory (Leiden: Brill, 
2017), 100; Ann Rigney, “The Dynamics of Remembrance: Texts Between monumentality and 
morphing,” Cultural Memory Studies, ed. Astrid Erll, Ansgar Nünning, and Sara Young (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, Inc., 2008), 345. 
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space, memory, and identity of Harbin.59 
 
The Theoretical Framework of Space  
In this dissertation, the notion of space is based on Henri Lefebvre’s concept of social 
space, especially its two layers of connotations. Firstly, social space encompasses 
both physical (the perceived) and mental (the conceived) space. It is both real and 
imagined. Secondly, social space is a social production and a network of social 
relations. 
According to Lefebvre, “The fields we are concerned with are, first, the physical-
nature, the Cosmos; secondly, the mental, including logical and formal abstractions; 
and thirdly, the social. In other words, we are concerned with logico-epistemological 
space, the space of social practice, the space occupied by sensory phenomena, 
including products of the imagination such as projects and projections, symbols, and 
utopias.”60 According to Soja, “Social space takes on two different qualities. It serves 
both as a separable field, distinguishable from physical and mental space, and/also as 
an approximation for an all-encompassing mode of spatial thinking.”61 
Lefebvre opens the way to a trialectics of spatiality, insisting that each mode of 
thinking about space — the physical, the mental, the social — be seen as 
simultaneously real and imagined, concrete and abstract, material and metaphorical. 
                                                                 
59 Matten’s edited book adopts Nora’s  lies leux de mémoire as the theoretical approach to examine the 
relationship between geographical places and collective identity in China. See Matten, Places of 
Memory in Modern China. 
60 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1991), 11-12; Soja, Thirdspace, 62. Emphasis original.  
61 Soja, Thirdspace, 62. 
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No one mode of spatial thinking is inherently privileged or better than the others as 
long as each remains open to the re-combination and simultaneities of the ‘real-and-
imagined.’62 Based on Lefebvre’s argument, Soja suggests thirding-as-Othering as an 
alternative perspective, to extend the understanding of the traditional dualism between 
material and mental space. Soja proposes the concept of “Thirdspace,” which is 
analogous to Lefebvre’s “social space,” to emphasize thirding as a means of a 
postmodern thinking of space. 
Lefebvre’s social space and Soja’s Thirdspace correspond to James Donald’s 
notion of city, as conceptual and personal, as both a state of mind and thingness.63  
Donald’s notion of city “is an imaginary space created and animated as much by the 
urban representation to be found in novels, films, and images as by any actual urban 
places.” According to Donald, “We never experience the city unmediated. The city 
we experience – the city as state of mind – is always already symbolized and 
metaphorised.”64 
Many scholars deem space as a dynamic process rather than a static being. 
Lefebvre defines space as a social production composed of social relations. For 
Lefebvre, lived space is a symbolic space; it is vitally filled with politics and ideology, 
with capitalism, racism, and other material spatial practices that concretize the social 
relations of production, reproduction, exploitation, domination, and subjection.65 De 
Certeau defines space as composed of intersections of mobile elements; space is a 
                                                                 
62 Ibid., 62, 64, 65. 
63 Ibid., x, 8.  
64 James Donald, Imagining the Modern City (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 17.  
65 Soja, Thirdspace, 68. 
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practiced place; there are as many spaces as there are distinct spatial experiences.66 
Benjamin pays attention to the uniqueness and multiplicity of individual buildings and 
persons and makes it possible to conceptualize the city, not as a single monolithic 
space but as many places, constructed through use and experience.67 Doreen Massey 
deems space as “constructed out of social relations.” She extends this argument by 
saying that “since social relations are inevitably and everywhere imbued with power 
and meaning and symbolism, this view of the spatial is as an ever-shifting social 
geometry of power and signification.”68  
By adopting Massey’s, Lefebvre’s, and others’ arguments, this dissertation 
focuses not on the things in space but the social production of space as a process. I 
examine the powers, meanings, ideologies, and symbolism embodied in the social 
relations that engage in producing the social space of Harbin. Meanwhile, the 
interconnection between the real and the imagined (specifically, in architecture, 
literature, film, and television drama) provides a platform to examine Harbin, neither 
merely as a geographical place, nor only as a representation or figment of the 
imagination, but as both. Harbin in this dissertation is liminal, thirding, and at the 
edge of spatial and temporal overlapping territories.69 
                                                                 
66 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 117-118. In contrast, de Certeau defines place as “the 
order in accord with which elements are distributed in relationships of coexistence.” Place implies 
stability, whereas space does not. “The street geometrically defined by urban planning is transformed 
into a space by walkers.”  
67 Deborah Stevenson, Cities and Urban Cultures (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2003), 66. 
68 Doreen Massey, Space, Place, and Gender (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 3. 
69 Edward Said uses this term to emphasize that the culture of the US was actually formed by two 
parts: the literature of the colonized and that of the colonizer. Yue Meng uses this term to refer to th e 
overlapping territories in Shanghai between the Qing Empire and Western Imperialism, and between 
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Methodological Framework: Translation, Intertextuality, and Articulation 
I compare the city of Harbin to a “text,” a site of translations from the colonial and 
cosmopolitan Harbin to the postcolonial and post-socialist one. I also compare Harbin 
to a site of “intertextuality” among different art forms. Notions such as text, 
intertextuality, and translation are utilized metaphorically, instead of referring only to 
literary texts.70 This way, I “read” the textures and textuality of landscapes, cities, 
façades,71 as well as films, television dramas, and literature. Textuality, in Roland 
Barthes’ sense, is “the manifestation of open-ended, heterogeneous, disruptive force 
of signification and erasure that transgresses all closure.”72 To decipher the 
ambivalent and multifaceted meanings of Harbin as a text, I focus on examining “the 
text’s social articulation,”73 the diverse discourses and practices that confront and 
interact with each other in the production of meaning, while bearing in mind the 
umbrella notion of Harbiness. According to Stuart Hall, this approach aims to 
                                                                 
two or more types of histories. I use this term to refer to the temporally overlapping territories of 
Harbin between the colonial past and postcolonial present and, spatially, between the real and the 
imagined Harbin. See Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 
xxv; Yue Meng, Shanghai and the Edges of Empires, xii, 150; Samuel, Raphael. Theaters of Memory: 
Past and Present in Contemporary British Culture . London and New York: Verso, 1994.   
70 See Lydia H. Liu, Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity-
China, 1900-1937. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. 
71 Karl Schlögel, “History Takes Place – Problems of a Topographically Sensitive Historiography.” 
Paper presented at the seminar “Why People like to live in Cities,” (The Hague: November 2009), 6. 
72 Johnson, “Writing,” 229. Barthes suggests that “work” and “text” are two different ways of viewing 
the written word. Unlike work, a text is an open, infinite process that is both meaning -generating and 
meaning-subverting.  
73 Lawrence Grossberg, “History, Politics and Postmodernism: Stuart Hall and Cultural Studies,” in 
Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, ed. David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 157. 
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“conceptualize the specificity of different practices (analytically distinguished, 
abstracted out), without losing its grip on the ensemble which they constitute.”74 
Moreover, Hall emphasizes the importance of a “reading of those linkages [among 
discourses] and how they articulate, at specific times and places, interests, 
subjectivities, and social forces.”75 Hall’s method of articulation refers to mapping 
unity in difference and contextual analysis. By adopting Hall’s approach, in this 
dissertation I explore the connections between the architectural, literary, and 
cinematic narratives of the city’s pasts and the various factors involved in the social 
production of memorial space and spatial memory in Harbin.  
 By adopting Barthes’ concepts of dissection and articulation, I organize my 
analysis in two simultaneous steps: de-composing (dissection) and re-composing 
(articulation). By de-composing, I mean the dissection of the practices, perceptions, 
and discourses involved in each case of my selected seven lieux de mémoire, in order 
to reveal the power relations, ideological apparatus, social and economic mechanisms 
underlying these phenomena. By re-composing, I aim to reveal a totality that 
encompasses the seven dissections, and to unveil or produce new meanings of the text 
named “Harbin,” which otherwise could have been ignored. In this way, I suggest a  
                                                                 
74 Jennifer Daryl Slack, “The Theory and Method of Articulation in Cultural Studies,” in Stuart Hall: 
Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, ed. David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen (London: Routledge, 
1996), 122; Stuart Hall, “Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms,” Media, Culture and Society 2, no. 1 
(1980): 69. 
75 Radstone, “Reconceiving Binaries: The Limits of Memory,” in The Politics of Cultural Memory, ed. 
Lucy Burke, Simon Faulkner and Jim Aulich (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 27; 
John Trimbur, “Articulation Theory and the Problem of Determination: A Reading of Lives on the 
Boundary.” Journal of Advanced Composition  13, no. 1(Winter 1993): 33-50. 
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rethinking of the collective memory of Harbin, not as created from the “top” by 
officials only, but as from “within” by the diverse practices of the people (including 
officials, among many others).  
Inspired by Bakhtin, Richard Bauman takes intertextuality to be discursive 
practice and the relational orientation of a text to other texts.76 By adopting Bauman’s 
approach, I read Harbin as a site of intertextuality, amongst the spatial practices of 
architecture, literature, films and television dramas. These various practices 
demonstrate, individually and collectively, the social signification of the city’s pasts in 
the present. How does each spatial practice tell a similar or different story of Harbin? 
And how do they interact and work together to enrich the city with meanings of 
ambivalence and contradiction, open to multiple interpretations? By delineating and 
comparing the production, interpretation and consumption of the “city text” from 
these cultural forms, I aim to map a Harbin that exists as an in-between space, 
haunted by layers of real and imagined past.  
Moreover, these diverse places of memories are sites of power contestation, such 
as those between the government and the public, or between those who are nostalgic 
for a cosmopolitan Harbin and those who emphasize the Chinese tradition of the city. 
To decipher the underlying power contention behind the memory phenomena in 
Harbin, I adopt Robert Young’s notion of translation, which refers to a practice of 
                                                                 
76 Richard Bauman, A World of Others’ Words: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Intertextuality 
(Malden: Blackwell Pub., 2004), 4; Mikhail M.Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, ed. 
Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Trans. Vern McGee (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 
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empowerment and disempowerment. According to Young, “Translation involves 
questions of power relations, and of forms of domination.”77 Young suggests that a 
colony begins as a translation, a copy of an original that is located elsewhere on the 
map. The colonized person is in the condition of being a translated man or woman.78 
In Young’s analysis of the psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, Fanon’s action of provoking the 
agency of patients in the hospital at Blida-Joinville is interpreted as “translating the 
patients from passive, victimized objects into subjects who began to recognize that 
they were in charge of their own destiny.”79 
In this dissertation I examine the translation of Russian, Japanese, and Chinese 
cultural legacies into the contemporary city of Harbin. Histories and memories matter 
as semiotic reservoirs for cultural translation and resignification. The empowerment 
and disempowerment of translation are implied in spatial practices concerning 
architectural preservation and demolition, and in cultural productions devoted to the 
city’s history. The mistranslation and misinterpretation denote resistance to a colonial 
history and the efforts to reinvent a Chinese history for Harbin. The “assimilative 
cultural sympathy” with Russian legacies, and the “agonistic cultural clash”80 with 
the Japanese legacies, suggest political and ideological rationale behind cultural 
                                                                 
77 Robert Young, Postcolonialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 140. 
Other sources that investigate the relationship between (post)colonialism, translation and power include  
Susan Bassnett and Harish Trivedi, eds. Post-Colonial Translation: Theory and Practice. London: 
Routledge, 1999; Tejaswini Niranjana, Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism, and the 
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78 Ibid., 139-140. 
79 Ibid., 144. 
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practices. Memories become an arena for the contemporary Harbiners to negotiate the 
divergent ideologies and economic and cultural concerns. The past exists in the 
present as a phantom, a contention of power, and a symbolic capital to serve the 
political and economic interests of those in power. The city itself is a palimpsest, a 
text which has experienced and is experiencing a process of being “rewritten,” 
translated, and resignified. In this process the text of Harbin becomes “a discursively 
organized system of power relations.”81 
 
A Historical Introduction of Harbin  
As James Carter argues, “Harbin’s past is not the province of any single nation or 
people. It is a city that grew up on the geographical and temporal frontier. It was 
located in space on the edge of Chinese, Russian, and Japanese spheres of influence. 
It began existence near the violent ends of imperial Russia and China and the equally 
violent beginning of expansionist Japan.”82 Due to its special location and birth at a 
turbulent historical time, the city was doomed to be contested amongst the three 
nations and many other Western powers.83 Located on the outlying border beyond the 
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reach of Han culture, the dominant culture of ancient China, the Harbin area was 
sparsely inhabited by ethnic minorities of Nüzhen from the twelfth century A.D., and 
later by the Manchu from the seventeenth century A.D.84 Harbin did not grow into a 
city until the end of the nineteenth century, when the Russians came to build the 
Chinese Eastern Railway (the CER). Despite the nominal railway concession, the 
major part of Harbin became a de facto colony of Russian empire from 1900 to 1917, 
before the October Revolution broke out.85 In 1907, Harbin became an open port. 
Around 200,000 immigrants from forty countries inhabited Harbin.86 Eighteen 
countries established consulates in Harbin.87 From 1907 to 1917, although Russia 
was still the leading power, its authority was diluted by the international powers and 
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University Press, 1973), 70. 
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Chinese authorities.88 From 1917 to 1931, China gradually restored its sovereignty. 
However, substantial stretches of time during this period were still characterized by a 
co-administration between China and Russia (1920-1924), and between China and the 
Soviet Union (1924-1931). From 1932 to 1945, Harbin was under the Japanese 
colonial control, in the puppet state of Manchukuo.89 In January, 1946, after the 
Soviet invasion of Manchukuo and the fall of Japan in World War II, the Chinese 
government restored its sovereignty over Harbin.90 
According to Mary Louise Pratt, “contact zone” refers to “the space of colonial 
encounters, the space in which peoples, geographically and historically separated, 
come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving 
conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict.”91 Harbin was a 
contact zone, in which Russia, China, and Japan “experienced periods of passing 
dominance,”92 and in which the international communities also played an important 
role in containing either of the three from growing into a dominant power. Harbin was 
an arena among many nations, and it belonged to, in Wolff’s term, “competitive 
colonialism.”93 
                                                                 
88 Isabella Jackson addresses a similar case in Shanghai, where the de facto colonial administration by 
the British was situated in the International Concession. Jackson calls the case in Shanghai 
“transnational colonialism.” See Isabella Jackson, Shaping Modern Shanghai: Colonialism in China’s 
Global City. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.  
89 The complexiticy of the notion of Manchukuo and the different understandings of Manchukuo 
amongst scholars in China, Japan, and Western Countries will be addressed later.  
90 Harbin Gazetteer Compiling Committee, Haerbin shizhi zongshu (Harbin: Heilongjiang People’s 
Press, 2000), 48. 
91 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation  (London: Routledge, 1992), 
6.  
92 Wolff, To the Harbin Station, 2. 
93 Ibid.  
26 
 
The competition between Russia and Japan over the occupation of Manchuria 
grew intense in the late nineteenth century. Japan’s victory in the first Sino-Japanese 
War in 1895 rewarded it with the concession of the Liaodong Peninsula in Northeast 
China. The Triple Intervention initiated by Russia, together with Germany and France, 
forced Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula to China. The assistance of Russia in 
defending this territory against Japanese encroachment put Russia in a position to be 
perceived as China’s ally. In May, 1896, Tsar Nicolas II’s coronation took place. Li 
Hongzhang, the Qing China’s chief diplomat, was formally invited to attend the 
ceremony. During the ceremony, the Russian Finance Minister Sergei Iulevich Witte 
proposed to borrow land in Northeast China to build the CER. On June 3, 1896, after 
a series of negotiations between Witte and Li Hongzhang and a 3,000,000-ruble bribe 
for Li Hongzhang himself, a Russo-Chinese treaty of alliance was signed by Li, Witte, 
and the Russian Foreign Minister, Prince A.B. Lobanov-Rostovskii.94 With this 
treaty, Russia and China allied in defense of each other, against further Japanese 
intervention; China allowed Russia to build its railway through the areas of 
Heilongjiang and Jilin to reach Vladivostok. 
 On September 8, 1896, a contract was signed in Berlin between the Chinese 
government and the Russo-Chinese Bank, stipulating that “the CER Company, 
organized by the Russo-Chinese Bank, would construct and operate the railway.”95 
The Qing government defined the CER as a commercial enterprise run cooperatively 
by Russia and China, and insisted on China’s sovereignty over the CER zone. 
                                                                 
94 Ibid., 6. 
95 Ibid. 
27 
 
However, in reality, the CER was run predominantly by the Russians. “Funding, much 
of it from France and Belgium, was channeled through the Russo-Chinese Bank, but 
the controlling shares rested securely in the vaults of the Russian Finance Ministry.”96 
The co-administration of the CER was a “polite myth rarely discussed by either side” 
before 1917.97 The CER zone was a de facto “country within another county.”98 
On April 23, 1898 a group of seventy-seven people, under the leadership of 
engineer A. I. Shidlovskii, arrived at Harbin to prepare housing and raw materials for 
the CER construction. They settled in Tianjia shaoguo (the Tian’s Distillery), an 
abandoned liquor factory in Old Harbin, in the present Xiangfang district. The 
construction and operation of the CER attracted increasing numbers of Russians and 
other nationalities, together with Chinese immigrants from the South, because of its 
employment opportunities. Harbin gradually developed into a modern city with 
                                                                 
96 Ibid. Also see Rosemary K. I. Quested, The Russo-Chinese Bank: a Multinational Financial Base of 
Tsarism in China. Birmingham: Department of Russian Language and Literature, University of 
Birmingham, 1977; Boris Aleksandrovich Romanov, Rossiia v Manchzhurii 1892-1906 (Russia in 
Manchuria 1892-1906), trans. Susan Mann Jones. Ann Arbor: J. W. Edwards, Inc. 1952. The Qing 
government invested five million liang (250,000 kilogram) silver in the establishment of the Russo-
Chinese Bank. Harbin Municipal Archive, Haerbin dangan jiyi, 29. The treaty has Russian, Chinese, 
and French versions. “French was used as the language of final arbitration. In article 6 of the treaty, the 
Russian and French texts note that “The company will have the absolute and exclusive right of 
administration of its lands (in the railway zone).” In contrast, in the Chinese text, the word employed 
for administration is  jingli. Jingli is understood as the administration of a business, unlike the word 
guanli, which means political administration. Chiasson, Administering the Colonizer, 22-23; also see 
Heilongjiang Provincial Archive, “Zhongdong tielu hetong (The Chinese Eastern Railway contract),” 
Zhongdong tielu (the Chinese Eastern Railway) (Harbin: Heilongjiang Provincial Archive, 1986), 18;  
John MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919 Vol.1 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1921), 75. The debates over whether the CER was a commercial or political 
entity, whether Harbin was a colony or not, started from this controversial treaty. 
97 Chiasson, Administering the Colonizer, 36. 
98 Li, Shi, and Gao, Harbin shilüe (Brief history of Harbin), 65. 
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dominant Russian culture. The opening of Harbin in 1907 further facilitated the 
internationalization of the city.  
Harbin was mainly composed of two parts, the CER zone and Fu-jiadian. The 
CER zone was mainly inhabited by the Russians and the international communities, 
and was under the administration of the CER before 1917. Dmitrii Khorvat, the Chief 
General of the CER since 1903, was practically the dictator of the railway zone.99 Fu-
jiadian was the adjoining Chinese settlement under Chinese administration. On Oct. 
31, 1905, the Qing China government ratified the decision to establish in Fu-jiadian 
the Binjiang circuit (Binjiang guandao), which was co-terminous with Binjiang 
County.100 A magistrate and a military commander were assigned by the Qing 
government to manage Binjiang County and communicate with the Russian officials 
in the railway zone.101 To some extent, Harbin was a dual city.102 The racial 
segregation between the CER zone and Fu-jiadian is revealed in the following 
statistics.  
                                                                 
99 This is quoted from a report from the U.S. consul. It presented Harbin as virtually a Russian colony 
in China. Carter, Creating a Chinese Harbin, 30; George Hanson, “Political Conditions in North 
Manchuria,” 13-14. United States National Archives -RG59, File 893.00/5420. 
100 Carter, Creating a Chinese Harbin, 22. 
101 Fu-jiadian was not a legitimate part of Harbin until 1932, when the Manchukuo government 
combined Fu-jiadian and other adjacent places into the Great Harbin Area. Fu-jiadian had been 
officially affiliated with Binjiang County. Olga Bakich compared Harbin to the railway zone, a Russian 
city. Olga Bakich, “Harbin, a Russian City in China before 1917,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 28, no. 2 
(1986):136. 
102 James Carter, “A Tale of Two Temples: Nation, Region, and Religious Architecture in Harbin, 
1928-1998,” in Harbin and Manchuria: Place, Space, and Identity , ed. Thomas Lahusen. The South 
Atlantic Quarterly 99, no.1 (Winter 2000): 98-99; Linda Cooke Johnson compares Shanghai to a dual 
city. Shanghai: From Market Town to Treaty Port, 1074-1858. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1995.  
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The CER zone was mainly composed of New Town, Pristan and Old Harbin.103 
In 1913, only one-half of 1% of New Town’s real estate was in Chinese hands.104 
Chinese held 14% of the private land and accounted for 43% of the population in 
Pristan.105 Before the First World War, there were 1,790 Chinese businesses and 
thirty-four foreign businesses in Fu-jiadian.106 According to Dr. Jerzy Sie-Grabowski 
of Warsaw University, born and raised in Harbin with a Chinese father and a Polish-
Russian mother, many Russians who lived in the CER Zone never entered the Chinese 
district during their lifetime.107 
Many White Russians immigrated to Harbin after the October Revolution of 
1917.108 By 1929, the census listed 274,000 Chinese, 28,800 Soviet Russians, and 
314,000 stateless Russians.109 Japanese citizens constituted the third most important 
group in Harbin.110 In 1913, the statistician V.V. Soldatov described Harbin as “a 
composite Russian-Chinese population with a minor admixture of Japanese 
                                                                 
103 Old Harbin was the present Xiangfang district. It was where the Tian’s Distillery was located, and 
the area where the Russians first settled when they arrived in 1898. However, it gradually deteriorated. 
Wolff notes that the population of Old Harbin declined 48% from 1903 to 1912. New Town, Pristan, 
and Fu-jiadian constituted the urban trinity of Harbin. Wolff, To the Harbin Station, 94; Shuangping 
Jin, “Nangangqu zaoqi bufen jianzhu fengge suotan (Exploring the architectural styles of some 
buildings in Nangang district in the early stage),” Nangang wenshi (Nangang literature and art) I, 
(1989): 124; Stat.op., 55, 4; spravochnaia knizhka Kharbina , 7.  
104 Wolff, To the Harbin Station, 92; Stat.op., 8, 55, 57; Chumnye epidemii, table 5b. FO371, carton 
845, f.214, 227. 
105 Wolff, To the Harbin Station, 93. 
106 Fang Shi, Ling Gao, and Shuang Liu, Haerbin eqiaoshi (The history of Russian immigrants in 
Harbin) (Harbin: Heilongjiang People’s Press, 2003), 601. 
107 See Thomas Lahusen’s film Manchurian Sleepwalkers (2017). 
108 According to Clausen and Thogersen (1995), after the 1917 Russian revolution, Harbin remained 
dominated by its White Russian community (1917-1926), while at the same time experiencing growing 
Soviet influence in the years following the 1924 Sino-Soviet treaty concerning the CER. 
The Making of a Chinese City, 23. 
109 Chiasson, Administering the Colonizer, 154; also see Hong Mao, “Haerbin zhong-e renmin 
shenghuo zhuangkuang (Harbin’s Russian and Chinese citizens’ living situation),” Shishi Monthly 1, 
no.2 (1929): 116. 
110 Carter, Creating a Chinese Harbin, 29. 
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subjects,”111 but the Japanese participation in major trading and industrial companies 
gave them disproportionate influence.112 After the victory of Japan in the Russo-
Japanese war in 1905, Japanese business grew quickly in Harbin. “In 1907, both 
Mitsubishi and Matsui opened branches in Harbin. Dozens of smaller companies 
established themselves as well. Japanese schools and cultural organizations also were 
founded, as were a half-dozen Japanese newspapers.”113 In 1923, there were more 
than 500 Japanese businesses; imports from Japan accounted for 60% of the total 
import in Harbin; the exports by the Japanese businessmen in Harbin accounted for 
almost 30% of the total export. From 1924 to 1931, the total investment by the 
Japanese in Harbin was over 60 million yen.114 
This dissertation focuses on the Russian, Chinese, and Japanese communities in 
Harbin. However, this by no means suggests that Harbin was only composed of three 
nationalities. Indeed, the city was inhabited by around forty nationa lities during the 
first three decades of the twentieth century. Jews and Poles were among the major 
ethnic minorities. In 1909, Harbin’s 5,032 Jews constituted 11.5% of the Russians.115 
The Polish residents took up 5.9%.116 Besides, Wolff noted the presence of many 
                                                                 
111 Wolff, To the Harbin Station, 91; Stat.op., 63-64. Brothel keeping remained one of the most 
prominent Japanese activities. There were still alleged to be 1,254 Japanese women and only 529 males 
in the town in 1913. Quested, “Matey” Imperialist, 283. 
112 See Carter, Creating a Chinese Harbin, 29; Fogel, “Integrating into Chinese Society,” 45-69. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Harbin Gazetteer Compiling Committee, Haerbin shizhi zongshu (Harbin city gazetteer overview), 
200. 
115 Wolff, To the Harbin Station, 96-7; Encyclopaedia Judaica, “Irkutsk”; Sta. op., 51, 63. According 
to Li, Fareast Newspaper reported that on January 17, 1919 there were 7500 Jews in Harbin. Shuxiao 
Li, Harebin lishi biannian 1896-1949 (Harbin: Harbin Press, 1986), 82. 
116 Wolff, To the Harbin Station, 97; According to Jerzy Czajewski, “Poles were up to one-third of the 
staff of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) from 1903 to 1925.” He delineates a strong sense of Polish 
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other Russian Imperial “nationalities,” such as Georgians, Latvians, and 
Ukrainians.117 “Armenians, Germans, Russian kulaks, and even gypsies all rush into 
the mad hurly-burly [of Harbin].”118 Twenty eight countries competed for interests in 
Harbin.119 In 1921, the taxation of the Russians in the CER zone accounted for 
61.7%, the Chinese 18.5%, the Japanese 14.5%, the British 2.1%, the French 1.2%, 
the American 0.7%, the Danish 0.4%, and the German 0.4%.120 According to Hong 
Mao, in 1929, there were 3,007 Japanese, 1,350 Koreans, 1,500 Jews, 590 Poles, 160 
English, 150 French and Germans, 150 Latin Americans, 60 Italians, 50 Americans, 
56 Turks, 50 Czechs, 30 Swedes, 30 Dutch, 9 Greeks, 8 Indians, 6 Hungarians, and 3 
Belgians.121 
                                                                 
nationalism in Harbin. For example, Polish aviators Boleslaw Orlinski and Leonard Kubiak were 
enthusiastically greeted by the local Poles when they landed at Harbin in 1926. After Orlinski returned 
to Poland, he often said, “Where you look for the spirit of Poland, go to Harbin to feel it.”  Jerzy 
Czajewski, “Gospoda Polska Association in Harbin 1907-1947,” Foreigners in China Magazine, no.2 
(April 2018): 90. Moreover, Thomas Lahusen argues that the Poles were both “colonizers” of the 
Manchurians and “the colonized” by the Russian Empire. See  Thomas Lahusen, “Colonized 
Colonizers: Poles in Manchuria,” in Crossed Histories: Manchuria in the Age of Empire, ed. Mariko 
Tamanoi (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2005): 150-164. 
117 Wolff, To the Harbin Station, 220; TsGADV 577: I, 2, 126. 
118 Wolff, To the Harbin Station, 115; also see V.I. Nemirovich-Danchenko, Na voinu. Moscow, 1904. 
119 Harbin Gazetteer Compiling Committee, Haerbin shizhi zongshu, 199. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Chiasson, Administering the Colonizer, 256; Mao, “Haerbin zhong-e renmin,”115-123. According 
to Mariko Asano Tamanoi, in the census of the city of Harbin, the “Manchukuoans” refers to “Han 
Chinese and Manchus,” and is only one among 32 categories; the population census for the city of 
Harbin, compiled by the Manchukuoan Police Department in 1933, includes the following categories: 
the Manchukuoans, Taiwanese, Soviets, Soviets without nationalities, Japanese from Japan proper, 
Japanese Koreans, British, American, German, French, Italian, Polish, Jew, Greek, Dutch, Turk, 
Austrian, Hungarian, Dane, Latvian, Portuguese, Czech, Armenian, Belgian, Serb, Swede, Latin, 
Romanian, Swiss, Indian, and other. Mariko Asano Tamanoi, ‘‘Knowledge, Power, and Racial 
Classifications: The ‘Japanese’ in ‘Manchuria,’” The Journal of Asian Studies 59, no.2 (2000): 255-6; 
also see Dai Harubin An Nai-Sha, ed., Dai Harubin An’nai. Harbin: Dai Harubin An’nai-sha, 1933; 
Thomas Lahusen, “Remembering China, Imagining Israel: the Memory of Difference,” in Harbin and 
Manchuria: Place, Space, and Identity, ed. Thomas Lahusen. The South Atlantic Quarterly 99, no.1 
(Winter 2000): 254. 
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During the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks tried to overthrow Khorvat’s 
leadership of the CER. The fight between the Bolsheviks and the White Russians 
made the public order in the CER zone chaotic. The Chinese officials used this as an 
opportunity to restore Chinese sovereignty. The Bolshevik soldiers were expelled out 
of Harbin on December 26, 1917. This was the first time the Chinese came into power 
in the CER Zone. The Tsarist military power over the CER came to an end.122 After 
this incident, Khorvat was still the General of the CER, but the CER gradually 
reverted into an economic enterprise, rather than a camouflaged institute for colonial 
administration. 
On October 31, 1920, the Beijing government established the Special District of 
the Three Eastern Provinces (dongsansheng tebiequ), to replace the Russian-
controlled CER concession. The local warlord Zhang Zuolin was the de facto leader 
of the Special District. From 1920 to 1924, the Special District “left most of the 
Russian institutions intact but inserted a new Chinese supervisory class.”123 In 1924, 
according to the Beijing Treaty and the Shenyang Treaty, the CER began to be co-
administrated by China and the Soviet Union.124 In 1926, the Beijing government 
dismissed the Russian-controlled Harbin municipality. On July 10, 1929, Zhang 
Xueliang (the effective ruler of Northeast China, after the assassination of his father 
                                                                 
122 Quested, “Matey” Imperialist, 325. 
123 Chiasson, Administering the Colonizer, 44. 
124 Beijing Treaty refers to the Agreement on the General Principles for the Settlement of Questions 
between the Republic of China and the USSR; its official name is zhong-e jiejue xuanan dagang 
xieding (The Sino-Russian outline agreement for resolving outstanding cases). Shenyang Treaty refers 
to the Agreement between the Government of the Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces of the 
Republic of China and the Government of the USSR; its official name is feng-e xieding (The agreement 
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Zhang Zuolin by the Japanese in June, 1928) began to restore Chinese sovereignty of 
the CER by force, but failed during the military confrontation with the Soviet army. 
As a result, the two sides signed the Khabarovsk Protocol, on December 22, 1929, and 
restored the co-administration by China and the Soviet Union. This only lasted until 
the Japanese intervention in 1932. From 1932 to 1945, the Imperial Japanese Army 
occupied Harbin under the puppet regime of Manchukuo. In February, 1935, the 
Soviets sold the CER to the Japanese, at the price of 140 million yen. “Several 
thousand Russians [and other nationalities] left Manchuria in the late 1920s and the 
1930s. By the end of the 1930s, the Russian population of Harbin had dropped to 
around 30,000.”125 After the Soviet Union’s entry into Manchuria in 1945, the Soviet 
soldiers took over Harbin on September 25, 1945. Shortly after that Harbin’s 
administration was temporarily taken over by the Kuomintang (KMT). On April 28, 
1946, the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP) took over control of the city.  
The memories of the cosmopolitan Harbin and its former colonizers were 
obscured during the thirty-plus years from 1945 to 1978, when China was engaged, 
first, in the Civil War between the KMT and the CCP (1945-49) and then, in the 
industrial development and various economic vicissitudes of the Great Leap Forward 
(1958-1960).126 The political movements reached their peak during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976). China did not enter a new stage of economic or social 
                                                                 
125 Victor Zatsepine, “Divided loyalties: Russian emigrés in Japanese occupied Manchuria,”  History 
and Anthropology 28, no.4 (2017): 472; Mara Moustafine, “Russians from China: Migrations and 
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development until the implementation of the policy of Reform and Opening Up, 
initiated on the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China in December 1978. In that particular context, the contested 
memories of the Russian, Japanese, and cosmopolitan legacies were gradually 
aroused. At the same time, the Chinese history under the CCP leadership had been 
emphasized. Consequently, the foreign past of Harbin has become a matter of 
contestation. As Wolff states, “Even now, when Harbin has become almost 
exclusively Chinese, the writing of local history still provokes discomfort about the 
city’s true identity. An emphasis on Harbin’s unique characteristics will always draw a 
line between Beijing’s unifying version of national history and the Northeast’s 
historical identity as a zone of contact with non-Chinese.”127  
At present, the city and provincial archives, storing important materials about the 
international past, are still very difficult to access and are entirely closed to foreigners. 
The foreign past still seems to be a threat haunting the city. At the same time, the 
local government, Harbin architects, and city planners now use this foreign past to 
promote Harbin’s profile and attract investment and tourism from home and abroad. 
A number of old Russian/other foreign buildings have been restored (while many 
have been destroyed). More importantly, the overall architectural style of the new 
high rises adopts “Russian” stylistic features, for example, topping with kitschy 
cupolas, like Russian churches. The revival of the Russianized/Europeanized 
architecture incurs nostalgia from some locals for the once-cosmopolitan Harbin. This 
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nostalgia occurs alongside many others’ criticism of the commercial and fake nature 
of these buildings. Meanwhile, in eloquent contrast, the former site of Unit 731 – a 
biological and chemical warfare research unit of the Imperial Japanese army in Harbin 
during World War II – has been preserved and promoted since the 1980s, after being 
abandoned for three decades. The designation of increasing numbers of patriotic 
education sites coexists with the promotion of the city’s European and Russian 
cultural legacies. Since the 2000s, the local tendency of writing the city into the 
history of China shifted subtly to excavate the international history of Harbin.128 The 
local sense of pride changes slightly from being a Chinese city to being an exotic non-
Chinese one.  
 
The Contribution and Scope of This Dissertation 
Contribution 
This dissertation adopts interdisciplinary, inter-medial, and comparative approaches, 
which are inspired by the ways that Ackbar Abbas structures Hong Kong: Culture and 
the Politics of Disappearance. Abbas examines the cultural transition of Hong Kong 
around 1997 through the lenses of architecture, film, literature, photography, and 
“postculture.”129 Hong Kong and Harbin have certain similarities in terms of colonial 
history, and both remain postcolonial cultural contact zones. However, a major 
difference is the political system the two cities are affiliated with. The 
                                                                 
128 Writing a Chinese history of Harbin was also resistant to the criticism that Northeast China “lacks 
history” by historians who tend to ignore the history of non -Han ethnic groups. See Clausen and 
Thogersen, The Making of a Chinese City, 10. 
129 Abbas, Hong Kong, 141. 
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(post)communist political apparatus of the PRC definitely plays an important role in 
shaping the ways in which the once cosmopolitan and colonial Harbin is 
reconstructed. It would not likely find its parallel in Hong Kong or other parts of the 
world. This is part of the rationale I provide in dissecting the political power at work 
behind the cultural (re)production of Harbin. My political perspective in examining 
the cultural memories of a non-traditional Chinese city in the PRC contributes to a 
multifarious understanding of the social production and imagination of China as a 
whole. 
Apart from its political significance, this dissertation contributes to urban 
cultural studies in terms of approach. In fact, there are very few interdisciplinary 
studies of the cultural memories of cities in China. Chen Pingyuan and Wang Dewei 
edited a series of books named Dushi xiangxiang he wenhua jiyi (The urban 
imagination and cultural memories of cities), including that of Beijing, Xi’an, 
Kaifeng, and Hong Kong. Three of the four are traditional Chinese cities.130 By 
focusing on Harbin, a non-traditional Chinese city by most standards, this dissertation 
contributes to the redefinition of “Chineseness” in terms of heterogeneity. 
 Shanghai is a city similar to Harbin, at least in terms of its international and 
                                                                 
130 Pingyuan Chen and Dewei Wang, Beijing: dushi xiangxiang yu wenhua jiyi  (The urban imagination 
and cultural memories of Beijing). Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2005; Pingyuan Chen, Dewei Wang, 
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colonial histories. However, unlike my focus on contemporary cultural memories of 
Harbin, recent scholarship on Shanghai (such as the erudite works, Shanghai Modern: 
The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945, by Leo Ou-fan Lee, and 
Shanghai and the Edges of Empires, by Yue Meng) has mainly focused on its cultural 
memories in the first half of the twentieth century. 
The major Chinese scholarship engaged in Harbin studies includes Yige chengshi 
de jiyi yu mengxiang: Haerbin bainian guoying (The memories and dreams of a city: 
Harbin in the past 100 years) (2012), by Zhenwei Fan; Haerbin jianzhu yishu (Harbin 
architectural art) (1990), by Huaisheng Chang; Haerbin dianying ditu (The filmic map 
of Harbin) (2008), by Zhiyuan Shen; and Heilongjiang wenxue tongshi (The general 
history of Heilongjiang literature) (2002), by Fang Peng. However, these works are 
introductory in nature and focus on the city’s past. This dissertation fills the living 
temporal gap by exploring the impact of historical legacies on the current city, and by 
researching the social, political, and economic significances of Harbin’s contested 
history to the present. More specifically, this dissertation addresses the problem of a 
lack of critical interdisciplinary studies of the memories and imagination of Harbin. 
By filling such gap in scholarship, this dissertation enriches the approach to city 
studies in and of postsocialist China. It facilitates a “thirding” understanding of cities, 
one that is simultaneously lived, represented, and abstracted, and that is both 
traditional and international, both politically bounded and resistant.  
 
The Scope of This Dissertation 
38 
 
The city of Harbin explored in this dissertation refers to both a physical space and a 
concept city, both lived and imagined. Although the lived and the imagined are 
intertwined with each other and need to be understood as bound together in a whole, I 
dissect, respectively, the real and the imagined before arriving at a comprehensive 
understanding of the city as both. Therefore, I focus on architecture in the first four 
chapters, to examine the lived space of Harbin, and on literature, film, and television 
drama in the last three chapters, to examine the city as imagined. The first two 
chapters focus on the memorialization of Russian architecture in Harbin, while 
Chapter Three and Four focus on that of Chinese and Japanese architecture, 
respectively. 
Chapter One maps how architecture becomes a site of ideological contention, 
where nationalism appropriates and reshapes exoticism, a term with cultural, political 
and economic connotations. This mapping is done by tracing the historical evolution 
of St. Nicholas Cathedral and the debates over its reconstruction. Interpretations of the 
city’s cultural roots diverge between those who support the reinvigoration of the city’s 
Russian and cosmopolitan past and others who try to reinscribe the Chinese cultural 
tradition in Harbin. St. Nicholas Cathedral is a site of nostalgia for some, but of 
amnesia for many others. In the context of the booming tourist economy, the debates 
over the reconstruction of this cathedral imply not only a conflict over its political 
symbolism, but also a trend towards the commercialization of materialized memories. 
Memories are recalled by affective, political, as well as economic catalysts.  
Chapter Two continues the discussion of former Russian landmarks of Harbin as 
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lieu de mémoire. However, unlike Chapter One’s delineation of the diverse public 
discourses involved in remembering and forgetting St. Nicholas Cathedral, this 
chapter focuses on the official perception of the colonial Russian legacies of the city, 
by examining the resurrection of the old Harbin Railway Station in 2018. The new 
station imitates the demolished art-nouveau Harbin Station, built by the Russians in 
1904.131 As a city arising from railway construction, this railway station symbolizes 
the city’s heart,132 from which its life started. The imitation of the old station in this 
new construction signifies local officials’ efforts to revitalize the city’s Russian root, 
an incorporation of the colonial past that develops a unique and non-Chinese cultural 
identity. The city practices, what Svetlana Boym calls, “restorative nostalgia,”133 a 
nostalgia for the past for the sake of the future. The local, national, and global 
contexts in which this reconstruction is located are examined in order to answer the 
following questions: Why have local officials decided to transplant a European and 
Russian “heart” in this city in current decades? In contrast, why was the 1904 station 
demolished in the Mao era in 1959? I argue that the resurrection of Harbin Station 
1904, in 2018, conveys a circular trajectory of development where the future 
encounters the past. The overlapping temporal space, symbolized by the resemblance 
between Harbin Station 1904 and Harbin Station 2018, also suggests a circular 
decolonization of the decolonized in terms of politics.134 This chapter also examines 
                                                                 
131 Hereafter, I use “Harbin Station 1904” to refer to the old station and “Harbin Station 2018” to the 
new one.   
132 Wolff, To the Harbin Station, 19. 
133 Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia. New York: Basic Books, 2001. 
134 “The decolonized” refers to the demolition of Harbin Station 1904 in 1959, because it might relate 
to the dominated Maoist ideology of that time. Therefore, I call the contemporary reconstruction of 
Harbin Station 1904 (the decolonized) “a decolonization of the decolonized.” 
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the paramount political symbolism of the Harbin Railway Station. It was a perennial 
site of power: from the Manchukuo Monument, the Soviet Red Army Monument, to 
the recent Ahn Jung-geun Martyr Memorial Museum on the site of this railway 
station, Harbin Station implies the political agenda of those times as well as of today.  
Chapter Three shifts focus from the “European” Harbin to the Chinese Baroque 
neighborhood in the Daowai District, the former Fu-jiadian. First, this chapter 
provides a cultural explanation of what I would like to call “the identity crisis of 
Daowai.” After 2007, many Chinese-Baroque buildings in Daowai were 
reconstructed; businesses and tourists replaced the original residents, who were forced 
to move into apartment buildings in the suburbs, in a classic gentrification pattern, 
despite this being called “preservation” by the local government. The relocation of 
these old residents and the commercialization of these old buildings suggest the 
pervasiveness of capitalist economics and the economic marginalizing of the poor by 
the rich, causing the disappearance of Old Daowai. I call this process the 
recolonization of the colonized, in economic terms. In other words, it is my contention 
that the segregation of the Chinese in Fu-jiadian from the Russian and international 
communities in the CER zone during the colonial era morphed into the displacement 
of the poor at present. Secondly, this chapter examines the diverse forms of resistance 
to the disappearance of Old Daowai, including verbal criticism of the gentrification 
and commemoration of Old Daowai in cultural productions. 
The cultural identity of Harbin is characterized by the ambivalence between an 
ambiguous exoticism and an ever-resurging nationalism. While the city’s promotion 
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of exoticism is discussed in the previous chapters, Chapter Four examines the spatial 
practices of constructing nationalism in Harbin. It delineates the consistentency 
between the political narrative that diminishes the Japanese contribution to the city, 
and remains inactive in collecting records of former Japanese migrants’ lives in 
Harbin, and local officials’ emphasis on Japanese war crimes. Through such a 
selective memorialization of the Japanese, the local officials homogenize and 
politicize cultural memories of the city in relation to Japan. Historical text, heritage 
building and museum are the lenses through which I examine the representation of the 
Japanese in Harbin. (Re)writing history, protecting heritage buildings, and 
establishing museums are not simply for the sake of preserving memory, “but about 
governing the social and cultural meanings represented and transmitted at these 
sites.”135 These places of memory are prone to be loaded with ideological 
connotations and speak the political language of nationalism.  
Chapter Five examines the local literary canonical figure, Xiao Hong (1911-
1942), as a lieu de mémoire for Harbin. Xiao Hong held a paradoxical perception of 
the colonial Harbin in the 1930s: she embraced the consumption of Russian food and 
dress, but she was averse to Russian colonizers; she felt empathy towards the plight of 
the common people in Manchukuo under the Japanese occupation, but, at the same 
time, she was indifferent to politics. Xiao Hong’s paradox speaks to many 
contemporary Harbiners, who are caught between promoting the city’s exotic heritage 
                                                                 
135 Martin Gegner and Bart Ziino, eds., The Heritage of War (New York: Routledge, 2012), 4; 
Laurajane Smith, Use of Heritage (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2; Chris Ryan, ed., Battlefield 
Tourism: History, Place and Interpretation  (Oxford and Amsterdam: Elsevier. 2007), 1. 
42 
 
and complying with the Central State’s call for a nationalist construction of the city. 
The examination of Xiao Hong’s paradox reveals a historical continuity for the 
cultural and political struggles of the city’s identity over time. Moreover, an 
individual female writer’s memory of Harbin contributes to the heterogeneous 
perception and imagination of Harbin, diviersifying official representations of the city.  
While Chapter Five focuses on Xiao Hong’s writing of Harbin in the 1930s, and 
the memorialization of Xiao Hong by her colleagues and friends from the 1940s to the 
early 1980s, Chapter Six finalizes the chronological study of Xiao Hong, as a lieu de 
mémoire for Harbin, by focusing on the commemoration of Xiao Hong in the past 
four decades. I focus on her lieu de mémoire in three senses: in physical space, in 
filmic space, and in official discourses. I argue that Xiao Hong is missed as much as 
she is branded. The commemoration of Xiao Hong suggests, in Boym’s terms, both 
the past-oriented “reflective nostalgia,” as well as the future-oriented “restorative 
nostalgia.”136 I further complement the analysis of the two different kinds of nostalgia 
for Xiao Hong with Michel Hockx’s concept of “force field,”137 according to which 
Xiao Hong and her works possess literary, economic, and political capital and 
individual agents pull these various capitals into different directions. By adopting 
Hockx’s concept, I explore the intertwined political, economic, and cultural 
significance of Xiao Hong for Harbin, and the ways in which Xiao Hong’s literary 
memory of Harbin develops into a lens, through which many other writers, civilians, 
                                                                 
136 Boym, The Future of Nostalgia.  
137 Michel Hockx, The Literary Field of Twentieth-Century China. Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 
1999. 
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local officials, and film audiences imagine the city. This constitutes an intertextual 
network between Xiao Hong’s Harbin of the 1930s and that of contemporary writers. 
Xiao Hong manifests herself as a literary ghost who resurrects in present Harbin. 
Chapter Seven examines the representations of the Japanese and the Russians in 
Harbin in Chinese historical dramas and films. A differentiated Other of Russia and 
Japan is portrayed on the screen of China. In my analysis, I provide evidence of a 
trend, in Chinese historical dramas, of representing friendly Russians and demonic 
Japanese. However, I argue that in Harbin there are heterogeneous portrayals of the 
Japanese and the Russians. Cinematic production is a site where rebellion against 
homogeneous Chinese nationalism is practiced, where a European and Russian 
cityscape is promoted, under the camouflage of telling a patriotic story about fighting 
against the Japanese colonizers.  
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Chapter One. St. Nicholas Cathedral: A Site of Ideological Contestation 
 
The Social Context of Russian Architecture Revitalization in Harbin 
In the early 1980s, Harbin was officially defined as a city of heavy industry.1 There 
seemed to be an oblivion, if not repression, of its international history. However, since 
the 1990s, there has been a trend to revive the Russian and European cultural relics in 
Harbin.2 The local officials make efforts to restore the bygone glory of the city as 
“Oriental Paris and Oriental Moscow” that characterized the city in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Many projects have been carried out in recent years to reconstruct a 
Europeanized and Russianized Harbin, such as the restoration of Gogol Street into a 
Russian street in 2003,3 and the systematic restoration of architectural façades into 
classical European style since 2005.4 The predominant colour of the city was 
designed to be creamy yellow. According to Vice Mayor Qu Lei, “Moscow is glowing 
                                                                 
1 For example, in the forward of Haerbin fengguang (Harbin scenery), it is stated that “Harbin used to 
be a collecting and distribution center for goods and materials in Northeast China. Since the founding 
of the PRC, the city has undergone earth-shaking changes and has become a new type of 
comprehensive city with mechanical and electrical industries.” The foreign cultural heritage of the city 
was not mentioned at all. Harbin Municipal Government, Haerbin fengguang (Harbin scenery). Harbin: 
Harbin Municipal Government, 1983.  
2 See Koga, “The Double Inheritance,” 227.  
3 In the early decades of the twentieth century, many Russians inhabited Gogol Street. This street was 
named after the Russian writer, Nikolai Gogol. It was changed into “Fendou Road” in 1958, to 
commemorate Chairman Mao’s inscription “fendou” (strive) during his visit to Harbin in 1950. The 
street reverted to its former name in 2003, when the municipal government of Harbin initiated the 
project to reconstruct Gogol Street into a Russian Street. Among the many efforts are the expansion of 
Alexeyev Church Square and the renovation of the Russian Riverside Park, a leisure and entertaining 
site of consumption. Moreover, street cars operated in Harbin from 1927 to 1987. During the 
renovation project in 2003, a street car was exhibited on Gogol Street. It resembles a monument in 
terms of function, putting the repressed history onto display.  
4 According to the Updated Plan for Renovating the Architectural Façades in Harbin in 2005, five 
historical districts, six neighborhoods, eight axes of streets, and ten scenic views were on the lists of 
façade renovation.  
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in yellow. We wanted to paint Harbin in the image of Moscow.”5 The architect, 
Zhang Lufeng, compares the façade project to plastic surgery, which transformed 
Harbin into a masked city.6 Despite new outlooks on the Moscow model, the internal 
layouts and residents of these buildings, the Chinese, remain the same.7 According to 
Daping Liu and Guoyou Li, in the new Qunli District in suburban Harbin, numerous 
buildings have been constructed since the 2000s. The initial plan was to construct 
modern architecture. However, under the guidance of local government, many 
buildings ended up being new classical in style.8  
Indeed, such embracing of Western classical architecture is not unique to Harbin. 
                                                                 
5 Dan Ben-Canaan, “Engineering History - The Reconstruction of the Harbin Old Synagogue: A Case 
Study in Interpreting and Engineering a Past.” Presentation in the Jewish Historical Society of Hong 
Kong, 29 May, 2016. 
6 Lufeng Zhang, “Jiamian chengshi: dui haerbin jianzhu limian gaizaore de leng sikao (Masked City: 
Reflections on Façade Renovation in Harbin).” In Paper Collections of Sino-Russian Forum for Urban 
Design and Architectural Style, 2006. 
7 The fact that the majority of the residents in “Oriental Moscow” are Chinese has similarity with the 
analogy that the American-born Chinese is like banana - it seems to be “yellow,” but is actually “white” 
inside. To some extent, the case of Harbin is the opposite - a “white” outside (European/Russian style 
façade) with a “yellow inside” (the Chinese inhabitants).  
8 Daping Liu and Guoyou Li, “Cong shishang weimei zouxiang diyu lixing: yanjinzhongde xinshiji 
haerbin jianzhu chuangzuo qishi (From fashion and aesthetics to geographical rationality: the 
inspiration from architectural designs in the new century),” Jianzhu xuebao (Journal of architectural 
studies), 7(2010): 14-19. Zhang, Liu, and Li’s critiques of the “fake” Russian and classical buildings  
involves the questioning of translatability, i.e., whether the Russian/European buildings are 
“translatable” into Harbin. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe compares translation to transplantation of a 
living plant from its original land to a new pond of water, because Goethe understands the barriers of 
languages, cultures, and literatures, encountered in the process of translation, as fluid and blurred . 
According to Goethe, the plant of literature would not demise in transplantation; instead, the foreign 
culture’s contribution plays an important role in retaining the vitality of literature that is in translation 
and circulation. In this sense, through “translation” (and the inevitable transformation), Harbin, as an 
art work, is endowed with vitality, which ensures the dynamic evolution of its Russian and European 
cultural tradition, although such tradition is a combination of reality and imagination. Azadeh Yamini-
Hamedani, “Foundational Metaphors: Goethe’s World Literature; Posnett’s Comparative Literature,” in 
Foundational Texts of World Literature, ed. Dominique Jullien (New York: Peter Lang, 2012), 156. 
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It was “already a national phenomenon by the mid-1990s.”9 Sizheng Fan suggests 
that this phenomenon was mainly provoked by developers rather than architects. The 
former use European classical style as a “sales strategy” in the housing market. 
However, this choice also conveys a hierarchical perception of architectural 
aesthetics. Choosing the Western style implies good cultural taste. “The historical 
consensus of Western superiority still casts its shadow on the glorious presentation of 
the imported architecture.”10 
But this choice, obviously, begs the question: When “foreign” buildings and 
“foreign” cities are mushrooming throughout China, what is the specific, defining 
feature of the return to “Russianness” in Harbin? The answer is that it is, at least 
partly, the establishment of local particularism and the attractiveness to tourists and 
investors. In Jeffrey Cody’s words, this is “recreation by re-creation, and making 
history pay.”11 However, restoring or recreating Russian façades for the city is not 
only for tourism. As Svetlana Boym suggests, “The façade is a mere projection of 
utopian dreams and ideological visions.”12 Constructing a real or fake Oriental 
Moscow embodies political signification and ideological contention that require 
unfolding. Its political signification is manifested even in the renovation of the Jewish 
legacies in Harbin. The municipal government of Harbin initiated the project of 
renovating the old synagogue and its surrounding area on Tongjiang Street in 2012. 
                                                                 
9 K. Sizheng Fan, “Culture for Sale: Western Classical Architecture in China’s Recent Building 
Boom,” Journal of Architectural Education  63, no. 1 (October 2009): 65-6.  
10 Ibid., 72. 
11 Jeffrey W. Cody, “Making History (Pay) in Shanghai: Architectural Dialogues about Space, Place, 
and Face,” in Shanghai: Architecture and Urbanism for Modern China , ed. Peter G. Rowe and Seng 
Kuan (Munich: Prestel, 2004), 139. 
12 Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 134. 
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The façade of this synagogue is painted into yellow colour. The building is used as a 
music hall. The local officials “name the whole site after a Russian musician named 
Alexander Konstantinovich Glazunov, who never set foot on Harbin’s soil and had 
nothing to do with Judaism.”13 According to the local scholar, Dan Ben-Canaan, “the 
name ‘Glazunov’ suited the political agenda very well, because in 2013 the Chinese 
decided to ‘warm up’ their strategic relations with Russia.”14 The municipal 
government values this heritage more as a symbolic capital, and architectural “input” 
is transformed into political “output.”15  
Indeed, Harbin has established close relationship and economic cooperation with 
Israel, due to the fact that Harbin used to be a haven for many Jews, mainly from 
Russia, who escaped totalitarian regimes and looked for business opportunities. The 
renovation of Jewish heritage in Harbin is part of the pragmatic plan to put history 
onto the stage and perform the play of economy. To put it rather prosaically, the 
renovation and renaming of this synagogue is like killing two birds with one stone: its 
renaming after a Russian musician fits the political agenda to reconstruct Harbin into 
Oriental Moscow, while the preservation of the synagogue promotes the connection 
with Israel, the former Jewish residents of Harbin, and their offspring across the 
world. 
Against such national and local context, this chapter takes St. Nicholas Cathedral 
                                                                 
13 Dan, “Engineering History,” 25-26. 
14 Ibid., 29. Indeed, the building adjacent to the synagogue, which is part of the renovation project, 
used to be Glazunov Musical School from 1925 to 1936. It was established by a Jewish couple.  
15 Michael Minkenberg, ed., Power and Architecture: the Construction of Capitals and the Politics of 
Space (New York: Berghahn, 2014), 3; also see Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr. 
Comparative Politics: System, Process, and Policy. Boston: Little, Brown, 1978.  
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as an opportunity to explore how architecture becomes a site of political contestation 
and how cultural hegemony by local officials manifests itself through spatial 
narratives, and is challenged by affect, particularly nostalgia, from the public.  
St. Nicholas Cathedral, a Russian Eastern Orthodox Church, was located in the 
central area of Harbin. Its construction was completed by December 18, 1900.16 It 
was then demolished by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution in August 
1966. St. Nicholas Cathedral has been a site of contention from the beginning of its 
construction until the present. The original plan to build this cathedral was resisted by 
local Chinese officials because of the geomantic importance of the location. 
According to traditional feng shui (geomancy), it is where the “dragon vein” of Qing 
China was located. Manchuria, the present Northeast China, used to be “the land of 
the rising dragon” in Qing China, and Straight Street in Harbin was regarded as the 
“dragon keel.” St. Nicholas Church was located right in the middle of this dragon 
keel, dividing it into Eastern Straight Street and Western Straight Street. From this 
perspective, St. Nicholas Cathedral symbolizes a violation and foreign invasion of the 
Qing tradition. The contestation of this cathedral was further illustrated by the 
insurgents’ prevention of its construction during the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), the 
demolition of this building during the Cultural Revolution, and, finally, by various 
public debates over its reconstruction, and the emerging models of this church in 
recent years. Interestingly, nationalists’ resistance to this cathedral contrasts greatly 
with many local residents’ embracement of it. The latter is partly due to the unique 
mode of Russian colonialism in Harbin. Wolff (1999) defines it as “liberal 
colonialism;” Quested (1982) defines Russia as a “matey” imperialist in Manchuria. 
                                                                 
16 Guojun Wu, Jianzhu yishu changlang (The corridor of architectural art) (Harbin: Heilongjiang 
People’s Press, 2008), 81. 
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However, there was a distinction between the political attitude of the Chinese 
authorities (as mentioned in the Introduction Chapter) and that of the local population, 
who could profit from their interactions with the Russians.17 Thus this ideologically 
ambiguous signifier of Russian culture has been both loved and hated by local 
officials and commoners.  
 
Figure 1. St. Nicholas Cathedral18 
St. Nicholas Cathedral was central to the city not only in terms of geographical 
location and architectural style but also due to Harbiners’ intimacy with it. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral was culturally appropriated by the local Chinese, who nicknamed 
it “Lama Tower.”19 Indeed, old Harbiners were more familiar with the name of Lama 
Tower than with its formal name. According to Yang Shuhua, an old Harbiner who 
                                                                 
17 For the Chinese officials’ struggles with the CER for the sovereignty of Harbin, see Chiasson, 
Administering the Colonizer.  
18 All figures with no indication of origin are from internet. 
19 Ao Wang, Xiaoshide jianzhu: sheng nigula dajiaotang chuanqi (The disappeared architecture: the 
legend of St. Nicholas Cathedral). Beijing: China Central Television production, 2010. 
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witnessed the demolition of this cathedral in 1966, “It was only then that I got to 
know that its name was St. Virgin Mary Church. I had only known it as Lama 
Tower.”20 When St. Nicolas Cathedral was destroyed by the Red Guards during the 
Cultural Revolution, many local Chinese citizens felt sorrow and helplessness for its 
loss. Tingkui He, the official who was in charge of demolishing the onion-shaped 
dome of the cathedral, expressed his lament for destroying this building.21 
Photographers Wan Jiyao from Heilongjiang Daily and Song Hui from Heilongjiang 
Picture Newspaper took photos that caught the last moment of St. Nicholas Cathedral. 
After being “hidden deep in Wan Jiyao’s closet for more than thirty years,”22 the 
reappearance of these photos in the local New Evening News in 2000 evoked 
Harbiners’ nostalgia for St. Nicholas Cathedral.  
 
The Spatial Politics of the Afterlife of St. Nicholas Cathedral 
The destruction of St. Nicholas Cathedral was followed by the construction of a 
“Working Class Cultural Revolution Memorial.” “This political memorial, on 
which Lin Biao inscribed ‘Always keep in mind,’ was hurriedly destroyed 
overnight and replaced by a small hill covered with trees and flowers, upon Zhou 
Enlai’s visit to Harbin in 1972.”23 In 1997, the site of the cathedral was revamped 
                                                                 
20 Apparently, even then, Yang still did not know the correct official name of this cathedral. 
21 Wang, Xiaoshide jianzhu. 
22 Koga, “The Double Inheritance,” 71. 
23 Ibid., 77. Also see Fenghui Ji, “Chengshi guangchang (City Square),” Heilongjiang Morning 
Newspaper, May 8, 2002. Lin Biao was Mao’s designated successor since 1969. He died on 
September 13, 1971, when the plane he boarded crashed in Mongolia. The Chinese official 
explanation was that Lin and his family attempted to flee, following the coup against Mao. In China, 
Lin is designated a traitor.  
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into the Hongbo Underground Mall, covered by a glass octagonal-shape roof, with 
a gilded sculpture of a snow flake in its center, suggesting the official identification 
of Harbin as Ice City, promoting ice and snow tourism. The first impression is that 
the old Harbin as Oriental Moscow has been transformed into a modern city, 
characterized by its winter tourism,24 and that the memory of the Russian Harbin is 
being gradually hidden by modern skyscrapers; however, there is more to it than 
that. The official name of this new building is the Sunshine Hall. Its positive 
signification contrasts with the negative nicknames given it by the public, such as 
“crystal coffin,” “glass grave,” “glass bulge,” “glass tent,” et al.25 They signify the 
public’s lament for, and resistance to, the concealed memories of St. Nicholas 
Cathedral. The four stone buttresses that support the snow-flake sculpture hint at 
the four historical stages of Harbin since 1946, when the CCP restored the 
sovereignty over Harbin. The four stages refer to liberation, economic 
development, reform and opening up, and envisioning the future.26 The Sunshine 
Hall suggests the official’s attempt to erase the spatial memory of the international 
Harbin of before 1946, and to inscribe Chinese history into the urban space. As 
Alexandra Staub argues, “Space is power. The exertion of power is embedded in 
                                                                 
24 For tourists, from home and abroad, the Ice Lantern Festival is one of the most famous name cards 
of Harbin. 
25 Hanke Si, “Haerbin: cengjing yuanqu de laojie (Harbin: the disappeared old streets),” August 10, 
2012. http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_53c032dd0102dxl0.html; also see Lishun Tan and Hongbin Yu, 
“Fandui fujian sheng nigula jiaotang de shida yuanyin (Ten reasons of resisting St. Nicholas Cathedral 
reconstruction),” Life Newspaper, September 5, 2005.  
26 Dandan de Xiangming, “Harbin St. Nicholas Cathedral,” January 19, 2012. 
http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=8058779 
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the control of space.”27 This building stands as a political statement on reclaiming 
the Chinese ownership of Harbin. The colonial and international Harbin before 
1946 was spatially erased twice: first, by the Red Guards and, later, by the designer 
of the Sunshine Hall. The new landmark competes with the haunting phantom of 
St. Nicholas Cathedral, in that it speaks an architectural language of nationalism 
versus cosmopolitanism. However, to some extent this official concealment of St. 
Nicholas Cathedral fails in affective terms. Many Harbiners feel strongly nostalgic 
for St. Nicholas Cathedral. In Jie Yang’s words, “affect can direct people to act in 
ways that [c]hallenge power.”28 Despite its physical disappearance in 1966, St. 
Nicholas Cathedral has never left the life of Harbiners. It has existed invisibly, so 
to speak, in the memory of Harbiners, in postcards and paintings, and in Harbiners’ 
discussions in everyday life. Naming the Sunshine Hall as “crystal coffin” 
metaphorically suggests the public’s nostalgia for the “death” of St. Nicholas 
Cathedral. To a certain extent, St. Nicholas Cathedral has never stopped being the 
center of Harbin even today, because its replacement, the “crystal coffin”, is a 
“dead” form. The nostalgic past, according to Linda Hutcheon, “is rarely the past 
as actually experienced; it is the past as imagined, as idealized through memory 
and desire.”29 Old Harbiners’ retelling of the story to their offspring transforms the 
                                                                 
27 Alexandra Staub, Conflicted Identities: Housing and the Politics of Cultural Representation  (New 
York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), 3. 
28 Jie Yang, ed., The Political Economy of Affect and Emotion in East Asia (London: Routledge, 
2014), 17. 
29 Linda Hutcheon and Mario J. Valdés , “Irony, Nostalgia, and the Postmodern: A Dialogue,” 
Poligrafías 3 (1998-2000): 20, January 19, 1998; also see Dan Ben-Canaan, “Nostalgia vs. Historical 
Reality.” This  is an expanded version of a paper presented at the International Forum on the History 
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“death” of St. Nicholas Cathedral into “a sense of loss without firsthand 
experience,”30 constituting a second-hand and twice-removed nostalgia. 
 
Figure 2. The Sunshine Hall 
The longing for the demolished St. Nicholas Cathedral has motivated people 
to make its physical body morph into various forms and retrieve the lost belonging. 
In December 2002, Hongbo Underground Mall invested more than 100,000 Yuan 
(roughly $15,000) to build a wooden model of St. Nicholas Cathedral, one tenth of 
its original size. This replica was put inside of the “crystal coffin.” This way, the 
model’s function becomes ambiguous, because it may be interpreted either as a 
celebration of the resurrection of the old St. Nicholas Cathedral or as a “memorial 
marker”31 to remind people of its absence. Moreover, next to the Sunshine Hall is 
a plant sculpture, trimmed into the shape of St. Nicholas Cathedral. The 
underground wooden model and the plant are overshadowed by the Sunshine Hall, 
                                                                 
and Culture of Harbin Jews. Harbin, June 17, 2006.  
30 Koga, “The Double Inheritance,” 70. 
31 Ibid., 76. Marilyn Ivy calls “a memorial marker, a monument to an absence, to a loss that must be 
perpetually recovered.” Marilyn Ivy , Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 95.  
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in terms of size, the bustling traffic of this area, and the hustling people, busy with 
shopping in the underground mall. To some extent, the model and plant are present 
absence or, in Abbas’s words, “historical quotation” and decoration.32 
In July 2007, a replica of St. Nicholas Cathedral was constructed as part of a 
modern Russian theme park, called Volga Manor in Chenggaozi town in the suburb of 
Harbin. It was funded by the Harbin entrepreneur, Huang Zuxiang, and supervised by 
the Russian architect, Nikolai Petrovich Kradin, who brought the original blueprint of 
St. Nicholas Church from St. Petersburg. The replica of St. Nicholas Church is 
heatedly debated. While many Harbiners and tourists enjoy the revival of St. Nicholas 
Cathedral, regret and sorrow coexist, given that it is basically only a scenic site for 
tourist consumption. This old/new building barely contains any affective memory of 
the original St. Nicholas Cathedral. The replica’s authenticity is questioned by the 
public.33  
I argue, though, that the replica is incomparable with the original. To be more 
precise, it is not necessary to compare the two. The replica is a product of the 
contemporary era rather than a lament for the bygone past. Nostalgia, the major 
motivation for Huang to build this replica is, to put this in Svetlana Boym’s terms, 
restorative (prospective) rather than reflective (retrospective). In fact, Boym argues 
that nostalgia is not only “for the unrealized dreams of the past but also for visions of 
                                                                 
32 Abbas, Hong Kong, 66. 
33 Chong Wan, “‘Sheng nigula’ chuanyue 43 nian ‘fuhuo’ le (St. Nicholas Cathedral resurrected after 
43 years of its demolition),” Heilongjiang Daily, July 10, 2009. 
http://epaper.hljnews.cn/web/hljrb/html/2009-07/10/content_412680.htm 
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the future.”34 Dai Jinhua understands nostalgia as “fashion,” “a positive construction 
[to] ensure the meaning of modern ‘progress’.”35 The replica of St. Nicholas 
Cathedral suggest Huang’s nostalgia for the old cathedral but, in essence, it signifies 
his envisioning of the future, especially when considering that this replica is located in 
a theme park. The replica presents a trajectory of development, adapting the cultural 
capital from the past in order to construct the future.  
 
Figure 3. The Replica of St. Nicholas Cathedral in Volga Manor 
This intertwinement of the past and the future is also implied in two other 
proposals to reconstruct St. Nicholas Cathedral. In September, 2010, a fiberglass, two-
thirds sized model of St. Nicholas Cathedral was designed by the Planning and Design 
Academy in the Harbin Institute of Technology. In January, 2015, at the Harbin 
Political Consultative Conference (HPCC), Yu Kefei, a committee member of the 
HPCC conference, proposed a model made of “sound, light, and electricity.”36 
                                                                 
34 Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, XVI.  
35 Jinhua Dai, “Imagined Nostalgia,” in Postmodernism and China, ed. Arif Dirlik and Xudong Zhang, 
trans. Judy T.H. Chen, 205-221. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000): 206-9. 
36 Xuenan Yang, “HPCC member proposed to restore St. Nicholas Cathedral,” Life Newspaper, 
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Neither of the two was put into the public space. The two plans denote a futuristic and 
postmodern representation of St. Nicholas cathedral, dressing history up in 
postmodern clothes. It signifies a transformed memory and inheritance of the past, 
embodying temporal layers of both the past, the present, and the future. According to 
Yukiko Koga, the various models and replicas of St. Nicholas Cathedral stand as a 
reminder, not of “the victim of the Cultural Revolution but as the embodiment of the 
glorious Old Harbin and Harbin’s future.”37 This selective choice of the past involves 
forgetting the Cultural Revolution and the imaginary construction of a glorious, exotic 
past, and of an equally remote and ambiguous future. 
 
Nostalgia for St. Nicholas Cathedral 
Why would some Harbiners have such deep attachment to this cathedral? Why is 
there the longevity of a “foreign” cultural signifier in Harbin? What exactly do people 
try to remember? What made this past so glorious? Before answering these questions, 
I must clarify that none of this suggests that all Harbiners are nostalgic for St. 
Nicholas Cathedral. According to the local painter Wang Wei, the artists of his 
generation, those born in the 1970s, have paradoxical feelings towards Harbin: they 
are nostalgic for the demolished old buildings, but look forward to a new city; people 
of his generation are not as nostalgic as the previous generations, but not as 
indifferent as the next.38 Wang’s differentiation of the generational perceptions of 
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Old Harbin does not apply to all Harbiners. For example, a senior local citizen in his 
80s described “the old hairy ones” (Russians) as demonic bullies of the Chinese, and 
stated that St. Nicholas Cathedral had nothing to do with his life. On the other hand, 
many of the volunteers engaged in heritage protection are youngsters. Nonetheless, it 
is safe to say that in recent years there has been an increasingly stronger nostalgia for 
St. Nicholas Cathedral and the once-Europeanized Harbin.39 
Such conflicting views, or different “degrees” of longing, might suggest that, 
despite lingering on the past, nostalgia relates more to the present. Fredric Jameson 
asserts that “nostalgia is a form of ideological critique of commodity culture; it is not 
a yearning for the past but rather a ‘longing for the present’.”40 Koga understands 
nostalgia for Old Harbin as “a displaced form of social criticism of contemporary 
Harbin.”41 Ming-Bao Yue goes further by arguing that nostalgia implies “longing for 
the unfulfilled dreams of a better future.”42 The strong nostalgia for the cosmopolitan 
Harbin suggests Harbiners’ criticism of social problems in the present and a craving 
for a better future. Many people do not believe that Harbin municipal officials are 
competent and sincere enough to reconstruct a St. Nicholas cathedral as good as the 
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old one, because they have already seen a large amount of kitschy reconstruction of 
fake antiques. Corruption is another problem. Urban development projects that are 
initiated by local government are susceptible to being interpreted, by the public, as 
corrupt attempts at bolstering the prestige and reputation of certain officials. 
Bureaucracy and failure to work for the people further discredit local officials.43  
Take the experience of a local architect, Hu Hong, as an example: Hu was born 
in 1951 of a Russian mother and a Chinese father. After living in Harbin for decades, 
Hu worked as an architect in Japan for more than ten years since 1988, and then went 
back to Harbin. Hu has been nostalgic for the demolished St. Nicholas Cathedral and 
averse to the Sunshine Hall, which he called “a glass bulge.”44 Hu designed a modern 
sculpture in Baroque style made of steel and iron, and named it “Nigula jiaotang de 
fuhuojie (the Easter of Nicholas Cathedral).”45 Over the years, he recommended this 
design to different officials in charge of urban planning and construction, yet no 
official took it into consideration. Nor did Hu receive respect. In his first visit to the 
Municipal Construction Committee, he was made to wait for two hours in the office 
of the staff, with whom he had made the appointment, the staff ignoring him. This 
contrasts with the respect and prestige he received as an architect in Japan. Hu felt 
humiliated and disappointed by the bureaucracy of these officials in Harbin, 
lamenting that Harbin is not an inclusive and international city anymore.46 He wrote a 
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novel, Haerbin de youshang (The melancholy of Harbin) (2014), portraying Russian 
immigrants’ life in Harbin from the 1920s to the 1960s. As implied by the title, Hu 
retreats, in the novel, to an imagined Old Harbin, in order to create a fictional utopia, 
in which he eschews the actual, hostile city. Hu’s and other Harbiners’ nostalgia for 
St. Nicholas Cathedral and cosmopolitan Harbin constitutes, in Boym’s term, a 
“defense mechanism,”47 i.e., a way of resisting the present social problems.  
Moreover, longing for St. Nicholas Cathedral signifies local people’s desire to 
construct a unique identity for Harbin, in order to protect themselves against the 
flattening and fragmenting effects of modernization and globalization. In Xudong 
Zhang and Ban Wang’s words, nostalgia is a “sentimental response to global 
ideology” and “a resistance as well as alternative to the homogeneous narrative of 
globalization.”48 Nostalgia for the cosmopolitan Harbin facilitates the city to 
construct local particularism and “local internationalism.”49 That is to say, in order to 
be competitive in the present global world, Harbin constructs its particularism by 
evoking the cosmopolitan Harbin of the past. Such re-membering of Harbin’s history 
contradicts the Chinese official discourse, which emphasizes the CCP’s role in 
liberating and administrating Harbin. It confronts both globalization and nationalism, 
while at the same time carving a niche for Harbin in the national and global markets. 
Nostalgia is a product of the spreading market economy, as well as a means of 
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resisting it. 
Apart from the political and economic criticism embodied in the notion of 
nostalgia, this concept has affective and romantic layers of meaning. As pointed out 
by Boym, nostalgia is “a romance with one’s own fantasy.”50 According to a local 
painter, WangWei, “What we are nostalgic for is not the old city itself, but ourselves 
in the old days and the city that witnessed our growth.”51 It is the inaccessibility to 
the past that motivates people to linger on it, imagining a collective myth of the 
irreversible past as a utopia. As situated in the affective locus of nostalgia, the past 
experiences have been endowed with an aura of romantic fantasy, embellishing the 
present routine life. As Boym states, it is hard to say “what exactly [people] yearn for 
– St. Elsewhere, another time, a better life.”52 It appears, though, that Harbiners 
evoke or create dreams of the past to “assuage the present,”53 and navigate the future.  
Nostalgia is only one side of the story. Political symbolism and ideological 
contention, embodied in this colonial building, exist alongside economic concerns. 
These are major reasons for the heated debate among local officials, professionals, 
and commoners over the reconstruction of St. Nicholas Cathedral on its original site.  
Several realistic concerns make the construction of any model of St. Nicholas on 
its original site difficult. First, that area is the crowded center of Harbin; therefore, 
there is not enough space nearby to accommodate the cathedral model. There is also 
traffic pressure in this area. The reconstruction would also be a huge financial 
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expense. Moreover, a local architect, Qu Chunxing, also questions the necessity of 
reconstructing a church, if it will not have the function of a church.54 Further, the 
Sunshine Hall was designed by the wife of the former mayor of Harbin, Wang 
Guotao; officials presently in office might be concerned that the dismantling of the 
Sunshine Hall may shame Wang and his wife.  
Alongside these practical concerns, I argue that another reason for the 
contestation lies in the fact that reconstructing a colonial building in the center of the 
city is likely to evoke its negative symbolic meaning. It is susceptible to the 
politicized interpretation of being a reminder of the humiliating history of having been 
colonized. The following is an illustration of the debates over the political and 
apolitical decoding of this church. In September, 2005, Life Newspaper reported a 
number of active feedbacks from the public about the cathedral restoration. It 
included ten reasons to support the restoration, and another ten to resist it. In the 
following, I examine the ideological assumptions behind the debates. I subdivide 
these debates into two themes: the contention between nationalism and exoticism, and 
that between Chinese tradition and Russian tradition. 
According to John B. Thompson, language is an instrument of power; to study 
ideology is, in some part and in some way, to study language in the social world; it is 
to study the ways in which the multifarious uses of language intersect with power, 
nourishing it, sustaining it, enacting it.55 The diverse discourses concerning the 
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reconstruction of St. Nicholas Cathedral offer a lens through which I both examine 
how language sustains or challenges power and reveal the ideological tensions behind 
these discourses. Moreover, examining the social context, from which these 
discourses derive, is helpful for understanding a social production of ideology and the 
ways by which architecture becomes an agonistic site for power.  
 
Nationalism versus Exoticism 
Among the ten reasons put forward in supporting the reconstruction of St. Nicholas 
Cathedral on its site was an argument that the restoration can illustrate the inclusive 
nature of Harbin, in a way similar to the preservation and branding of the colonial 
buildings near the Bund in Shanghai. According to Edward Denison and Guang Yu 
Ren, the Shanghai officials understand these historical buildings on the Bund as 
“represent[ing] the Shanghai characteristic cultural background combining Oriental 
and Western culture into a perfect match, while dismissing the idea that this cultural 
background is ‘semi-colonial and semi-feudal’.”56 The pragmatic and depoliticized 
interpretation of colonial architecture in Shanghai resonates with the supporters of the 
reconstruction of St. Nicholas Cathedral. For example, a local citizen, Si Tuxin, 
suggested that architecture has no nationality; St. Nicholas Cathedral is art, which 
transcends religion and politics; so, it deserves to be rebuilt. Si quotes Victor Hugo 
who once said, “One building possesses two components, function and beauty. 
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Function belongs to its owner, while its beauty belongs to the whole world.”57 He 
indicated the universal ownership of building’s aesthetic beauty. 
 In contrast, one of the opponents, Professor Yan from Heilongjiang University in 
Harbin argued that the restoration reminds people of its ugly history: St. Nicholas 
Cathedral is thought to be the product of colonialism and cultural invasion, and is not 
conducive to encouraging the national culture. Another opponent, Xiao Weilun, made 
a similar argument: “Taking the money of the Chinese to construct a foreign building 
is not necessary.”58 Yan and Xiao interpret St. Nicholas Cathedral as a signifier of 
“foreign hegemony,” in Gramsci’s terms.59 Yan and Xiao’s aversion to the 
reconstruction of St. Nicholas Cathedral signifies their efforts to overcome the real or 
imagined subalternity of the Chinese in the past and at present, and break with 
“foreign hegemony.” The underlying message is “This is our territory. The Chinese 
are the masters. Your Russian hegemony is over.”  
 This contrasts with the restoration, in the 1970s, of the Government House in 
Guam, the American Pacific Island, when the former governor of Guam, Ricardo 
Bardallo, decided to incorporate Spanish Colonial-style into the local Chamorro 
architecture. In his analysis of this restoration, Marvin Brown argues that  
“the Spanish Colonial architecture need not be viewed as a symbol of colonial 
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oppression. Rather, it declares that such architecture can stand as a symbol of 
resoluteness, determination [and local people’s] stride towards the future. It calls out: 
‘We are still here. Where are you?’”60 
Some proponents of the reconstruction of St. Nicholas Cathedral contend that this 
piece of exotic architecture fills Harbin’s citizens with a sense of pride, contributing to 
the unique characteristic of Harbin. In contrast, Professor Yan claimed that, “He 
always felt sorrow at hearing that Harbin was yangqi (exotic).”61 Yan said, “Exotic 
architecture is not conducive to encouraging the national spirit; a city’s cultural 
development should be integrated with national history, traditional culture, and 
revolutionary culture.”62 Pride and sadness, these distinctive feelings towards 
exoticism, indicate the struggles that Harbiners experienced in defining the city’s 
cultural identity, somewhere in between a Chinese city (therefore, feeling sad about 
the exotic non-“authentic” factors in this city) and an “exotic” non-Chinese city (more 
appealing, mysterious and charming).  
I will adopt Paul van der Gripp’s notion that “exotics are conceived of as 
material (art) products representing cultural otherness, and exoticism is seen as the 
yearning for this kind of otherness.”63 Exoticism involves not only aesthetics but also 
politics. It embodies a hierarchical perception of power between the indigenous and 
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the exotic. As Graham Huggan argues, “The exoticist rhetoric of fetished otherness 
and sympathetic identification masks the inequality of the power relations;” exoticism 
implies “a hierarchical encoding of cultural difference.”64 Harbiners’ sense of pride in 
the city’s European and Russian architecture can be understood as the Chinese 
submission to the cultural supremacy of Russia and Europe. As Bin Dai argues, the 
promotion of exoticism in China conveys the lack of cultural confidence.65 On the 
other hand, it can also be interpreted as a sense of postcolonial resoluteness – being 
proud of and taking advantage of the legacies inherited from former colonizers rather 
than feeling threatened. It conveys a triumphant discourse by the formerly colonized 
and a changed power dynamic between China and Russia.  
With regard to the relationship between exoticism and cultural translation, 
Huggan argues that “Exoticism is, in one sense, a control mechanism of cultural 
translation which relays the other inexorably back again to the same.”66 The city 
culturally “translates” the real and imagined Russian legacies into its current Chinese 
social context to produce a Harbin version of “Moscow.” The revitalization of 
exoticism in current Harbin makes the city both familiar (evoking memories of the 
city’s cosmopolitan past) and different (from cities with traditional Chinese cultures 
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and from Moscow). The familiar-and-estranged Harbin lauds both its local and 
international features, contributing to the construction of an identity through local 
particularism and local internationalism, by which Harbin claims to make itself stand 
out in the current national and global market.  
 
The Competition between the Russian and Chinese Traditional Harbin 
The debates over the restoration of St. Nicholas Cathedral involve divergent ideas 
about what traditional heritage contemporary Harbin should inherit. A local historian, 
Duan Guangda, opposes the restoration of St. Nicholas Cathedral by saying that “the 
existing colonial heritage could be protected but not promoted. Instead, Harbin has a 
large amount of traditional Chinese heritage, which deserves to be promoted.” Duan 
suggested to reconstruct Dao-taifu, the office of the Qing magistrate in Fu-jiadian.67 
Duan’s argument over St. Nicholas Cathedral in contrast with Dao-taifu suggests the 
competition between the Chinese and Russian traditions in reshaping the current 
urban space of Harbin.  
Indeed, there was such competition decades ago. Before the Russians came to 
build the CER in 1898, Harbin was initially a fishing village. Russian culture then was 
the dominated “traditional” culture in the city of Harbin. In the 1920s, a nationalist 
movement was launched to claim or invent a Chinese tradition of the city. The 
construction of the Confucian Temple in the 1920s, for example, can be interpreted as 
an attempt at reinventing the Chinese history of Harbin.68 Engraved on the stele 
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placed near the entrance of the Confucian Temple is an inscription by Zhang 
Xueliang, the general of Kuomintang (KMT) in Northeast China: “China is the home 
of Confucius and Harbin is a place where the Chinese people have gathered 
together.”69 But the Chinese gene was not dominant in the young Harbin before the 
1920s. Here, an apparently paradoxical question must be raised: How could Harbin 
inherit its traditional Chinese culture, if it was born of a Russian mother? Koga 
comments on the ironic eccentricity of Harbin by saying that “what is foreign, or what 
is frightening, is the Mao era, while the supposedly foreign Old Harbin with its 
‘atmosphere of a foreign country’ is perceived as home-like and accorded the status of 
authentic origin.”70 
Harbin’s eccentricity in its process of Sinification did not stop after the Cultural 
Revolution. The memory boom of the foreign Harbin in recent years is an example. 
Reinvigorating the cosmopolitan Harbin not only attempts to boost the local economy 
but also embodies a political symbolism, and implies an affective and cultural tie 
between contemporary Harbin and the “foreign” Old Harbin.   
What traditions the city identifies with is a political and economic decision and it 
changes over time. “Traditions are never the static legacy of the past, but rather a 
project for its dynamic reinterpretation in the service of the present and the future.”71 
Claiming the Chinese tradition in the 1920s gave way to the official promotion of the 
city’s Russian tradition in the 1990s. In 1996, St. Sophia Church, a Russian military 
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church forgotten for decades, was renovated with an investment of “more than ten 
million Yuan (more than $1.2 million)” and turned into a Harbin Architectural Art 
Museum. “Suddenly St. Sophia’s was publicly trumpeted as ‘the largest Orthodox 
Church in the Far East’ and “a great architectural product” that Harbin people should 
be proud of, according to city officials of that time.72 
Similar to the construction of the Confucian Temple in the 1920s, the 
reconstruction of Dao-taifu in 2005 can be interpreted as an attempt at reinventing the 
Chinese tradition of Harbin. But the two practices of reinventing Chinese traditions 
serve different purposes. In the 1920s, the Confucian Temple conveys a nationalist 
claim of Harbin as a Chinese city, while the reconstruction of Dao-taifu primarily 
serves as a means to develop tourism and boost the declining economy in the Daowai 
District.73 On the other hand, the restoration of St. Sophia Church and St. Nicholas 
Cathedral can be understood as reinventing the Russian tradition of Harbin. The 
competition between reconstructing St. Nicholas Cathedral and Dao-taifu manifests 
different understandings of the city’s identity, a nationalist one versus an international 
one. 
Moreover, the competition between St. Nicholas Cathedral and Dao-taifu also 
suggests a tension between the official and the commoners. One proponent of the 
restoration of St. Nicholas Cathedral deems that the decision on what to restore should 
depend more on the will and aesthetic values held by the majority of citizens rather 
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than on those of a minority of experts and officials. In the case of the Dao-taifu 
reconstruction, a few officials and experts made the decision, without taking into 
consideration the opinions of the common people. The reconstructed building turned 
out to be unattractive to local citizens and tourists. This view echoes Soja’s argument 
that “the social and spatial structures are constituted around an exploitative relation 
rooted in control over the means of production and sustained by an appropriation of 
value by the dominant social class.”74 Marx and Engels associated ideology and 
class, asserting that the ideas of the ruling class were the ruling ideas.75 Gramsci 
defines ideology as “a material ensemble of hegemonic apparatuses in civil society.”76 
The reconstructed Dao-taifu signifies a materialized representation of cultural 
hegemony, a hegemony exerted by the officials over the civil society without 
violence. Meanwhile, the emptiness of Dao-taifu is a form of silent resistance by the 
commoners to cultural hegemony. As Nezar Alsayyad argues, “hegemonic spatial 
practices may adopt or reinforce standard configurations of power and authority, 
while subversive ones may challenge or contest them.”77 The opponents of the 
restoration of St. Nicholas Cathedral argue that Harbin has limited financial capacity, 
which should be efficiently used for more urgent requests, such as education, poverty 
relief, and healthcare.78 Some others contend that it would be better to use the 
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funding for protecting the existing historical buildings.79 What is involved is the 
question of whose interests deserve priority. In David Harvey’s words, it is an issue of 
“the right to city,”80 which should not only belong to those with power but also to the 
common and the poor people. 
 
Conclusion 
The simmering nostalgia for St. Nicholas Cathedral by many Harbiners represents 
their longing for the dreamed city that, in Boym’s terms, “no longer exists or has 
never existed.”81 The various representations and reconstructions of St. Nicholas 
Cathedral illustrate the propensity of many Harbiners to establish a local particularism 
and local internationalism that both distinguish “their” city from many other Chinese 
cities and strengthen the connection with the international world. Unlike Shanghai, 
whose international past has been continued in the present, the cosmopolitan Harbin 
of the past contrasts with its presence as an inner-land provincial city, experiencing 
declining economic development. An important motivation for Harbiners to support 
the reconstruction of St. Nicholas Cathedral is to promote the consumption of the 
reinvented exoticism in the tourist scape of the city, analogous to the practice of 
producing a given commodity due to a potential demand in the market.  
However, exoticism is not only a potential commodity. It also has political 
connotation. The contradictory perceptions by the Harbiners, in their sense of pride or 
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humiliation towards the exotic nature of the city, manifests the contention between 
exoticism and nationalism. The competition between the Russian/European tradition 
of Harbin and its Chinese tradition takes spatial forms. The replacement of St. 
Nicholas Cathedral with the Sunshine Hall metaphorically signifies the official 
attempt to erase the international history and reinforce Chinese sovereignty over the 
city since 1946. However, the public’s mockery of this Sunshine Hall, i.e. their 
renaming it the “crystal coffin” suggests the desire to challenge power and cultural 
hegemony. St. Nicholas Cathedral becomes a political arena, in which the Chinese 
and international history compete for control over the city’s past and the 
memorialization and utilization of the contested pasts in the present.  
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Chapter Two. Harbin Station: A Site of Colonization and Decolonization 
  Here on the platforms and in station square, Harbin’s heart pulsed. — David Wolff1 
 
This chapter explores the changing Chinese official ideologies in Harbin, and the 
rationales behind such change from the suppression to the promotion of European 
classical-style architecture, by conducting a case study of Harbin Railway Station. I 
interrogate a chronological development of the construction, demolition, and 
reconstruction of Harbin Station from 1904 to 2018. Moreover, by examining the 
competition among various states over the ownership of Harbin Station, I explore the 
dynamic power contestation over Harbin by Japan, the Soviet Union, China, and 
Korea.  
The old Harbin Station, an art nouveau railway station, was constructed by the 
Russian-led CER Engineering Bureau between 1900 and 1904. It was demolished in 
1959, allegedly, according to the local official discourse, because of its limited 
capacity to accommodate the increasing number of passengers.2 A new station was 
planned on the Beijing model, but it did not come into being. Instead, a modernist 
railway station started to be built in 1960, but its construction was suspended due to 
the economic recession of that time. For three decades, the railway station was 
composed of only the east and west wings, while its main building was not 
constructed until 1989.3 Short-lived, it was demolished in 2015 and gave place to two 
                                                                 
1 Wolff, To the Harbin Station, 19. 
2 Hai Gao and Bingcao Qu, eds., Harbin Station Gazetteer, 1999. 
3 The construction of the west wing was completed in January, 1962, and that of the east wing, in 
1972. 
73 
 
new, connected railway stations, which are scheduled to be completed by late 2018.4 
Interestingly, this ongoing reconstruction imitates the style of the old Harbin Station 
built in 1904. Harbin’s development as a major center started from the railway 
construction and the railway station is, in a sense, analogous to the heart of the city. 
Its geographical and historical importance to the city makes it a “symbolic place that 
can serve to define a city’s vision.”5 Transplanting the old “heart” into its modern 
body conveys the local officials’ desire to reinvent the Russian and European tradition 
of the city. Replacing the modernist station with the art nouveau one suggests the 
triumph of Western classicism over modernist architecture, and the triumph of the 
European over the Chinese tradition in Harbin. The official promotion of the city’s 
European architecture inevitably exerts a side-effect of posing “a potential threat to 
the founding myth of the Chinese Communist Party.”6 The new/old art nouveau 
Harbin Station suggests the paradox of local officials’ attempts to strengthen Chinese 
Communist administration while promoting Russian/European culture.  
Such an official promotion of exoticism in Harbin Station contrasts with the 
conservative design of the Sunshine Hall, which was constructed in 1997. The former 
suggests a reclaiming of the Russian/European root of the city, while the latter 
metaphorically covers up the colonial and cosmopolitan Harbin of before 1946, 
reinforcing a purely Chinese history of the city. The distinct official attitudes between 
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1997 and 2015 signify that during these two decades the city gradually reclaimed and 
enhanced its local particularism – or, even, local patriotism – by resurrecting its 
cosmopolitan traditions. Koga understands the promotion of colonial heritage as a 
means of boosting the local economy of Harbin.7 This is a major reason for the 
reconstruction of Harbin Station 1904. For example, the new station is claimed to be 
“the first art-nouveau railway station in China.”8 It becomes a brand that 
distinguishes Harbin in the competition with other cities in China. However, this 
reconstruction has a political connotation. Harbin Station 1904 was demolished in 
1959. If this had anything to do with the dominant nationalist ideology in the Mao and 
Post-Mao era, the modernist station built in 1960 could be understood as a de-
colonization from the former Russian colonizer. Then, why was the once demolished 
colonial station reconstructed in 2018? Why was the modernist Chinese style effaced 
in the new plan? Harbin Station 1904 was endowed with changed connotations by 
local officials over time: it represented the end of colonial hegemony in the 1960s, 
and finally evolved into an exotic heritage that Harbiners should be proud of in the 
2010s. As Graham Huggan argues, “The exoticist production of otherness is 
dialectical and contingent at various times and in different places, it may serve 
conflicting ideological interests, providing the rationale for projects of rapprochement 
and reconciliation.”9 
                                                                 
7 Yukiko Koga, Inheritance of Loss: China, Japan, and the Political Economy of Redemption after 
Empire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 2. 
8 Jie Di, “Guonei shouli xinyishu yundong fengge zhanfang: haerbin huochezhan Xinjian beizhanfang 
‘loulian’ (The first Art Nouveau railway station in China: Harbin North Station was built up),” 
Heilongjiang Daily, March 31, 2017.  
9 Huggan, The Postcolonial Exotic, 13. 
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Architecture has ambiguous meanings and is open to many interpretations.10 
Whether Harbin Station 1904 is a marker of colonization or a heritage to be proud of 
is interpreted differently over time by the central and local officials, to whom the 
meaning of architecture is expected to serve political and economic ends. In Fan’s 
words, “In the course of appropriating the classical style, Chinese builders ignored its 
ideological implications and replaced them with an ideology of materialism.”11 In 
this chapter, I argue that the appropriation of Harbin Station 1904 in 2018 not only is 
a means of developing local economy, but also an indication of the changed official 
ideology in ruling the city. What this highlights is a shift away from an emphasis on 
nationalism to a celebration of the city’s cosmopolitan tradition, despite its colonial 
nature.12 
 I regard the reconstruction of Harbin Station 1904 in 2018 as decolonizing the 
decolonized. This reconstruction suggests a sense of resoluteness vis-a-vis the city’s 
colonial history and pride in its colonial modernity, “demonstrating China’s 
confidence in its economic power as well as in ideological accommodation.”13 Koga 
identifies such revitalization of the Russian heritage in Harbin as “unarticulated 
postcolonial unconsciousness;” it represents a “delicate coupling of desire and 
                                                                 
10 See Christoph Baumberger, “Ambiguity in Architecture,” in From Logic to Art: Themes from 
Nelson Goodman, ed. Gerhard Ernst, Jakob Steinbrenner, and Oliver R. Scholz (Frankfurt: Ontos 
Verlag, 2009), 293-319. 
11 Fan, “Culture for Sale,” 69. 
12 See Koga, “The Double Inheritance,” 6. 
13 Fan, “Culture for Sale,” 70-71; According to Fan, “Professor Wu Jiahua with China Academy of Art 
considered the importation of Western architecture to be a continuation of Western countries’ 
colonialist expansion.” Also see Wu Jiahua, “Lun kongjian zhiminzhuyi (On spatial colonialism),” The 
Architectural Journal, 1(1995):38.  
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disavowal faced by many postcolonial societies.”14 Demolishing the old station in 
1959 and reconstructing it in recent years suggests the selectivity in memorializing 
histories and the political reinterpretation of this new site of memory. Such acts are 
meant to frame and direct contemporary Harbiners’ remembering and forgetting of the 
city’s different versions of its past. The officials have inscribed distinctive ideological 
messages into spatial narratives through the removal and reconstruction of Harbin 
Station.  
Moreover, the complexity of Harbin Station should be examined as a site of 
power and ideological contention. In the analysis below, three cases are taken into 
consideration: the construction of the Manchukuo Monument on the square of Harbin 
Station in 1932, its replacement by the Soviet Red Army Monument in 1945 and the 
demolition of the latter in the early 1990s, and the construction of the Memorial 
Museum for the anti-Japanese Korean martyr Ahn Jung-geun in 2014. Harbin Station 
turned out to be a symbolic landscape of power contention among the tsarist Russians, 
Japanese, Koreans, the Soviets, and the Chinese. Like Tiananmen Square and People’s 
Square in Shanghai,15 which represent power and authority, Harbin Station Square 
was and is, in Lefebvre’s terms, a “monumental space” that is infused with power 
relations.16 Similar to Linda Hershkovitz’s understanding of Tiananmen Square as “a 
concrete representation of the hegemony of the Chinese state,”17 whoever sets their 
                                                                 
14 Koga, “The Double Inheritance,” 64. 
15 See Elizabeth J. Perry, “Shanghai’s Politicized Skyline,” in Shanghai: Architecture and Urbanism 
for Modern China, ed. Peter G. Rowe and Seng Kuan (Munich: Prestel, 2004), 104-109.  
16 Yomi Braester, Painting the City Red: Chinese Cinema and the Urban Contract  (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 153; also see Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 224-225. 
17 Ibid., 153; also see Linda Hershkovitz, “Tiananmen Square and the Politics of Place,” Political 
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monuments on the Harbin Station Square claims the hegemony over Harbin.  
 
Harbin Station 1904 versus 2018: The Revival of Classicism  
The reconstruction of Harbin Station is part and parcel of the comprehensive project 
to improve the local transportation system, which includes the construction of express 
railways from Harbin to several other major cities in Heilongjiang Province. Also 
included is the overhaul of the streets and squares in proximity to the two railway 
stations, and the renovation of the adjacent Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church, which 
was partly damaged during the Cultural Revolution and abandoned for decades 
thereafter.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Harbin Station South, courtesy of Harbin Urban and Rural Planning Bureau  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Harbin Station North, courtesy of Harbin Urban and Rural Planning Bureau 
                                                                 
Geography 12, no.5 (September 1993): 395-420.  
 
 
78 
 
 
    Figure 3. Harbin Station in 1904, courtesy of imharbin.com 
Harbin Station 2018 consists of the South Station and the North Station. The two 
new stations resemble, amplify, and transform Harbin Station 1904. The latter’s 
resurrection symbolizes a trend of going back to the “origin,” and the current city 
officials’ identification with the Russian cultural roots of the city. The resurrection of 
the original station in 2018 is partly a product of the official policy on urban 
development, fu gu (revival of classicism). According to Wu Songtao, a senior official 
with the Harbin Urban Planning Bureau, fu gu in the context of Harbin refers to 
valuing classical architecture in all styles, such as the Chinese, European, and 
Russian. In reality, European classism has been given priority. Fu gu is a response to 
the potential identity crisis that modernity inflicted on the city. As Jianfei Zhu argues, 
“What is coming into China from the West has been not only architectural post-
modernism, but also a broader post-modern conservative culture developed since the 
1970s, emphasizing cultural relativism, regionalism and traditionalism, which is in 
turn associated with a theoretical critique of ‘modernity’…and progress.”18  
The revival of European classical architecture in Harbin is partly a post-modern 
                                                                 
18 Jianfei Zhu, “Beyond Revolution: Notes on Contemporary Chinese Architecture,” AA Files, no. 35 
(Spring 1998): 10. 
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critique of modernity and progress, which have put the city in jeopardy of becoming a 
featureless city or “non-place,” in Marc Augé’s terms.19 
The new Harbin Station is more or less an imitation of the 1904 version, but it is 
also a mutated representation of the cultural memory of the once-Europeanized 
Harbin, which is exemplified by absorbing certain elements from such old art-
nouveau buildings as the Modern Hotel, the former Moscow Mall, and the former 
Russian Consulate in Harbin. The mushroom windows of the Modern Hotel and 
former Russian Consulate in Harbin are taken as a reference for Harbin Station 2018. 
Moreover, the red mansard roof of the former Moscow Mall, a piece of baroque 
architecture built in 1906, is referenced in the design of the new railway stations. By 
referencing elements of these historical buildings, Harbin Station 2018 becomes the 
epitome of old and new classical buildings. It is constituted by a series of enriched 
temporal layers, as well as a synchronic incorporation of other European architectural 
styles, telling a different, new, and old story of the European cultural space of Harbin 
in the past and at present. Moreover, Harbin Station 2018 chooses red roof and 
creamy yellow as its wall colour, in order to be consistent with the dominant yellow 
colour of the surrounding historical district.20 In close proximity to Harbin Station, 
several historical buildings in classical style are preserved well, such as the former 
CER Management Bureau Hotel and the building of the former South Manchuria 
Corporation Ltd. Harbin Branch. The new station opens up an architectural dialogue 
across time with the adjacent old buildings, implying local officials’ concerted efforts 
                                                                 
19 Marc Augé, Oblivion, trans. Marjolijn de Jager. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004. 
20 Harbin Urban and Rural Planning Bureau, “Huochezhan gaizao 1904-2016.” 
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to ensure the historical continuity of the European tradition of the city. Paradoxically, 
the price for such continuity is the demolition of the modernist Harbin Station, i.e., the 
rupture and erasure of the non-European history of the city. If the demolition of the 
old Harbin Station in 1959 was partly due to the Maoist ideology and the attempt to 
implant a Chinese “heart” into Harbin, then the construction of Harbin Station 2018 is 
similar to the reincarnation of the Russian and European ghosts into modern bodies. 
Architecturally, the sense of continuity between Harbin Station 1904 and 2018 
signifies the historical oblivion of the Mao and Post-Mao era of Harbin. Colonial 
modernity is celebrated. This signifies a cautious and strategic rapprochement of 
Harbin officials with their former colonizers. 
 
Going Back to the Russian Root: Decolonizing the Decolonized 
As indicated earlier, replacing the Chinese version of Harbin Station with the original 
Russian/European one is a process of decolonizing the decolonized. By claiming the 
new station as the first art-nouveau station in China, local officials reveal a sense of 
pride in the colonial modernity they inherited from their former colonizers. Exoticism 
is embraced in full, in order to establish local particularism and local internationalism. 
Its political connotation is downplayed as it is built up.  
Along with the construction of Harbin Station 2018, an abandoned church nearby 
has been restored on the new square of the North Station. Holy Iveron Church was a 
Russian military church built in 1913. It is located on Factory Street, which used to be 
a narrow and hidden street. As a result, not many people had a chance to see the 
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church. During the Cultural Revolution, its five onion-shaped domes were 
demolished. It was abandoned for decades and, in the 1980s, functioned as a 
warehouse of a clothing factory. After being forgotten for decades, Holy Iveron 
Church has been brought back to the public’s attention. Its surrounding areas were 
demolished to become a spacious square, on which both the church and the newly 
established Harbin North Station is located. The five onion-shaped domes have been 
reconstructed: this renovated church has become a combination of the freshly painted 
old body of this church and its new/old onion-shaped domes. The latter symbolize 
local officials’ reparation to the mistake made during the Cultural Revolution. As 
Jacques Derrida points out, inheritance is more than a simple transfer of capital from 
one generation to another, as secrets inherent in inheritance open up a possibility of 
betrayal.21 As the city capitalizes on its buried European past, the repressed memory 
of the Cultural Revolution, “the secret inherent in inheritance,” is brought to light.22 
It is a by-product of the nostalgia industry prevailing in Harbin, a betrayal that 
“discloses or reveals what should be kept secret.”23 The restored five onion-shaped 
domes tell the glory of the cosmopolitan Harbin, as well as the trauma it experienced 
during the Cultural Revolution. 
Despite adopting a classical form, this old/new Harbin Station and the Holy 
Iveron Church are essentially future-oriented. The station, first and foremost, meets 
the demands of passengers for a modern railway station. It is a symbol of modernity 
                                                                 
21 Koga, “The Double Inheritance,” 38; also see Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the 
Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International . New York: Routledge, 1994.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.  
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and modernization. Memorializing the once-glorious Harbin on this site of memory is 
not only meant to impart selective knowledge of the city’s history to contemporary 
Harbiners, but also to develop the city on its way to modernization and 
internationalization. Harbin defines its future by going back to its past. “The past 
repeats, but never without changing. Repetition is a form of memory within an 
openness to the future.”24 Harbin officials intend to evoke the glorious cosmopolitan 
past of the city, as a wish for building an equally glorious future. I call this past-and-
future-oriented mentality of city-development, “pre-post-erous.” This suggests the 
officials’ inability to live in the present. The demolition of the modernist Harbin 
Station is a case in point. This is similar to the case of Hong Kong before and after the 
transition in 1997. Struggling with an identity confusion of both/and, as well as 
neither/nor in terms of culture and language, the people of Hong Kong resorted to the 
city’s colonial past or envisioned a different future for an independent identity. 
Contemporary Harbiners have a similar propensity to construct a unique identity of 
Harbin by orienting toward the past-and-future. 
 
Away from Classic Nationalism to Modernist Exoticism and Public Perceptions of the 
Change 
What do local citizens think of the new Harbin Station? There are a variety of 
answers. Concerning the imitation of Harbin Station 1904 in this reconstruction, 
                                                                 
24 Lucy Burke, Simon Faulkner and Jim Aulich. The Politics of Cultural Memory (Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 65. 
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Wang Dongke, a staff member working with the Harbin Cultural Heritage 
Management Institute, said that the new station is “looking for the soul of the old 
Harbin Station, whose physical body is dead.” He does not think that the soul of the 
“dead” station could be resurrected.  
The notion and implications of such “resurrecting” for the contemporary city 
development of Harbin are both intriguing and problematic. By “intriguing,” I mean 
that the resurrected architecture arouses Harbiners’ memory and imagined experience 
of the city’s past, endowing the city with an aura of historicity through imagination. 
By “problematic,” I mean that the change in size and material from the original 
station, and the adoption of architectural elements from other buildings make the new 
station a malformation in time and space. This malformation is illustrated in the 
comments by Liu Songfu, a professor of the Architecture Department at the Harbin 
Institute of Technology. Professor Liu is critical of the new Harbin Station and says: 
“Take that ionic column as an example; if the ratio is changed, it will give people a 
sense of strangeness, because our eyes have already been used to the ratio.” For an 
alternative form of the railway station, Liu suggests that since its function is to meet 
the demand of modern transportation, a modern style would be more appropriate. 
Zheng Qi also agrees that such an “amplified version of the old station is neither fish 
nor fowl;” it is impossible to rebuild the old one; therefore, an advanced modern 
station could be a solution.25  
On the other hand, there is support from the public for an art-nouveau Harbin 
                                                                 
25 Zheng Qi is a retired staff from Harbin Railway Bureau and a scholar studying the old buildings 
related to the Chinese Eastern Railway. 
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Station. A train passenger, who is a graduate from a local university, prefers the new 
station because he thinks that it is beautiful and consistent with the other classical 
buildings in Harbin, such as those on Central Street.26 This expected consistency 
between the old and the new buildings suggests his and many other Harbiners’ desire 
for historical continuity in terms of urban space, which has been broken into 
fragments in the process of modernization.  
As illustrated by the demolition and reconstruction of Harbin Stations over the 
past century, the official ideologies behind urban planning have shifted from 
emphasizing nationalism to emphasizing exoticism, from a preference for modernism 
to classicism. I would interpret such change in terms of, what Ackbar Abbas defines 
as, a “culture of disappearance,” which means “the replacement and substitution of 
one thing for another, rather than a matter of effacement.”27 In the case of the Harbin 
Station reconstruction, that refers to the disappearance of Harbin Station 1960 and its 
substitution by Harbin Station 2018. However, in a sense, it is a reappearance of 
Harbin Station 1904.  
 
Façade, a Lens to See the Changed Official Ideologies in Regard to Harbin’s Russian 
Culture 
The official promotion of European architectural styles in Harbin is not without 
contention. A few years ago, some local officials were reluctant to recognize that they 
                                                                 
26 Central Street is famous for many European-style classical buildings on its two sides. It is called 
“Open Air Architectural Museum.” 
27 Abbas, Hong Kong, 9. 
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were imitating the architectural styles in Moscow. A sense of Chinese national dignity 
is part of the reason. In 2016, when I asked Wu, an official working at the Harbin 
Urban and Rural Planning Bureau, about the reason for painting the façades creamy 
yellow, he replied that, “It was according to Harbin’s Colour Plan and Regulation. 
Creamy yellow makes people feel warm in the cold winter of Harbin.” Similar 
comment was made by the former vice mayor of Harbin, Qu Lei, in an interview with 
Thomas Lahusen in the summer of 2014.28 I asked whether the new façades relate to 
the Russian heritage of Harbin, and whether this is part of the efforts to construct a 
modern Oriental Moscow. Wu retorted that “What you said is totally wrong. It has 
nothing to do with Russia.” In contrast, when I asked the same questions to Wang 
Yan, a professor at the Architecture Department of the Harbin Institute of 
Technology, she said, “Yes, these creamy yellow façades are for building Harbin into 
Oriental Moscow. The façades are kitschy, given that many residential buildings did 
not have such creamy yellow façades.”  
 These statements lend themselves to a speech act analysis. Following John B. 
Thompson’s interpretation of Pierre Bourdieu, “The utterance of speech-acts involves 
the implementation of institutionally established relations of power;” “In many cases 
a speech-act is an ‘institutional act’ which is listened to, believed, obeyed, answered 
precisely because it is ‘authorized’ by the institution concerned.”29 A speech-act is 
                                                                 
28 Thomas Lahusen, “Conflicting Memories.”  
29 John B. Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), 67; also see 
Pierre Bourdieu, Ce que parler veut dire: l'économie des échanges linguistiques. Paris: Fayard, 1982. 
Emphasis original. 
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empowered as well as constructed by the institution involved. Wu’s answer is 
representative of local official discourse. The contrast between Wu’s and Wang’s 
answers implies the different perceptions of the city’s past between the official and 
the professional. In August 2017, when I called Wu again, he agreed that the façades 
do help to constitute the Russian cultural space of Harbin. When I asked about his 
present opinion on the heritage renovation in Harbin, he replied, “Do not listen to the 
so-called experts. What they say is nonsense.” Wu blames local experts for the failure 
of some of their local heritage preservation projects. He does not have faith in the 
competence of local experts. On the other hand, local architects, historians, and 
cultural heritage researchers blame the municipal government for the kitschy quality 
of preservation and the commercialization of old buildings. There is more hostility 
than consent between the government and the professionals.  
Moreover, Wu’s changed interpretations of the façade renovation project 
demonstrates local Chinese officials’ evolved perceptions of the city’s Russian and 
European-style architecture. That is to say, the attitude and actions of CCP officials 
during the Cultural Revolution are at odds with that of their contemporary 
counterparts, who promote the colonial heritage of Harbin, although formally they are 
still the same administrative party in China. The party experienced a gradual 
ideological change over time and, in this process tension and controversy have 
characterized the relationship between the conservative and the progressive. Wu’s 
distinctive interpretations of the façade renovation project in 2016 and 2017 visualize 
the CCP’s ideological transformation from that of conservative nationalists to being 
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more open-minded,30 from classic nationalism some way toward a modernist 
exoticism.  
 
Harbin Station 2018 versus Kowloon-Canton Railway Clock Tower 
A case somewhat parallel to the reconstruction of Harbin Station is the relocation of 
Kowloon-Canton Railway Clock Tower in Hong Kong. The Clock Tower, forty-four 
meters high and in the Edwardian Classical Revival style, was part of the terminus of 
the Kowloon-Canton Railway in Tsim Sha Tsui (TST).31 Built in 1913, the main 
terminus building was demolished in 1978, leaving only the clock tower.32 On the site 
of TST Railway Station, the Hong Kong Cultural Center (HKCC) was constructed. Its 
construction began in 1984 and was completed in 1989.33 The Hong Kong Cultural 
Center is a modern complex of theaters, concert hall, and galleries. The Clock Tower 
became the only historical site in HKCC square. The single heritage building, steeped 
in modern surroundings, is problematic because it may distort people’s imagination of 
the “milieu de mémoire,”34 the real lived environment, which memory helps 
constitute and in which the Clock Tower was “situated.” Such a modern site now 
becomes secondary, rather than authentic, in preserving the memory of the Clock 
Tower. According to Abbas, the Clock Tower is a “quotation’ from Hong Kong’s 
architectural history, and it is the expression of a sense of historical moment, giving to 
                                                                 
30 Such observation of the CCP’s ideological transformation over time by no means suggests that the 
CCP has been a uniform entity. According to Lin Chun, “Mao was known to have cheerfully admitted 
parties within the party.” Lin, The Transformation of Chinese Socialism, 3.  
31 Hong Kong Tourism Board. “Former Kowloon-Canton Railway Clock Tower (Tsim Sha Tsui).” 
http://www.discoverhongkong.com/china/see-do/highlight-attractions/top-10/clock-tower.jsp 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Nora, “Between Memory and History,” 7-24. 
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the cultural center a patina of local history. But this patina is no more than decorative, 
an image of history meant for visual consumption.”35  
Despite the problematic nature of situating both the historical building in modern 
surroundings in Hong Kong and the reconstructed “antique” in Harbin, the Clock 
Tower and Harbin Station 2018 are memorial markers of the past. I argue that by 
preserving this historical reminder, the Clock Tower suggests the Hong Kong 
officials’ efforts to affirm a separate “Hong Kong” identity. Hong Kong’s inheritance 
of, and identification with, its colonial past strategically integrates its modern 
commercial buildings into its given historical environment, which differentiates it 
from other Chinese cities. While modern skyscrapers make Hong Kong look similar 
to other modern cities, Hong Kong officials promote the city’s profile by preserving 
its colonial past. The “Russianness” (fake or not) in Harbin would play a similar role. 
 
Harbin Station: A Site of Power Contention 
Located in the city’s center, Harbin Station’s importance goes beyond its geographical 
location. According to Abbas, “Architecture, because it is always assumed to be 
somewhere, is the first visual evidence of a city’s putative identity. In this regard, the 
symbolic landscape of center exerts a particular fascination.”36 The central 
geographical location of Harbin Station makes it an obvious site of political power 
struggles.  
                                                                 
35 Abbas, Hong Kong, 66. 
36 Ibid. Meanwhile, Abbas questions the center’s role as a representative of a city by saying that “Can 
the architecture of the center, even the whole of Hong Kong architecture, represent the city?”  
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During the Japanese-led Manchukuo period, a plaque with the name 
“Manchukuo” was added onto the top of the main entrance of Harbin Station; and the 
Manchukuo Monument was built in front of Harbin Station to commemorate the 
nation building of Manchukuo.37 In this way, Harbin Station Square was transformed 
into a symbolic landscape of power. The Manchukuo Monument is the assertion of the 
Japanese hegemony over Harbin. Similarly, Benedict Anderson understands the 
National Monument in Jakarta as “less a part of tradition than a way of claiming it.”38 
The spatial claim to one’s authority over the city was further illustrated when the 
Manchukuo Monument was replaced by the Soviet Red Army Monument in 1945,39  
when Russian soldiers invaded Manchukuo and defeated the Japanese army. The 
changed monuments on the Harbin Station Square are an abstraction and display of 
the power contention for the leadership of Harbin between Japan and the Soviet 
Union.40 
 
A Place of Oblivion: the Soviet Red Army Monument  
The Soviet Red Army Monument was built in front of the main entrance of Harbin 
Station on November 23, 1945, to commemorate the Russian martyrs in the Anti-
                                                                 
37 Hai Gao and Bingcao, Harbin Station Gazetteer, 8.  
38 Benedict Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia  (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), 175; also see Abidin Kusno, Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban 
Space, and Political Cultures in Indonesia (London: Routledge, 2000), 64. 
39 See Harbin Gazetteer Compiling Committee, Harbin shizhi: shizheng jianshe (Harbin gazetteer: 
public construction), 1995.  
40 See Lawrence J.Vale, “Capital Architecture and National Identity,” in Power and Architecture: the 
Construction of Capitals and the Politics of Space , ed. Michael Minkenberg (New York: Berghahn, 
2014), 42. 
90 
 
Japanese War. It was dismantled in the early 1990s.41 It is ironic that this monument 
was preserved in the 1960s, when Sino-Russian friendship worsened, but was 
demolished in the peaceful era of the 1990s. Indeed, many more monuments and 
heritage buildings were actually destroyed in the 1990s than in the Cultural 
Revolution. They gave way to high buildings. Moreover, a strong sense of Chinese 
national dignity was prevalent among the Chinese officials in the 1990s.42 According 
to Zheng Qi, the dissolution of the Soviet Union partly provided a chance for the 
municipal officials of Harbin to justify the demolition of this monument. I assume that 
the special location of this monument was the main reason for its demolition. For one 
thing, it was located right in front of the main entrance of Harbin Station. Passengers 
could see it on entering and exiting Harbin Station. As a marker and catalyzer of Sino-
Russian relationship, its presence might become embarrassing, after China’s 
detachment from the Soviet Elder Brother and after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. For another thing, due to the decline of its political function, it was thought to 
be a road block on the square. In contrast, another smaller Soviet Red Army 
Monument has survived. It is located near the Sunshine Hall, 800 meters away from 
Harbin Station. Its location and height are not as conspicuous as the one on the Harbin 
                                                                 
41 According to Li Shuxiao, a well-known local historian, the Soviet Red Amy Monument was planned 
to be relocated to Huangshang Cemetery in the suburb of Harbin, but this plan failed. Changhe, a local 
volunteer in the protection of cultural heritage, explained that this failure was due to ineffective 
supervision and management; also see Suan cai bang zi, “Haerbin ren xinmu zhong bugai shiqude 
sanzuo jianzhu (Three buildings that should not be forgotten by Harbiners).” 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_11278406_1.html 
42 One of the examples is the demolition of the old Germanic-style railway station in the city of Jinan 
in 1992. The officials tried to prove that they could build better modernist buildings, to decolonize the 
works of the former colonizers. 
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Station Square. This is part of the reason for its survival from demolition. Such 
contrast, again, illustrates the geographical importance and political sensitivity of 
Harbin Station.  
Covering up the Soviet Red Army Monuments from public sight happened not 
only in Harbin but also in several other cities in Northeast China.43 In Dalian, the 
Soviet Red Army used to be located downtown on People’s Square, whose former 
name was Stalin Square from 1945 to 1993. It was relocated in 1999 to the Soviet Red 
Army Martyr Memorial Park in an isolated area of the Lüshunkou District (formerly 
known as Port Arthur). In Shen Yang, the Soviet Red Army Monument used to be 
located on Shenyang South Railway Station Square and it gave way to subway 
construction in 2006. The monument was relocated to the Soviet Army Martyr 
Memorial Park in the north part of Shenyang. Only the Changchun Soviet Red Army 
Monument remains on its original site, the People’s Square. After the removal of the 
monuments, the former sites have given way to modern construction. However, the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the renewed relationship between China 
and Russia have also relegated the symbolic importance of these monuments. Having 
a Soviet Monument located in the downtown of cities in Northeast China does not fit 
the nation-building agenda of the CCP. I assume the reasons for the “survival” of the 
one in Changchun might be related to the fact that Changchun used to be the capital 
city of the Japanese colonial regime, Manchukuo. The Soviet Red Army Monument in 
Changchun functions not only as a memorialization of the Soviet martyrs, but also a 
                                                                 
43 The Soviet Red Army Monuments were built in several cities in Northeast China in the 1940s and 
early 1950s. Among the major ones are Harbin, Changchun, Dalian, and Shenyang. 
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physical reminder of the defeat of the Japanese fascist invaders of China.44 
 
    Figure 4. The Soviet Red Army Monument in front of the Former Harbin Station  
 
Figure 5. Ahn Jung-geun Martyr Memorial Museum in the East Wing of the  
Former Harbin Station45 
 
A Place of Memory: Ahn Jung-geun Martyr Memorial Museum 
While the Soviet Red Army Monument was demolished in the early 1990s, the Ahn 
Jung-geun Memorial Museum was built in Harbin Station in 2014 to commemorate 
the Korean martyr, Ahn Jung-geun, who assassinated the Minister of Japan Privy 
Council, Ito Hirobumi. On October 26, 1909, conspiring to exploit Northeast China 
with Russian representative Vladimir Kokovtsov, Ito Hirobumi visited Harbin to 
                                                                 
44 Darien Rozentals examines the dismantling of Soviet monuments in Villnus, Lithuania in the 1990s, 
in relation to the reconstruction of a post-soviet national identity. See Darien Rozentals , “Opacity: 
Reading Dialogues in Monumental Space,” in The Politics of Cultural Memory, ed. Lucy Burke, Simon 
Faulkner, and Jim Aulich (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 133-146. 
45 In this picture, next to the museum (of yellow colour) is a business-class concourse of the former Harbin 
Station.  
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discuss the amendment to the Russo-Japanese Secret Treaty.46 On his arrival at the 
platform of Harbin Station, the Korean patriot Ahn Jung-geun shot him. Ahn was 
arrested on the site and was sentenced to death in the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison 
on March 26, 1910.47 
 The establishment of Ahn Jung-geun Memorial Museum was supported by the 
former South Korean President Park Geun-hye. During her visit to China in June, 
2013, she emphasized the significance of Ahn’s act and made a request to build a 
memorial museum for him. This request was taken seriously by Chinese 
government.48 This construction also happened one year before the 70th anniversary 
of the victory in the Anti-Japanese War. The museum becomes a site of “patriotic 
education” for both Koreans and Chinese.  
According to Pierre Nora, “It is memory that dictates while history writes.”49 
The opposition between memory and history is essential. “History” would relate to 
the site, where Ahn Jung-geun assassinated Ito Hirobumi, but memory would 
transform the place into a lieu, the memorial museum. Because it is artificially 
constructed, the museum is a symbol and a political act. By monumentalizing the 
history of anti-Japanese Korean heroism in 2014, Harbin Station becomes a site of 
memory, embodying ideological partnership between China and Korea in 
confrontation with Japan not only in the past but also at present.  
                                                                 
46 Shuxiao Li, Haerbin lishi biannian 1896-1949 (Harbin historical chronology 1896-1949) (Harbin: 
City Gazetteer Compiling Office of the Municipal Government of Harbin, 1986), 36. 
47 Ibid. 
48 “Waijiaobu: anzhonggen shoudao zhongguo renmin zunjing (The Foreign Ministry of China: An 
Jung-geun is respected by the Chinese).” The Beijing News, January 21, 2014. 
http://www.bjnews.com.cn/world/2014/01/ 21/302842.html 
49 Nora, “Between Memory and History,” 21.  
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In the same vein, the demolition of the Soviet Red Army Monument embodies 
an equally rich political message. Through covering up and unveiling different pasts 
of the city, Harbin Station becomes a barometer that suggest the diplomatic 
relationships between the states in East Asia and Russia. It is a place of memory and 
oblivion serving the political ends in contemporary Harbin and China at large. 
 
Conclusion 
Harbin Station has been speaking an architectural language of politics. From 1904 to 
2018, Harbin Station witnessed a circular trajectory of development, which I call “a 
decolonization of the decolonized.” In contrast to the nationalist ideology that 
contributed to the demolition of the Russian-built railway station in 1959, Harbin 
Station 2018 shows an official desire to go back to its Russian and European roots, 
forgetting the colonial connotation of the old buildings. Through covering up the 
nationalist past and reinventing the exotic one, local officials manifest a positive 
revision and utilization of the colonial past to serve both economic and cultural ends. 
As Abidin Kusno argues, “Decolonization can be understood as both a rupture and a 
continuation of the existing power relations. It entails the appropriation of symbols 
and the investment of meanings into the architecture of the colonial era.” 50  
Referring to Indonesia’s architecture and urban design, Kusno further observes that 
                                                                 
50 Brown, “Design of Guam’s Government House,” 162; Kusno, Behind the Postcolonial, 5; also see 
Arjun Appadurai, “Playing with Modernity: the Decolonization of Indian Cricket,” in Consuming 
Modernity: Public Culture in a South Asian World , ed. Carol A. Breckenridge (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press), 23-48. 
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“the past returns, in an active form, in the present.”51 The postcolonial inheritance of 
the Russian-built art nouveau railway station is a strategy for the city to establish a 
unique local identity, reposition itself in the national and global market, and make a 
niche in the political arena of China, Japan, Russia, and Korea. 
 
                                                                 
51 Ibid.  
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Chapter Three. Chinese Baroque: A Site of Economic Re-colonization and 
Cultural Resistance 
 
In the first half of the twentieth century, the cultural identity of Harbin has been 
controversial. Its intricacy cannot be displayed in a simplified, diachronic definition 
of the city as either Chinese or Russian. For one thing, Harbin was inhabited by multi-
ethnic communities from more than forty countries, although the Chinese and 
Russians were dominant. For another, the Chinese and Russian cultures appropriated 
and intertwined with each other in Harbin. In this hybrid cultural space, cooperation 
and competition coexisted and power struggles abounded. The complexity that 
involves Harbin’s Russianness has been examined in Chapters One and Two; Harbin’s 
Chineseness is analyzed in this chapter. Indeed, Harbin’s Chineseness is not given but 
a dynamic construction through intercultural communication, and its meaning evolved 
from the colonial context to the contemporary context of market economy. Harbin’s 
Chineseness distinguishes itself from that of other cities in China because of its 
specific hybridity and, what I call, its “double exoticism.” 
If the CER Zone represents the Russian cultural space of Harbin, Fu jia-dian 
(1890-1956), the current Daowai District, represents the cultural space of the Chinese 
community of Harbin in the first half of the twentieth century. The Chinese Baroque 
neighborhood is representative of Old Daowai, especially its communal way of life. 
Chinese Baroque refers to an architectural style, which is characterized by a 
combination of Baroque façades, Chinese decorations, and Chinese courtyard layout. 
When the Baroque style of architecture was introduced by the Russians to Harbin, it 
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became complex, because of its cultural layering of the “imagined” European 
Baroque and the transformed neo-Baroque in Russia, on top of the Chinese style. 
Many of these buildings were constructed by Chinese merchants in the 1920s, when 
the Chinese national capitalist economy boomed in Fu jia-dian.1 After decades of 
vicissitudes, this neighborhood is disappearing and “reappearing” through 
preservation and gentrification.  
The primary objective of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, this chapter provides a 
cultural explanation of, what I would like to call, the identity crisis of the Daowai 
District in its recent renovation. Since 2007, many of these buildings have been 
reconstructed; businesses and the tourist industry have replaced the original 
residential area, forcing residents to move into apartment buildings in the suburbs. 
The relocation of these old residents and the commercialization of these old buildings 
suggest the pervasiveness of an aggressive market economy and the economic 
marginalization of the poor. The colonization of Daowai did not end when the 
Russians and the Japanese left Harbin. Contemporary Daowai has witnessed the 
recolonization of the colonized, in terms of economy.  
Secondly, this chapter examines the criticism of the commercialization of the 
Chinese Baroque neighborhood that has transformed Old Daowai, a lived space of 
memory, into a historical sight for consumption. The original residents are caught 
                                                                 
1 According to Koshigawa, the Japanese Oriental Development Company contributed to the 
construction of many buildings in Fu Jia-dian from 1919 to 1923 by providing real estate mortgage 
financial services. Akira Koshigawa, Haerbinde chengshi guihua (Harbin Urban Planning) , trans. 
Xiliang Li (Harbin: Harbin Press, 2014), 68. 
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between nostalgia for Old Daowai and preference for the modern living conditions that 
they can enjoy after displacement to the suburbs. 2  They paradoxically love and hate 
the restored Chinese Baroque neighborhood. Additionally, silent resistance to the 
disappearance of Old Daowai in a variety of cultural productions is analyzed. 
Photographs, paintings, and memoirs become visual and literary monuments to the loss 
of Old Daowai, perpetuating the memory of this place. As much as they are memorials 
to Old Daowai, they are also a denunciation of the gentrification of this historical place. 
The diverse forms of resistance, in the wake of this renovation, complicate the dynamic 
process of Daowai’s regional identity, in its transition from the old living space to the 
new commercial one. However, much of the resistance is ineffective, due to the 
overwhelming power of Capitalist-influenced socialism in China, or “One Party Market 
Economy.” 3  In order to explore the struggle between establishing a new market-
oriented identity for Daowai and preserving the old one, I examine the tensions among 
a variety of stakeholders and powers, including the poor versus the rich, the original 
residents versus the municipal government, and real estate developers versus heritage 
protectors. These diverse tensions constitute the social production of this old/new place 
of memory in Daowai.  
 
                                                                 
2 In the summer of 2014, I interviewed a tuk-tuk driver in Daowai. He was in his 40s and had been 
living in the old buildings and would move into a modern apartment offered by the government. When 
I asked his preference, he replied, “The old, because I had lived there for years and I am attached to it.” 
When I asked “which one do you prefer to live,” he said, “The new one. It is modern and convenient.” 
Such a conflict between emotional and functional preference is common among many old citizens 
there. See Thomas Lahusen, Manchurian Sleepwalkers. Chemodan Films, 2017. 
https://www.chemodanfilms.com/manchurian-sleepwalkers  
3 Wendy Su, China’s Encounter with Global Hollywood: Cultural Policy and the Film Industry, 1994-
2013 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2016), 13. 
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The Introduction of Old Daowai 
Before getting into a thorough analysis of Chinese Baroque renovation, this chapter 
starts with a historical introduction of the Daowai District and the social context, in 
which Chinese Baroque came into being, because Daowai has been controversial:  
some historical discourses about Old Daowai speak of the Harbin’s identity as 
exclusively Russian while others, as exclusively Chinese. One of the most sensitive 
questions has to do with whether the construction of the city was started by the 
Russians, in the CER Zone in 1898, or by the Chinese, in Fujia-dian (Daowai) in 
1905. Some Chinese historical writings claim that Fujia-dian is the origin of Harbin, 
as illustrated by the title of the book, The Hundred Years of Daowai—the Annual-
Rings of Harbin Extended from Here. Moreover, according to Chinese official 
discourse, the establishment of modern Harbin began on Oct. 31, 1905, when the 
Qing government established its administrative institute in Fujia-dian. That is why in 
1998 the proposal for an academic conference for a centennial celebration of Harbin’s 
establishment was refused by the Propaganda Department of China, although it had 
been approved by the municipal government of Harbin.4 
Fujia-dian literally means the Fu’s Stores, and such name was chosen to honour 
Fu Baoshan (1864-1973), one of the pioneers, who contributed to the development of 
Fujia-dian into an urban area.5 The Russian construction of the Chinese Eastern 
Railway (the CER) attracted many Chinese immigrants from Shandong and Hebei 
                                                                 
4 See Thomas Lahusen, “A Place Called Harbin: Reflections on a Centennial,” The China Quarterly, 
no. 154 (June 1998): 400-410. 
5 Shiliang Li, Fang Shi, and Ling Gao, Haerbin shihua (Harbin History) (Harbin: Heilongjiang 
People’s Press, 1994), 127. 
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provinces to do labor work for the CER. Many of the Chinese labor workers lived in 
Fujia-dian and China Street (or Kitaiskaya Street in Russian). The latter was in the 
Daoli District, which was within the CER Zone and the majority of its residents were 
Russians. After 1900, the Chinese were not allowed to live in the CER Zone, unless 
they owned property or business there.6 Moreover, the Russian police were in charge 
of the criminal affairs in the CER Zone, and the Russian security regulation was 
implemented in the CER Zone in 1911. As a result, there were many constraints on 
Chinese businessmen there. Therefore, many Chinese moved to Fujia-dian.7 These 
historical facts suggest that the exclusive policy by the Russians in the CER Zone 
facilitated the growth of Fujia-dian into a Chinese community.  
The two communities, the Chinese in Fujia-dian and the Russian in the CER 
Zone, were separate from each other. An example is given by Elena Petrovna Taskina, 
the author of the Russians in Manchuria, who was born in Harbin in 1927 and left for 
the Soviet Union in 1954. Taskina stated that Harbin, as a whole, was a Russian 
cultural space; she had only gone to Fujia-dian once on an invitation from a friend at 
school, whose father worked in a Japanese company; the company offered a nice 
apartment for her friend’s family in Fujia-dian; but Fujia-dian did not appeal to her. 
She hinted at the isolation of Fujia-dian from the CER Zone by saying that it was a 
long ride by streetcar.8 Here “racial segregation and European superiority” were 
                                                                 
6 Olga Bakich, “Harbin, a Russian City in China before 1917,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 28, no. 2 
(1986): 136. In 1900, the CER Engineering Bureau made urban planning of Harbin. According to this 
planning, Xiang fang, Daoli and Nangang districts became the residential, administrative, and business 
area for the CER Zone. Li, Shi, and Gao, Haerbin shihua, 125. 
7 Li, Shi, and Gao, Haerbin shihua, 130. 
8 Ibid. 
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exemplified; according to Blaine Chiasson, “the ease with which racial and cultural 
boundaries were crossed and flaunted in Harbin was unsettling.”9 
 
Chinese Baroque Renovation and People’s Perceptions  
Chinese Baroque 
Peter Davidson highlights the universal and hybrid nature of the Baroque style. He 
states that “Baroque is not a term for a period, or as a term defining, or denigrating, a 
single style, but a cultural system which is supra-national, supra-confessional; it is not 
a system spreading out from European capitals in washes of dilution and 
enfeeblement. Each center of cultural production worldwide produces its own 
Baroque. Baroque inevitably embraces hybridity.”10 The hybrid nature of Baroque is 
especially evident in the Chinese Baroque style of Harbin. The term “Chinese 
Baroque” was coined by the Japanese scholar Yasuhiko Nishizawa in his article “the 
Features of Contemporary Architecture in Harbin.” According to Nishizawa, the term 
“Chinese Baroque” refers to those buildings that “Chinese designers constructed 
based on their understanding of Western classical buildings. The buildings with 
excessive decorations in Fujia-dian belong to Chinese Baroque.”11 
Local architecture professors and graduates, such as Yan Wang, Daping Liu, and 
                                                                 
9 Chiasson, Administering the Colonizer, 2. Another reason for the quick development of Fu jia-dian is 
the Russo-Japanese war, when Harbin was the army service station for Russia. Chinese businessmen 
established enterprises in Fu jia-dian to provide materials for Russian army. According to Akira 
Koshigawa, Fu jia-dian started urban construction since 1909; by 1916, the population of Fu jia-dian 
reached 22,613. Koshigawa, Haerbinde chengshi guihua, 75. 
10 Peter Davidson, The Universal Baroque (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 12-13. 
11 Yasuhiko Nishizawa, “Haerbin jindai jianzhu de tese (The features of contemporary architecture in 
Harbin),’’ in Zhongguo jindai jianzhu zonglan haerbin pian (The general review of contemporary 
Chinese architecture—Harbin) (Beijing: China Architectural Industry Press, 1992), 15.  
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Tong Lu argue that, technically, many of the so-called Chinese Baroque buildings are 
not strictly Baroque. They contend that it is not accurate to use the term “Chinese 
Baroque” to refer to all these buildings that combined Western façades with Chinese 
decorations and a layout of courtyard. They suggest that two main features of Baroque 
are flamboyant decoration and Baroque structure, but many of these buildings in 
Daowai are not characterized by flamboyant decorations and the architectural 
structure itself is not as elaborate or dynamic as that of European Baroque buildings. 
Wang and her colleagues contend that some buildings have elements of art-nouveau 
and Russian buildings.12 Therefore, it is more accurate to understand the so-called 
Chinese Baroque as a combination of an imagined “Baroque,” combined with other 
architectural styles.  
The decoration on Chinese Baroque buildings incorporates many traditional 
Chinese elements. For example, images of bats are quite common in the Chinese 
Baroque, because they carry positive symbolic meaning: bringing more happiness to 
your house (“bat” in Chinese is a homophone with “happiness”). Moreover, the eaves 
were decorated with bamboo, plum blossoms, copper coins, and the Chinese character 
of shou (longevity), which are all tokens of traditional Chinese culture.  
The buildings were usually two to three floors, with the first floor being 
businesses and the upper floors being residences. The Baroque style was imitated, 
partly because its massiveness represents wealth. In fact, the Chinese merchants 
                                                                 
12 Yan Wang, Daping Liu, and Tong Lu. “Harbin zhonghua baluoke jianzhu zhiyi (Questioning 
Chinese Baroque in Harbin).” Contemporary Chinese Architecture Research and Protection, no.5 
(2006): 694-702. Beijing: Tsinghua University Press. 
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adopted the Baroque style in order to indicate their prosperity.13 This innovative, 
Chinese Baroque creation suggests the cooperative and competitive mentality of the 
Chinese merchants of that time, in response to the dominant European culture in the 
CER zone of Harbin. 
In spite of the wealthy façade, there was no running water, sewer, or flush toilet 
in any of these buildings; a shared one was available in each of the courtyards. Such 
design shaped a communal way of life.14 The collective way of living was further 
strengthened after the founding of new China in 1949, when many of the buildings 
were confiscated by the Communist party from capitalists and rich landlords and re-
assigned to the working class. Take No. 19 Courtyard on Second Street South as an 
example: In 1931, No.19 Courtyard was the location of Renhe-Yong Silk Store. It was 
closed down in 1944 by the Japanese colonizers. In the 1950s, No. 19 Courtyard 
became state-owned, and it was used as a fire station from 1956 to 1968. Since 1968, 
it has been used for residence. It is 1,396.63 square meters, accommodating 51 
households,15 and in this time the internal layout of these buildings was changed. 
They were further sub-divided into more rooms to accommodate more families, and 
shabby additions were built on the side of the original buildings. During the 
                                                                 
13 Shubo Liu and Hanbing Zhang, “Tanfang zhonghua baluoke youlai: yizuo chengshi de xuemai yu    
linghun (Exploring the origin of Chinese Baroque: the bloodline and soul of a city),”  Harbin News Net, 
January 18, 2012. Northeast net, January 18, 2012. h t t p : / / n e ws . h e xu n . c o m/ 2012 - 01-
18 / 137381 06 5 . h t m l  
14 Weinan Liang, “Haerbin jindai jianzhude qipa: zhonghua baluoke jianzhu (Chinese Baroque: a 
unique modern style of architecture in Harbin),” Journal of Harbin University of C.E. & Architecture 
34, no. 5 (2001): 100. 
15 Harbin Urban and Rural Planning Bureau, Daowai chuantong shangshi baohu  (Protecting 
traditional Daowai market landscape) (Harbin: Harbin Urban Planning Bureau, 2001), 8. 
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population boom that took place in the 1950s and 1960s, diao pu (suspended cloth 
beds) were created for the children to sleep in. Due to the lack of maintenance over 
the past one hundred plus years, many Chinese Baroque buildings have seriously 
deteriorated and are now even in danger of collapse. 
 
The Chinese Baroque Renovation 
The Chinese Baroque Renovation project started in 2007 and is still ongoing. This 
project is supposed to transform the slum-like neighborhood into a clean and modern 
one. But many old buildings end up being kitsch reconstructions. This old/new place 
of memory tells of the loss of Old Daowai culture. History is dressed up as a 
commodity to be consumed.  
The renovation project includes three stages. The first stage (2007-2008) focused 
on renovating Second and Third Street South. 39 buildings on Second Street South 
and 28 buildings on Third Street South were targeted in the renovation. 51 original 
households were forced to be relocated.16 The second stage of renovation (2010-
2011) covered the block made up by Fourth Street South, Jingyu Street, Jingyang 
Street, and Nanxun Street. During this second stage, 150,500 square meters were 
demolished and the original residents were compelled to move out. The relocation 
involved 3,185 residential households, 31 public institutes, and 447 enterprises.17 The 
third stage of renovation is presently underway. The old neighborhood has given place 
                                                                 
16 Ibid., 5.  
17 Xiaoyi Wang, “Zhonghua baluoke erqi tiqian shixian jingdi; jiangdui laojianzhu jinxing baohuxing 
xiufu (Moving out for the second stage of Chinese Baroque renovation was finished in advance; old 
buildings will be protectively restored),” Harbin News Net, April 11, 2010. 
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to new shops, restaurants, hotels, artisan workshops, and recreational businesses. This 
project was initiated by the municipal government, to regenerate the culture and 
economy of this slum-like area, and revitalize Chinese Baroque into a brand of 
cultural tourism, for recreational and commercial consumption.18 Good Neighbors, a 
state-owned real estate company, was entrusted by the municipal government to be in 
charge of the renovation and redevelopment. The transformation from shabby 
residential neighborhood to commercial site for tourist consumption manifests “an 
entrepreneurial style of urban governance and a focus on the middle classes as the 
new savior of the city.”19 Consequently, the poor are priced out and relegated to the 
margins of the city.20 
Specifically, Third Street South is the location of cultural entertainment 
institutes, such as traditional Daowai talk show performances, film shooting locations, 
painting and sculpture workshops, and hotels. Second Street South is home to 
restaurants, many of which are old establishments of Daowai. This is part of the 
official efforts to brand the traditional Daowai culture. Moreover, it attracts many 
other cultural artisans, whose artworks enhance the cultural and artistic atmosphere of 
this area.  
The original residents of these buildings were forcefully driven out before the 
                                                                 
18 Harbin Urban Planning Bureau. Traditional Daowai Market Landscape Protection , 6. 
19 Rowland Atkinson and Gary Bridge, “Globalization and the New Urban Colonialism,” in 
The Gentrification Debates, ed. Japonica Brown-Saracino (London: Routledge, 2010), 52; David 
Harvey, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: the Transportation of Urban Governance in Late 
Capitalism,” Geografiska Annaler 71B, no.1 (1989):3-17.  
20 Reichl compares such urban renewal efforts to “a process of radical surgery that involved cutt ing out 
the blighted areas that acted as a cancer on the body of the city.” See Reconstructing Time Square, 1-19.  
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renovation. The municipal government either paid them money or offered them 
apartments in the suburbs of Harbin. The majority of the original residents chose to 
accept the offer of new apartments rather than money because to buy an apartment in 
a good location in Harbin is expensive, and the compensation money the government 
gives is not enough to buy an apartment in downtown Harbin. To some extent, the 
Chinese Baroque Renovation created migration within the city: many old Daowai 
citizens collectively moved to the suburbs, such as the Taoci Residential area and the 
Qunli District. In contrast, the Chinese Baroque area, the center of Daowai, is and will 
be inhabited by more and more businessmen, who are able to either afford the 
expensive rent or buy the buildings, which are 30,000 RMB (6000 CAD) per square 
meter (The housing price in the suburbs can be 5000 RMB, 1000 CAD). The 
transformation has also caused the replacement of the original residents with 
businessmen and tourists. Such redistribution of people with different economic 
power within the city is a type of economic colonization. As Rowland Atkinson and 
Gary Bridge argue, “Contemporary gentrification has elements of [neo]colonialism as 
a cultural force in its privileging of …the more class-based identities and preferences 
in urban living.”21 
                                                                 
21 Rowland Atkinson and Gary Bridge, “Globalization and the New Urban Colonialism,” 52.  
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Figure 1. The Old Chinese Baroque Neighborhood 
 
Figure 2. The Old Neighborhood under Renovation 
The Center versus the Margin, Recolonizing the Colonized 
In comparison with the Daoli and Nangang Districts, Daowai used to be the suburb of 
Harbin at the beginning of the twentieth century; in Bakich’s words, Fujia-dian (the 
present Daowai District) was outside of Harbin.22 Due to the current urban 
expansion, Daowai has become one of the geographic centers of Harbin. For example, 
the Chinese Baroque neighborhood is three kilometers from Central Street (the center 
                                                                 
22 Bakich, “Harbin, A Russian City,” 136. 
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of Daoli District), and four kilometers from Harbin Station (the center of Nangang 
district). Consequently, living there has become more expensive. Some occupants 
with poor economic status in Daowai have lived at the margins, from childhood to 
their senior years. In other words, first, the Chinese were pushed out of the Nangang 
and Daoli Districts by the Russians; now, the poor Chinese are marginalized by the 
rich Chinese. The marginalization of the poor Chinese in Daowai has never stopped 
since the beginning of the twentieth century.  
The original residents’ reluctance to move out is not only due to their emotional 
attachment to the old buildings and old ways of living; it is also because of economic 
concerns. In the summer of 2016, when I met Mr. Han, a retired worker who had lived 
in the Chinese Baroque building for many years, he was selling his old tools on the 
street, because he expected to move into an apartment building, where many of the 
tools, like axe and bow, would not be of use anymore. He was indignant about the 
municipal government, because he thought their policy of compensation was unfair. 
“The government gave privilege to those whose houses were less than 20 square 
meters. The compensation money for a house of 15 square meters could be, for 
example, 300,000 RMB (60,000 CAD); but my house of 40 square meters will only 
get me 400,000 RMB (80,000 CAD).” In contrast, his wife, who was helping him to 
sell the old tools said, “You should not complain. The government had very good 
compensation for us. As long as you can move into a modern apartment, you should 
be satisfied. Without the help of the government, you will be stuck in the old 
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buildings forever.”23  
The Chinese writer Pingwa Jia wrote about a similar situation in his novella 
Feidu (The ruined city): The Earth City has thousands of years of history. The local 
officials plan to revitalize this city by demolishing old houses and constructing 
modern buildings. Qiu Laokang is an old man, who made a living by transporting 
water from a well to local residents. But the well will be buried in this modernization 
project, and Qiu will lose his job, because running water will be available. Qiu 
complains about this project. In contrast, many local residents support it. When Qiu 
reminds a local young man, Jiu Qiang, that he should not forget that theirs is an 
ancient city, Jiu retorts, “It is not an ancient city anymore; it is ruined.”24 The 
conversation between Han and his wife, and the debate between Qiu and Jiu, reveal 
the paradox of modernization: nostalgia for the old way of living coexists with many 
local residents’ wish to enjoy better living conditions in modern buildings. In Yingjin 
Zhang’s words, they “live in space but think in time.”25 
Another middle-aged man could not wait to tell me his story, asking me several 
times, “Since you are abroad, can you help me to report the problems here? With your 
help, our problem might be solved.” He complained about the relocation of these 
original citizens from the city center to the suburbs, but said that if the new apartment 
                                                                 
23 The government policy of giving more compensation for those who have small houses is to ensure 
they are able to buy a new apartment although it is in the suburb. 
24 Pingwa Jia, “Fei du (The ruined city),” in Jiapingwa huojiang zhongpian xiaoshuo xuan  (The 
awarded novellas of Jia Pingwa). Xi’an: Northwest University Press, 1992. 
25 Yingjin Zhang, The City in Modern Chinese Literature and Film: Configurations of Space, Time, 
and Gender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 178; also see Burton Pike, The Image of the 
City in Modern Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 135. 
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was close to his old house, he would accept it. Moreover, his house is collectively 
owned. Even if he accepts the offer to move into a new building in the suburbs, he has 
to pay the government first for the ownership of his house. He said it would take him 
200,000 RMB (40,000 CAD) and he was unable to afford it.  
The economic situation of another man I interviewed was even worse. He was 
only able to rent an old house on Second Street North. His complaint about the 
officials’ corruption was the strongest. He had been marginalized since he was young. 
According to this poor man, when his parents immigrated to Harbin, because they 
were poor and did not have the Harbin Hukou (household register), his two sisters 
married local Harbiners who were disabled, and he married a woman who suffered 
from mental illness. In Kusno’s words, this is “not because they were less fortunate, 
but because they formerly lived according to unjust traditions,”26 implying a 
historical continuity of Daowai as a habitat for the subaltern. Indeed, poverty was an 
issue for many people in Daowai. Many of the poor people rented the shabby houses 
in Daowai because the rent was cheap. The evacuation of the inhabitants for the sake 
of gentrification is harmful to these poor tenants because their living expenses will 
increase in other parts of the city. David Harvey argues that the city is a cultural 
expression of capitalist accumulation, and that “urbanization has always been a class 
phenomenon of some sort, [given that] control over the use of the surplus typically 
lies in the hands of a few.”27 The poor’s rights to the city are limited.28 “Problems are 
                                                                 
26 Nezar Alsayyad, “Whose Tradition?” 5. 
27 Harvey, Rebel Cities, 5. 
28 Ibid, XV. 
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moved rather than solved” in the process of gentrification and displacement.29 
In contrast with the three residents mentioned above, who criticized the 
municipal government and were reluctant to move out, many others have moved into 
new buildings. Chen Qihui, a scholar with the Harbin Cultural Heritage Managing 
Institute and an original resident of Daowai, said that many of the original citizens in 
Daowai, who moved to Taoci area, do not talk about the old days. According to Chen, 
only when he initiated a topic about Daowai, were the original citizens moved to 
reminisce. Many of them seemed to be more open to the new life but, subconsciously, 
were nostalgic for the old days, even though they did not realize it. The “forgotten” 
past could only be brought to life when an outsider stimulated that part of their 
memory.  
Moreover, the marginal status of Daowai is, to some extent, implied in its name. 
In Chinese, “Daowai” literally means “outside of the railway,” in contrast with 
“Daoli,” which means “inside of the railway.” Indeed, the railway, which runs north-
south, marks the division between the two districts. Apart from the arbitrary division 
by the railway, there is no reason to call one “inside” and another “outside.” The 
reason it was called Daoli is that it used to host the Russian community; that area was 
wealthier and cleaner than Fujia-dian, a relatively poor and dirty zone inhabited by the 
Chinese. Based on these historical facts, the Chinese government named the former 
Russian settlement “Daoli” in 1946; Fujia-dian was renamed Daowai District in 1956. 
                                                                 
29 Rowland Atkinson, “Measuring Gentrification and Displacement in Greater London,” Urban Studies 
37, no. 1 (2000): 163. 
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Such naming of the two districts illustrates, what Prasenjit Duara calls, a “spatial 
visualization of social stratification.”30 
The Chinese Baroque renovation project speaks to Alexander J. Reichl’s 
argument that “preservation has often translated into gentrification, a process by 
which higher-income people reclaim and revalue older inner-city residential 
neighborhoods.”31 Neil Smith and Peter Williams define gentrification as “the 
rehabilitation of working-class and derelict housing and the consequent 
transformation of an area into a middle-class neighborhood.”32 The gentrifying nature 
of the Chinese Baroque preservation project is one major reason why many local 
scholars, cultural heritage volunteers, and common citizens regard it as a failure. 
Many of the renovated buildings turned out to be fake antique because the builders 
dismantled the majority of the old buildings and in imitation of the old style built 
replicas of the original buildings. Chen Qihui witnessed the demolition of many of the 
old buildings. He photographed these buildings before the renovation. In the 
beginning, many of the building façades were kept but, later, they were torn down. 
According to the Urban Planning Bureau, the façades of thirty-one buildings on 
Second Street South have been preserved and repaired, and eight buildings have been 
newly constructed.33 Chen argues that the majority of these buildings have been 
                                                                 
30 Prasenjit Duara, “Local Worlds: the Poetics and Politics of the Native Place in Modern China,” in 
Harbin and Manchuria: Place, Space, and Identity , ed. Thomas Lahusen. The South Atlantic Quarterly 
99, no.1 (Winter 2000): 37.  
31 Reichl. Reconstructing Times Square, 12; Shirley Bradway Laska and Daphne Spain, eds., 
Back to the City: Issues in Neighborhood Renovation . New York: Pergamon Press, 1980. 
32 Neil Smith and Peter Williams, eds., Gentrification of the City (Boston: Allen & Unwin 1986), 1. 
33 Harbin Urban Planning Bureau, Daowai chuantong shangshi baohu , 14. 
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demolished, despite government promises.  
Moreover, without residents, these new buildings lack vitality and they resemble 
a person’s body without a soul. The renovation project is similar to dispersing the 
souls while renewing the bodies. It conveys the end of the old way of life. The 
intended resurrection of these old buildings has turned out to be the demise of the real 
Daowai culture. 
 
Figure 3. Chinese Baroque Neighborhood after Gentrification 
Another factor that adds to the problematic nature of the gentrification is the 
commercial concern of the new inhabitants, the businessmen. To a certain extent, shop 
owners and artisans in the gentrified and tourist-oriented Chinese Baroque 
neighborhood perform in order to attract consumers. They do so by means of either 
strategically selling products or creating paintings and sculptures in front of visitors. 
They become part of the spectacle and commodity, and speak to Rey Chow’s concept 
of “being looked-at-ness.”34 In contrast, the original residents lived their lives without 
                                                                 
34 In Primitive Passions, Chow considers China as the object of gaze and argues that “being looked -at-
ness, rather than the acting of looking, constitutes the primary event in cross -cultural representation.” 
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such concerns. Following David Crowley’s interpretation of Henri Lefebvre’s notion 
of degraded space, “the tendency to make reductions of this kind – reductions to 
parcels, to images, to façades that are made to be seen and to be seen from – is a 
tendency that degrades space.”35 The gentrified Chinese Baroque neighborhood is 
degraded from lived space to a sight for consumption. Old Daowai is a landmark in a 
social and affective sense; it is a lived space of memory. In Crowley’s analysis of the 
citizens of Warsaw’s nostalgia for a demolished grocery store, Supersam (a popular 
one during the socialist period in Poland), he suggests that Supersam embodied the 
ordinary citizen’s everyday experience. People missed “the smells, tastes, and 
journeys across the city, often made in childhood.”36 Similarly, what people are 
nostalgic for in the case of Old Daowai is the community way of life, the intimacy 
between neighbors, the rustic yet appealing local specialties. While Old Daowai 
remains “a rich and textured space of memory,”37 a space saturated with people’s 
experience and affect, the new Daowai is fabricated into an image for visual 
consumption. In Abbas’s words, “The preservation of old buildings gives us history in 
site, but it also means keeping history in sight.”38 
Daowai is bittersweet, given that it is less developed in comparison with the 
Daoli and Nangang Districts. However, it is rich, because of its special culture and 
                                                                 
Rey Chow, Primitive Passions: Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary Chinese Cinema 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 180. 
35 David Crowley, “The Ruins of Socialism: Reconstruction and Destruction in Warsaw,” in Power  
and Architecture: the Construction of Capitals and the Politics of Space, ed. Michael Minkenberg 
(New York: Berghahn, 2014), 218. 
36 Ibid., 223. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Abbas, Hong Kong, 66. Emphasis original. 
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history and because of the fact that people in the neighborhood all know each other. In 
comparison, the dominant residential buildings in the Daoli and Nangang Districts are 
apartments. People who live in apartment often do not know their next-door 
neighbors. The close relationships among neighbors from Old Daowai disappear in 
apartment living.  
Stanley Kwan suggests a similar situation in the case of Hong Kong in his film, 
Rouge (1988).  In the 1930s, the courtesan, Fleur, and Chan, a playboy from a 
wealthy family, meet in an opium house in Hong Kong and fall in love. Due to the 
fact that their romance is not socially accepted, they decide to commit suicide by 
opium overdose. Fleur dies and Chan survives. After waiting 53 years in the afterlife, 
Fleur comes back to Hong Kong in the 1980s to look for Chan. But Fleur gets lost in 
the new cityscape. Kwan metaphorically juxtaposes two temporalities by making 
Fleur revisit her city after decades. The uncanniness Fleur feels in the modern Hong 
Kong, including in the high rises that distance people from each other, suggests 
Kwan’s critique of the modern city, in terms of its scarcity of close connection among 
people. Kwan represents the sense of estrangement between individuals through the 
spatialization of time; that is, through Fleur’s distinctive spatial experiences of Hong 
Kong over time. Similarly, the sense of estrangement that the original residents of Old 
Daowai experienced after relocation into apartment buildings conveys the negative 
impact of modernity on the traditional, communal way of life.  
The original way of living and people’s practice of everyday life produced the 
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authentic Daowai culture.39 In contrast, the spatial restructure and control of this area 
by the local government, and the commercialization of the gentrified neighborhood 
turn this area into a theme park. The Chinese Baroque neighborhood “has come to 
embody the Disney model of public space as an orderly, controlled, and themed 
environment.”40 
The failure of this renovation is also implied by the high vacancy of these 
renovated buildings. Three old citizens who enjoyed drinking tea outside of their old 
houses on Third Street North, which is to be renovated soon, suggested that the low 
occupancy rate is due to the fact that the properties are state owned; the officials are 
not concerned how many buildings have been rented or sold out. Even if nothing were 
sold out, the officials’ interests would not be affected. According to the three citizens, 
if the officials set high rent and housing prices for these renovated buildings, they 
could obtain a commission; the officials do not plan a sustainable development for 
this area. The three citizens suggested that market law should be taken into 
consideration: in the beginning, the rent should be low to attract businessmen and, 
only later when this community becomes popular should the government gradually 
raise the rent. The low occupancy of the renovated neighborhood reveals the 
disadvantages of state-owned business. It also illustrates the potential problems of 
“One Party Market Economy,” struggling between the collective ownership of 
                                                                 
39 I follow Reichl’s definition of “authentic public space,” by which he means the space “where the 
physical environment supports a diversity of uses and users, thus creating an area for genuine, or 
relatively unrestricted, social interaction.” Reichl, Reconstructing Time Square, 177. 
40 Reichl, Reconstructing Times Square, 175; also see Sharon Zukin, Cultures of Cities. Cambridge: 
Blackwell, 1995. 
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property and the free market. As a result, a corrupt, speculative bubble seems 
inevitable. 
 
Silent Resistance in Cultural Productions 
The sense of crisis for a disappearing Daowai is not only implied by the messy 
remnant of those empty old buildings and by the characters wei 危 (danger) and chai 
拆 (demolition) on the walls, but also in various cultural productions, such as 
paintings, photography, newspaper report, memoir, and blogs.41 
As Yomi Braester argues, demolition resembles the bodily and psychological 
scarring of a city.42 These cultural productions are visual and literary monuments to 
the scars and loss of Old Daowai. The public perpetuates the disappearing Old 
Daowai in the “time capsules” made of photography, paintings, films, memoirs, and 
blogs.43 The local painter Huandi Wang, now in his 70s, told me that he can only race 
with demolition through his painting. Wang criticized the renovation project, which 
erases the historical texture and grain of these buildings; the renovation transforms the 
deteriorated yet lively neighborhood into manufac tured, or even virtual “historical” 
streets. Wang lived in Daowai for ten years. There, he experienced hardship as well as 
happiness. His family of five people used to live in a house of eleven square meters. 
He is nostalgic for Old Daowai, and has felt compelled to keep coming back to 
memorialize his life there, through painting old buildings and people’s daily life. In 
                                                                 
41 The rampant replacement of old buildings with modern ones in China is suggested by the word 
“chaina.” “Chai” means demolition in Chinese.  
42 Braester, Painting the City Red, 257. 
43 Ibid, 227. 
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his words, “the paintings disclose a story of time; I am coming back to my home that 
is located deep in the past.”  
Literature memorializing old Daowai and trying to seize/cease the last moment 
of these old buildings is booming. For example, a social media site called Seek Harbin 
was created by Hong Gao, who is the art director at the Harbin Tianyi Digital Art 
Company. She and her team spare no effort to find the stories behind these old 
buildings in Daowai.44 Many local citizens write blogs, expressing their nostalgia for 
their childhood, community way of life, popular restaurants, and brands of stores in 
Old Daowai. Interviews with eight old citizens in their 70s and 80s were organized 
from 2014-2015 by Zhang Peng, a journalist working for the Heilongjiang Morning, 
and the interviews were reported in this newspaper. One of Zhang’s interviews was 
with Sun Youlian. It was held in August, 2014, when Sun was 80 years old. Sun died 
of heart failure in 2016. According to Zhang’s report, Sun was an orphan, who was 
born in Heibei province in 1934, and immigrated to Daowai to join her aunt in 1948. 
After taking 8.5 years of school, Sun decided to work to reduce the financial burden 
on her aunt; so she became a cashier in Tongji Store.45 Sun moved to her parents-in-
law’s house at No. 201 Eighth Street South in 1958, when she got married; she lived 
there for 59 years. Thirteen households lived in this courtyard, when she moved in. 
The majority of her neighbors either ran small business or did labor work in Harbin. 
                                                                 
44 For example, Hong Gao, “Daowai bei sandaojie: lao jianzhu beihou de gushi (Third Street North: 
Stories behind Old Buildings).” Imharbin.com, Nov. 9, 2016. http://imharbin.com/post/28408 
45 Tongji Store was one of the biggest companies in Daowai. It was established by Wu Baixiang, a 
Chinese nationalist businessman. Tongji Store represented the Chinese-run business prosperity in 
Daowai before the 1980s. 
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Sun and her husband had three children. Together with Sun’s parents-in-law, a family 
of seven lived in a house of twenty-plus square meters. Such a crowded condition of 
living was common in Daowai before the 1980s. Her children moved to modern 
apartments after they got married in the 1980s, but Sun got used to living in her old 
house, so she insisted on staying there.46 Her attachment to the old house rings true 
for many other senior citizens. Sun’s life story reflects the old way of living in 
Daowai. The report of Sun’s story in the Heilongjiang Morning bears witness to this 
newspaper’s efforts to record the disappearing Daowai culture, whose end is 
symbolized by the death of Sun. The paintings, photographs, and news report store 
many memories and nostalgia for Old Daowai, but they also suggest lament for, and 
silent resistance to, the gentrified Daowai. 
While the public expresses its nostalgia for the loss of old Daowai, the local 
government, real estate developers, and businessmen see the promising future of the 
new Daowai. That is why after the first and second stages of renovation, the third one 
is underway. But there is a tension between the two sides. While the former gives 
priority to preserving heritage buildings and traditional life style, the latter gives 
priority to economic interests; the former is past-oriented, whereas the latter, future- 
oriented. They manifest a tension between the preservationist and developmentalist.47 
                                                                 
46 Peng Zhang, “Nan badaojie 81sui laoren wang youlian koushu: cong leting chuang guandong dao 
haerbin de chennian wangshi (The oral narration by the 81-year-old Sun Youlian, a resident on Eighth 
Street South: old stories of immigrating from Leting to Harbin),” Heilongjiang Morning, October 19, 
2014. http://imharbin.com/post/27134 
47 Also see Yomi Braester, Painting the City Red, 114.  
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Figure 4. The Old Chinese Baroque Neighborhood in a Painting  
Chinese Baroque versus Central Street, an Issue of Exoticism 
Central Street is an icon of Harbin. The majority of tourists usually visit Central Street 
when they come to Harbin. Central Street is a 1450-meter pedestrian street and it is 
characterized by the prevalent European-style buildings on its two sides. However, in 
comparison with Central Street, Daowai is regarded by many local people as 
representing a more authentic Old Harbin. The first reason is that Central Street is 
over-commercialized. In contrast, Daowai is in the early stage of tourism 
development. There is more everyday life of the common people in Daowai than on 
Central Street. Its vernacular flavor appeals to visitors, who enjoy being “voyeurs” of 
the authentic Old Harbin. Second, the prevalence of the “exotic” European buildings 
in Harbin provokes people’s interest in the Chinese Baroque, another different kind of 
“exotic” style. What makes Central Street exotic is its European architectural style, 
which is different from the styles in many other Chinese cities. However, since 
“European”-style buildings fill up Central Street and many other parts of Harbin, it is 
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possible for people to become bored with too many “European” elements. As a result, 
they might get attracted to traditional Chinese buildings. Thus, in the case of Chinese 
Baroque, exoticism means “different from both Central Street and from the European 
part of Harbin.” Being exotic in Harbin does not necessarily mean being non-Chinese. 
Chinese Baroque is even more exotic than Central Street for the city of Harbin, 
because Harbin has more European-style buildings than Chinese-European combined 
buildings. If Central Street is considered exotic, Chinese Baroque is twice exotic, or 
the exotic of the exotic. In Giovanni Careri’s analysis of the hybrid nature of Baroque 
in America, he understands the American Baroque as “a site where images are both 
stratified and joined, at the level of both form and content, in such a way that in the 
end a third term appears, neither European nor indigenous, and outside the categories 
of either. ”48 Similarly, Chinese Baroque speaks a third language of architecture, 
representing a Harbin, which is neither European/Russian (like Central Street) nor 
Chinese (like the Confucian Temple or Dao-taifu). In this sense, the twice exotic 
nature of Chinese Baroque manifests the in-between identity of Harbin, in between 
Russian, European, and Chinese, yet belonging to neither of these categories. 
 
Conclusion 
Historically, Chinese Baroque was both an appropriation of the intruding culture and a 
resistance to it.49 It shows the Chinese constructors’ agency and a pragmatic 
                                                                 
48 Giovanni Careri, Baroques (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 24; also see Davidson, 
The Universal Baroque, 8. 
49 According to José Lezama Lima, “Latin American Baroque is an art of conquer-conquest.” José 
Lezama Lima, La Expresión Americana. Madrid: Alianza, 1969. 
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mentality, which is “to absorb whatever is good for the sake of strengthening oneself.” 
The same mentality applies to the preservation and gentrification of this 
neighborhood. Behind the pragmatic revitalization of Old Daowai is a contradictory 
embodiment of “the historical layering of the space, the heritage value of the place 
and the cosmetic nature of its face.”50 The gentrification of Chinese Baroque 
neighborhood into an old/new place speaks to Jameson’s concept of “commodity 
fetishism and the atrophy of ‘real’ history.”51 In this process, new Daowai witnesses a 
continuation of colonization and segregation, although that between international 
communities and the Chinese has been changed into the one between the rich and the 
poor. The atrophy of “real” history is seen through the transformation of Old Daowai, 
a lived space of memory, into a site/sight for consumption, leaving the former only to 
the twice-removed memories and imagination of later generations through cultural 
productions, the permanent monuments to the loss of Old Daowai. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
50 Cody, “Making History (Pay) in Shanghai,” 139. 
51 Susannah Radstone, Memory and Methodology (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 8; also see Fredric Jameson, 
Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. London: Verson, 1991.  
 
123 
 
 
Chapter Four. Memory and Amnesia: The Japanese Architecture in 
Contemporary Harbin  
By adopting Assman’s notion of cultural memory (discussed in the Introduction 
Chapter), this chapter explores three kinds of “figures of memory” in relation to the 
Japanese in Harbin in the first half of the twentieth century; they are, respectively, 
historical texts, heritage buildings, and the sites of war and museums. These figures of 
memory are examined in their “mode of actuality.”1 That is to say, I analyze the 
social context, which produces the cultural memory of the Japanese residents in 
Harbin. Historical text, heritage building, and museum are the lenses through which I 
examine the construction of Harbin’s identity, with reference to the mirror of the 
Other: the Japanese.2 Writing and re-writing history, protecting heritage buildings, 
and establishing museums are not actions carried out simply for the sake of preserving 
memory but are also “about governing the social and cultural meanings represented 
and transmitted at [these] sites.”3 Local officials are mainly in charge of deciding 
what kind of Japanese cultural memories are to be preserved in Harbin. “They ‘code’ 
these artifacts in a way that makes the desired ‘decoding’ by the public possible.”4 
                                                                 
1 Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” 126-130. 
2 It is my contention that there is not an essentialist culture of one’s own or that of the others, nor a 
clear boundary between the two. “Us” and “Other” are expedient terms for the sake of critique. “Us” 
and “Other” should be understood through the double  refraction of each other. They constitute the 
construction of each other. Freud promotes the examination of the uncanny, because he argues that we 
are ourselves “foreign speakers.” Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Crossing Borders,” in The Princeton 
Sourcebook in Comparative Literature: from the European Enlightenment to the Global , ed. David 
Damrosch, Natalie Melas, and Mbongiseni Buthelezi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 
395; also see Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” in The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works, 
trans. Alix Strachey et al (New York: Norton, 1961), 17:221. 
3 Martin Gegner and Bart Ziino, eds. The Heritage of War (New York: Routledge, 2012), 4; Laurajane 
Smith, Use of Heritage (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2; Chris Ryan, eds., Battlefield Tourism: History, 
Place and Interpretation (Oxford: Elsevier, 2007), 1. 
4 Gegner and Ziino, The Heritage of War, 3; Stuart Hall, “Encoding, Decoding,” in Culture, Media, 
Language, eds. Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, and Paul Willis (London: Routledge, 
1992), 128-38.  
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I argue that the contemporary “memory map” of Harbin is characterized by an 
absence of apolitical narrative of the Japanese contribution to the city,5 and by the 
overemphasis on Japanese war crimes during World War II. Through a selective 
memorialization of the Japanese, the local officials homogenize and politicize cultural 
memories of the city in relation to Japan. In “Shanghai’s Politicized Skyline,” 
Elizabeth J. Perry notices that in the Shanghai History Museum there is a lack of 
narration regarding “Shanghai’s having been the birthplace of the Chinese Communist 
Party.”6 Instead, its exhibition focuses on the cosmopolitan Old Shanghai.7 In 
contrast to the downplaying of the communist history in the Shanghai History 
Museum, Harbin has witnessed increasing spatial practices that emphasize the city’s 
communist’s history, such as the hanging of plaques to commemorate the former site 
of the Communist revolution, and the establishment of a new Unit 731 Exhibition 
Hall. To use a chromatic metaphor, I argue that Harbin is on its way to becoming red 
and yellow. “Red” suggests the emphasis on the CCP’s role in leading the city. The 
creamy yellow is the dominant colour of many old and new buildings in European and 
Russian styles. With the official efforts to promote the European and Russian 
tradition, as well as reclaiming the Communist revolutionary history, exoticism and 
nationalism coexist in the urban space of Harbin.  
                                                                 
5 Mariko Tamanoi, Memory Maps: the State and Manchuria in Postwar Japan . Honolulu: University 
of Hawai’i Press, 2009. 
6 Perry, “Shanghai’s Politicized Skyline,” 107. 
7 In Perry’s words, “Facsimiles of foreign-owned mansions and enterprises stand alongside replicas of 
more humble Chinese shops and dwellings, [exhibited] to educate the younger generation about their 
city’s colourful past.” Ibid. 
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The History Writing of Manchukuo and Harbin 
In July, 2015, before the publication of Zhongguo jindai jianzhu yanjiu yu baohu shi 
(The research and protection of the contemporary architecture in China, volume ten), 
a collection of sixty-three conference proceedings, the editor Liu Yishi of Beijing sent 
an email to Chen Jianzhong, a scholar from Taiwan and the co-author of the article 
“Manchu Architecture Association under Japanese Imperialism,” and copied the other 
sixty-two authors, including me. In his article, Chen used “Manchukuo” and insisted 
on keeping this term, arguing its historical importance in his discussion about the 
Manchu Architecture Association. Nevertheless, Liu replied that “the Propaganda 
Department of the PRC is vigilant and censors such terms as ‘Manchukuo.’ You have 
to add ‘illegitimate’ before ‘Manchukuo.’ Otherwise, editors, and even the publisher, 
the Tsinghua University Press, will be questioned.” 
Although Chen tried to convince Liu that “it is contention rather than consistency 
that makes academia valuable,” Chen finally compromised by changing 
“Manchukuo” to “the illegitimate Manchukuo.” The debate between Chen and Liu 
illustrates two different points of view about historical writing in mainland China and 
Taiwan. To some extent, this implies different attitudes of the two regimes towards 
Japanese occupation.8 
                                                                 
8 The Taipei government no longer emphasizes the atrocity of the Japanese fascists, such as the 
Nanjing Massacre. The hostility of the Taipei government towards the PRC and the CCP overshadows 
that towards the Japanese. According to Edward Vickers, “There has been a tendency for ‘nativist’ 
narratives of the Taiwanese past and Taiwan substituted for ‘China’ as the national subject.”  
However, it appears that there is no consistent discourse in Taiwan with regard to the Japanese 
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The Chinese Version of Harbin’s History 
The emphasis on the Japanese occupation in Northeast China is revealed in many 
official history books in the PRC. As Shepherd and Yu argue, “The CCP continued the 
historiographical tradition in China, which emphasized not truth but morality, and 
focused on highlighting the just and the unjust, the good and the bad.”9 Likewise, 
William Shaw Sewell contends that the narration of Northeast-China history by the 
PRC and Japan is characterized by “either black or white.”10 While Chinese 
historians emphasize the atrocities of the Japanese imperialists, the Japanese 
historians have asserted the more positive aspects of their rule.11 Swell argues that in 
between the black and white, there is a “grey zone” which deserves attention.  
                                                                 
occupation of Taiwan. In the National Museum of Taiwan History (NMTH), “the section on the 
Japanese period is entitled “The Great Transformation and the New Order (though ‘Great’ is omitted 
from the English translation).” “Scientific administration” and “modern technology,” shown in the 
exhibition of NMTH, imply a recognition of the positive Japanese influence on Taiwan. Nevertheless, 
such narrative in NMTH is “not satisfactory, neither to the Blue nor to the Green.” Edward Vickers, 
“Transcending Victimhood: Japan in the Public Historical Museums of Taiwan and the People’s 
Republic of China,” China Perspectives 97, no. 4 (2013): 17-28. Similarly, Hsiao-Hsien Hou’s film, A 
City of Sadness (1989), suggests the Taiwanese ambivalent nostalgia for the era under Japanese control 
and their hostility towards the KMT, who oppressed the Taiwanese when it replaced the Japanese to 
become the new authority of Taiwan in 1945. For example, this film portrays the friendship between 
former Japanese residents and local Taiwanese. Taiwanese criticism of the KMT is shown when the 
characters claim that “rice was available in the era under Japanese control, but after Chen Yi (an 
official of the KMT) took office, the rice price has increased 52 times.” An independent Taiwanese 
identity is illustrated by such statements as “We islanders were first colonized by the Japanese, then by 
the Chinese. No one cares about us. We are the most pitiful.”  
9 Robert J Shepherd and Larry Yu, Heritage Management Tourism and Governance in China: 
Managing the Past Serving the Present  (New York: Springer, 2013), 13-15; Don Fowler, “Use of the 
Past: Archeology in the Service of the State,” American Antiquity 52, no.2 (1987):238. 
10 William Shaw Sewell, “Japanese Imperialism and Civic Construction in Manchuria: Changchun, 
1905-1945” (PhD diss., University of British Columbia, 2000), 347. 
11 Ibid. 
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Among the many history books that have a negative “all black” narration of the 
Japanese in Northeast China are Wei manzhouguo shi (History of the illegitimate 
Manchukuo), Harbin shilüe (Harbin history), and Harbin dangan jiyi 1726-1949 
(Harbin archival memory 1726-1949). The first two books are structured in a similar 
way, including the use of keywords such as “the fascist administration and 
oppression,” “economic exploitation,” “enslavement education,” “the miserable life of 
the people,” “the resistance by the CCP and the people.”12 The atrocities of the 
Japanese imperialists are emphasized in these books.  
This by no means suggests that the business and life of the former Japanese 
residents in Harbin are excluded from any Chinese history source. Harbin shizhi 
zongshu (Harbin city gazetteer overview) (2000), Harbin zhinan (Harbin guidance) 
(1922), and Harbin lishi biannian (1896-1949) (Harbin historical chronology 1896-
1949) (1986) are three relevant examples. Although all three books record the 
Japanese people’s commercial activities and other aspects of their life in Harbin in the 
first half of the twentieth century, they present subtle differences in the way they 
address the sensitive issue as to whether the Japanese were colonizers or not before 
1932.  
Harbin City Gazetteer Overview heavily criticizes the Japanese as invaders. For 
example, it claims that “the Japanese imperialists’ plan to invade Northeast China was 
conceived of long before the actual invasion.” The book makes the point that the 
                                                                 
12 Harbin History covers the Kuomintang’s  resistance to Japanese imperialism. History of the 
Illegitimate Manchukuo covers the resistance by the Japanese communists, peasants, and working 
class. 
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Japanese made various excuses to extend their influence in Northeast China, 
whenever it was possible. The following is a case in point: “At the beginning of the 
construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, eight Japanese came to Harbin, 
pretending to be contractors.”13 The underlying suspicion is that “some Japanese 
immigrants were spies.”14 Moreover, Harbin City Gazetteer Overview states that after 
the establishment of Manchukuo, many Japanese migrated to Harbin in order to 
establish “a fascist control over the Chinese.”15 It suggests a homogeneous politicized 
understanding of the Japanese migrants in Harbin. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on the leadership and heroism of the CCP is evident 
in this gazetteer. As indicated in its preface, “this gazetteer is partly to answer the call 
from the former president of the PRC, Jiang Zemin, who proclaimed that compiling 
new socialist gazetteers is an important part of the construction of two civilizations;16 
it is a systematic engineering of socialist construction, a transitional project that 
benefits the contemporary and future generations.”17 Moreover, this gazetteer 
compiling project is “under the guidance of the party and the government,”18 and is a 
document to assist “governance, pedagogy, and preserving history.”19 As implied in 
                                                                 
13 Harbin gazetteer compiling committee, Haerbin shizhi zongshu, 63. All the quotations from Chinese 
sources in this chapter are my translations. Moreover, Professor Dan Ben-Canaan, an Israeli citizen 
who married a Chinese woman and has been living in Harbin  for almost twenty years, also suspects the 
political motivations of the Japanese residents in Harbin. In our personal conversation in December 
2017, Dan said that “In most cases Japanese residents of the city were part of their country’s attempt to 
create what they termed ‘sphere of influence’. And most did not come here by choice.”  
14 This is true in the Nakamura Incident in 1931. The Imperial Japanese Army Captain, Shintarō 
Nakamura, pretended to be an agricultural expert, in order to visit with his entourage the militarily-
sensitive border area between Taonan and Solun in Manchuria. They were executed in Solun.  
15 Harbin gazetteer compiling committee, Harbin shizhi zongshu, 64. 
16 Material civilization and spiritual civilization. 
17 Harbin Gazetteer Compiling Committee, Haerbin shizhi zongshu, ii. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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the order of the three words, governance and pedagogy have priority over preserving 
history.  
The political discourse underlying the Japanese attempt to invade Northeast 
China, beginning in1898, is noticeable in the Harbin City Gazetteer Overview (2000). 
In contrast, Harbin Guidance (1922) portrays a sense of being threatened by the 
Japanese in terms of economy. Harbin Guidance mentions the prevalence of Japanese 
businesses in the city. It states that  
after the First World War in Europe, Russian businesses declined, and 
Japanese businessmen took their place. There are only hundreds of 
Japanese businesses, but their products account for sixty to seventy 
percent of the city. Their means of running business are predatory and 
sinister. They may dominate the market, exploiting the businesses 
which had been run for ten years by the Chinese. We Chinese 
businessmen had better unite and encourage each other to prevent the 
appropriation of profits by the Japanese.20  
This implies that, in 1922, the Chinese sense of being threatened by the Japanese 
had to do with economic concerns rather than with issues of political sovereignty. 
Mitter and Coble pinpoint that “the events contemporary audiences strongly associate 
with the war, such as the Nanjing Massacre, were not strongly emphasized during the 
war itself.”21 By the same token, the Japanese are critically portrayed as invaders in 
contemporary Chinese history publications, such as Harbin City Gazetteer Overview 
(2000); while, on the other hand, in the 1920s, the political threat from the Japanese 
                                                                 
20 Zuo Shan and XianfengYin, ed., Haerbin zhinan (Harbin guide) (Harbin: Dongchui Business 
Newspaper, 1922), 745. 
21 Rana Mitter and Aaron William Moore, “China in World War II, 1937–1945: Experience, Memory, 
and Legacy,” Modern Asian Studies 45, no. 2, (March 2011): 237; Parks M. Coble, “China’s ‘New 
Remembering’ of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937-1945,” The China Quarterly, no. 190 
(June 2007): 394-410. 
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did not seem a major concern in the Chinese press. Contemporary people, as Michael 
Prince says, tend to “see and recall things the way we wish them to be [and turn] 
insentient and anonymous history into a waking dream, filled with designs of our own 
making.”22 History is dressed up,23 if not made up, to serve those in power at 
present. 
Li Shuxiao’s Harbin Historical Chronology (1896-1949) (1986) records the 
diverse Japanese business and community life in Harbin. The reference to such 
content seems to be in antithesis to my argument that the Japanese contribution to 
Harbin was absent from Chinese historical narration. However, in the preface, Li 
states that this book informs readers about Harbin as a cradle of revolution. According 
to Li, another objective of this work is to improve education about three objects of 
love, which refer to love study, work, and (our) country. Li also emphasizes the 
contributions of communist leaders in the Anti-Japanese War. Li’s preface illustrates a 
historical narrative that is under the surveillance of the CCP. Nevertheless, the major 
part of his book presents a multi-perspective, historical narration, which is not geared 
only toward a patriotic education. Li recorded the establishment of Japanese cultural 
organizations, businesses, schools, and newspapers in Harbin. For example, Li noted 
the construction of a Japanese Hongan-ji temple in Harbin in 1901, and the opening of 
the Mitsui Group Harbin Branch, the South Manchuria Railway Company Harbin 
Office, and the Association of Japanese Immigrants in 1907. Li’s book manifests the 
                                                                 
22 Michael K. Prince, War and German Memory: Excavating the Significance of the Second 
World War in German Cultural Consciousness (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), 23. 
23 See Ben-Canaan, “Engineering History,” 5. 
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diverse contributions made by Japanese immigrants in Harbin in the early decades of 
the twentieth century. These historical facts are not supportive of patriotic education, 
as he stated in the preface. Therefore, I argue that although the preface seems to 
support the CCP’s leadership, it is in fact a strategy to bypass censorship. The 
presentation of this book in the preface as educational material is an example of local 
historians’ strategic maneuvering in the ideologically-charged cultural system of 
China in the 1980s. On the other hand, under the camouflage of “patriotic education” 
and “compliance with the CCP’s policy,” dissident voices (about the Japanese 
immigrants in Harbin) could be heard in the interstices left open by the ideological 
overhauling of the Reform and Opening Up in 1978. 
 
The Japanese Version of Harbin’s History 
The Japanese book, Harubin An’nai (Harbin guidance) (1925), presents an 
international Harbin by providing the statistics of multi-ethnic groups, in terms of 
demography, official institutions, and businesses from 1898 to 1924. Moreover, one 
section of Harbin An’nai presents in detail the Japanese institutes, schools, 
newspapers, banks, and other businesses in Harbin. Many advertisements of Japanese 
businesses are included as well. The last section of this book presents everyday 
conversations in Russian, Japanese, and Chinese for pedagogical purposes. This could 
be for local residents as well as tourists, especially those from Japan. Many of the 
trilingual daily conversations illustrated in this book are related to business. For 
example: “What do you want to buy today?”; “Is this a local product or a foreign 
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one?”; “Businessmen in the rural area are dishonest about pricing, those in the city are 
not.”; “Show me the food menu.”; “Are you OK with Russian food?” To some extent, 
this implies that the Chinese, Russians, and Japanese were influential communities in 
Harbin, and they intermingled and made business with each other, which necessitated 
learning some basic language skills from each other.  
Harubin Kankoo Boryumu Shikkusu (Harbin Sightseeing Volume Six) (1936) 
and Harubin (1941) are Japanese books, introducing tourist sites in Harbin. These two 
books concern primarily Russian culture. For example, they introduce several church 
buildings, the religious customs of Russian Orthodox Christians, Russian art, music, 
and cinema; even the portrait of a Russian girl becomes an attraction to be 
incorporated in Harbin Sightseeing Volume Six . In Harbin, the Jewish population and 
a synagogue are introduced, but there is not much reference to Harbin’s Japanese 
culture, except for two monuments of Japanese martyrs.24 Such an overview of 
Harbin implies that the author is attracted by the city’s multi-ethnic culture. Similarly, 
contemporary Chinese city officials also celebrate the exotic architecture and culture 
of Harbin. I will further discuss the rationale behind the preference for Western 
architecture by the Chinese and the Japanese in the second part of this chapter. 
Haerbinde chengshi guihua 1898-1945 (Harbin urban planning 1898-1945) was 
written by Akira Koshigawa in Japanese in 1989, and the Harbin Urban Planning 
                                                                 
24 Both books introduce the statue of Ito Hiroumi, the Minister of Japan Privy Council. He was 
assassinated by the Korean nationalist Ahn Jung-geun on October 26, 1909 at the Harbin Railway 
Station. Harbin introduces the monument to two Japanese martyrs, Oki Sosuke and Shozo Yokogawa. 
They were Japanese spies during the Russo-Japanese War, and were killed by Russian soldiers. 
Rixin Foreign Firm, Harubin (Harbin). Harbin: Harbin Railway General Bureau, 1941. 
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Bureau organized the translation of this book into Chinese in 2014. Koshigawa points 
out the modernity of Harbin’s urban planning during the Manchukuo period.25 He 
delineates the contributions of several Japanese urban planners to the city’s 
development in terms of the installation of hydraulic facilities, such as running water 
and drainage, as well as the addition of green spaces and parks, and the construction 
of the new city center.26 Moreover, Koshigawa states that the amended city-planning 
law in Japan in 1968 was similar to that in Manchukuo, the latter having come into 
being twenty-five years earlier.27 He further argues that the Japanese practice of 
urban planning in Manchukuo became a model for Japan. His argument is similar to 
Sewell’s, who claims that Manchukuo was “a practical laboratory to create idealized 
urban milieus.”28 Elaborating on Koshigawa’s and Swell’s argument, the case of 
Harbin and Manchukuo make it possible to redefine the hierarchical relationship 
between the center and the periphery, between the colonizer and the colonized.  
The Harbin Urban Planning Bureau wrote a preface for Koshigawa’s book. They 
claimed that Harbin is a meeting place for a diversity of architectural styles, includ ing 
“baroque, classicism, art-nouveau, romanticism, eclecticism, renaissance, traditional 
Chinese style, Islamic, and Jewish style. This earns Harbin the nickname of Oriental 
                                                                 
25 Koshigawa, Haerbinde chengshi guihua, 164. 
26 For example, Koshigawa states that before the Mukden Incident in 1931, there was no drainage 
system in Harbin and only limited running water available in the Port District; citizens obtained water 
from wells, many of which contained ammonia, and even smelled bad. Rubbish, including excrement, 
was transported by manual labor to the dumping ground near Taipei Bridge in Daowai District. This 
rubbish was not burned, and remained there for twenty years. According to Koshigawa, the Japanese 
engineer, Numata Soyaosu, led a systematic plan of running water and drainage installation in Harbin 
from 1934 to 1937. The underlying tone is that “the Japanese brought modernity to Harbin.” 
Koshigawa, Haerbinde chengshi guihua, 150-151. 
27 Ibid., 167. 
28 Sewell, “Japanese Imperialism and Civic Construction in Manchuria,” 2. 
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Paris and Oriental Moscow.”29 Interestingly enough, the Japanese style is not 
mentioned at all.30 This is ironic because a major part of this book addresses the 
Japanese urban planning in Harbin.  
In contrast, Koshigawa’s preface begins as follows: “Many Japanese who were 
born before 1939 are nostalgic for Harbin. Even in contemporary Japan, fewer cities 
have such well-organized planning and beautiful streets as Harbin.”31 The nostalgia 
for Harbin by its many former Japanese residents contrasts with the indifference to the 
Japanese heritage by the Harbin Urban Planning Bureau, who claims that 
“Koshigawa’s thesis does not represent that of the Harbin Urban Planning Bureau. 
The purpose of translating and publishing Koshigawa’s work in Chinese is only to 
enrich academic materials about Harbin urban planning.”32 
The different narration about Old Harbin between Koshigawa and the Harbin 
Urban Planning Bureau is further manifested by their distinctive attitudes towards the 
Russian heritage of the city. While the Harbin Urban Planning Bureau is proud of 
                                                                 
29 Koshigawa, Haerbinde chengshi guihua, i. 
30 Similarly, when Nie Yunling, the former vice mayor of Harbin, wrote a preface for The Preserved 
Buildings in Harbin (2005), he stated that “Harbin’s architecture in the early decades was composed of 
diverse European styles, including baroque, Byzantine, classicism, and eclecticism. These decorate the 
city together with the Chinese Baroque, industrial architecture with Soviet imprints, and traditional 
Chinese architecture.” Nie did not mention the Japanese style. Yunling Nie, ed., Haerbin baohu jianzhu 
(The preserved buildings in Harbin). Harbin: Heilongjiang People’s Press, 2005. Several other books 
briefly mentioned the Japanese buildings in Harbin. Huaisheng Chang, Harbin jianzhu yishu (Harbin 
architectural art). Harbin: Heilongjiang Science and Technology Press, 1990; Songfu Liu, “Haerbin 
jindai jianzhude fengge yu wenmai (The styles and cultural context of the contemporary architecture in 
Harbin).” Huazhong Architecture10, no.1 (1992): 51-55; Harbin Urban and Rural Planning Bureau, 
Haerbinshi chengxiang guihua fazhan baogao  (The annual reports of the planning and development in 
the urban and rural area of Harbin), 2009. 
31 Koshigawa, Haerbinde chengshi guihua, i. 
32 Ibid., i.  
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Harbin’s nickname, Oriental Moscow, Koshigawa foregrounds the colonial nature of 
this term and the Russian imposition of this nickname on Harbin. He states that “The 
Russian invaders lived in Harbin and called the city Oriental Moscow.”33 
Interestingly, no nickname, such as “Occidental Tokyo”, was ever coined by the 
Japanese.  
Yamamuro Shin'ichi delineates Manchukuo as much more complex than just a 
puppet state, as defined by China, or a utopian ideal, as claimed by some Japanese. He 
compares Manchukuo to a chimera, with the Kwantung Army as the head of a lion, 
the state of the emperor system as the body of a sheep, and the Chinese emperor and 
modern China as the tail of a dragon.34 He reveals the different sources behind the 
formation of Manchukuo, including “Manchurian regionalism and Qing 
restorationism from the Chinese side; and experimentalism, racial harmony, 
antiwarlordism, agrarian idealism, Asianism (liberation of Asia), Buddhism, and 
anticapitalism from Japanese officers and civilians.”35 The Japanese occupation of 
Northeast China is one among many diverse aspects examined by Yamamuro and the 
others, but it is by no means the dominant one, as emphasized by the official Chinese 
history narratives. 
 
The Western Version of Manchukuo’s History 
                                                                 
33 Ibid., ii. 
34 Yamamuro Shin'ichi, Manchuria under Japanese Dominion , trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Pennsylvania: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 8. 
35 Ibid.,111. 
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Similar to Yamamuro, Western scholars (such as Rana Mitter, William Shaw Sewell, 
Edward Vickers, and Prasenjit Duara) pinpoint the complexity of Manchukuo. For 
instance, Mitter states that representing Manchukuo as a puppet state is “by no means 
incorrect, but it is incomplete.”36 Sewell argues that modernity was one of the factors 
that motivated the Japanese to build Manchukuo and the achievement in Manchukuo 
also had a positive impact on Japan.37 Vickers argues that  
Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria was strongly 
‘developmentalist’ in that it sought not only to extract resources and 
dominate local markets, but also to integrate these territories - their 
agriculture, industry, and commerce, as well as their culture, language, 
and administration - with the imperial metropolis. The post-war 
industrialization of China’s North East was built upon foundations 
bequeathed by Japanese industrialists and administrators.38  
Duara determines that the complexity of Manchukuo’s history is not limited by 
its “puppet” character or “falseness,” which by no means diminishes the colonial and 
criminal character of Japan’s domination. But it was not a colony in the traditional 
sense. Duara analyzes how the discourse of civilization, especially Asian civilization, 
was utilized by the Kwantung Army and a variety of other stakeholders to fabricate 
the legitimacy of Manchukuo. As Duara states, “The tacit alliance that the 
Manchukuo state formed with Chinese landed groups, local elites, autonomists, and 
                                                                 
36 Rana Mitter, “Manchuria in Mind: Press, Propaganda, and Northeast China in the Age of Empire, 
1930-1937,” in Crossed Histories: Manchuria in the Age of Empire, ed. Mariko Asano Tamanoi 
(Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawaiʻ i Press, 2005), 25. 
37 Sewell, “Japanese Imperialism and Civic Construction in Manchuria,” 2. 
38 Vickers, “Transcending Victimhood,” 19; Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo 
and the East Asian Modern. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003; Andrew Hall, “The 
Word is Mightier than the Throne: Bucking Colonial Education Trends in Manchukuo,” The Journal of 
Asian Studies 68, no.3 (August 2009): 895-925. 
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redemptive societies, as well as modernizing bureaucrats and modernizing elements in 
the Concordia Association, shaped the rhetoric of its sovereignty claims.”39  
Moreover, Duara points out that the discourse of “Asian civilization” used in 
constructing the legitimacy of Manchukuo is traditional and modern (the “East-Asian 
Modern”), and anti-Western. Manchukuo was a fascist type of state but promoted 
minzu xiehe (Concordia of nationalities). The regime wanted to create a “New East,” 
socially egalitarian and progressive. At the same time, it used traditional Chinese 
spiritual and ethical principles, supporting redemptive societies like Daodehui 
(Morality Society), Hongwanzihui (Red Swastika Society), and the Concordia 
Association.40 In this way, Duara argues that in between the two faces of Manchukuo, 
as a puppet state and a developmental state, there are many other factors that have 
contributed to the construction of Manchukuo.  
By juxtaposing three versions of the history of Harbin and Manchukuo, I aim to 
reveal the complexity of the historical narrative of Harbin and Manchuria, and the 
social and political reasons that contribute to the different narrations.  
Memory and Amnesia: Japanese Buildings in Harbin 
While the city of Harbin promotes its buildings of Russian and European styles, the 
Japanese ones are downplayed, except those related to war crimes. Indeed, there were 
much fewer Japanese buildings than Russian and European ones in Harbin; Harbin 
was a lesser part of Manchukuo’s modernization, since it was built by the Russians. 
                                                                 
39 According to Duara, “There is considerable scholarly consensus that the most significant basis of 
Chinese support for the Manchukuo regime came from the landed classes who tacitly promised support 
in return for stability and anticommunism.” Sovereinty and Authenticity, 64-5. 
40 See Duara, Sovereinty and Authenticity, 60-79. 
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Two major reasons for the relatively low number of Japanese buildings in Harbin are: 
firstly, in the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Japanese official institutes 
and businesses preferred to construct European-style buildings in Harbin.41 For 
example, the Tosihisa Mizuue, a Japanese department store, was designed by a 
Russian architect, A.A. Miaskovsky. It was constructed between 1916 and 1918 in 
Baroque style. The Kondo Forestry Company invited another Russian architect, B.X. 
Svilidov, to design the Harbin New Hotel in Art-deco style in 1936.42 Secondly, 
when the Japanese occupied Harbin in 1932, they confiscated many buildings to serve 
their own interests. For example, the Yamato Hotel was originally the Hotel of the 
CER Management Bureau, built between 1901 and 1903. S.V. Ignatzius designed it in 
art nouveau style. In 1936, the Japanese changed it into the Yamato Hotel. Obviously, 
such change suggested the new status quo, in which the Japanese replaced the Russian 
colonizers as the new authority of Harbin. 
The Japanese buildings in Harbin can be categorized into the following three 
categories: European-style buildings, which used to be owned by the Japanese;43 
Japanese minimalist buildings constructed during the Manchukuo period; and 
barracks and other sites used by the Japanese army.  
Many of the buildings in the first category have been designated as heritage 
                                                                 
41 European classical-style architecture was also popular in Japan of that time. 
42 There are several other Japanese institute buildings in European architectural styles including the 
Harbin branches of the Manchurian Railway Corporation Limited (eclecticism, with Baroque as the 
main feature, built in 1924-25); the Yokohama Specie Bank (neo-classical style, built in 1912 and 
reconstructed in 1937); the Japanese-Korean Bank, (eclecticism, built in 1916); and the Oriental 
Development Company, (eclecticism, built in 1919). The Japanese architect Yoshida Yuio designed the 
Harbin Assembly Hall in Art-deco style in 1936; it is the present Harbin Drama Theater. The Japanese 
architect, Shuzo Otani, designed the Russian-style Riverside Restaurant in 1939. It was restored like 
the original and opened in 2017 as the new Riverside Restaurant. 
43 The majority of these buildings were constructed in the first two decades before Manchukuo.  
139 
 
buildings because of their European architectural styles. The Official Residence of the 
Japanese General Consulate is an example. It was built in 1920 by the designer Y.P 
Ridanov in eclectic style. Although the plaque on the wall of this heritage building 
marks the fact that this building was inhabited by the Japanese, it is one among many 
European-style buildings that contribute to the official project of rejuvenating 
Harbin’s bygone glory as Oriental Paris and Oriental Moscow. In contrast to the 
promotion of its architectural style, the local officials silence the poignant fact that 
this building was used as “the hub for transporting Chinese for human experiments at 
Unit 731.”44 
Whereas the cultural heritage of Russian immigrants (as well as of Jews) is 
widely promoted in various ways, including television programs and exhibitions,45 
similar commemorations of the former Japanese immigrants have never happened. In 
contrast, the Japanese atrocities that took place between 1932 and 1945 have been 
repetitively emphasized at different venues and through different channels, such as the 
exhibitions in Northeast China Martyr Memorial Museum,46 the Museum of the 
CCP’s History, as well as Unit 731 Crime Evidence Exhibition Hall. What local 
officials are doing with regard to the Russian and Japanese heritage is analogous to 
                                                                 
44 Koga, “The Double Inheritance,” 21. 
45 The municipal government of Harbin organized an exhibition named “Harbin, the Memory of the 
Russians” on the Central Street in Harbin in December 2017. The event was geared toward tourists, 
given that December is a popular season for tourists to appreciate ice and snow in Harbin. A news 
report of the Russian culture in contemporary Harbin is available on the following link. 
http://video.tudou.com/v/XNjk1MjY4MDMy.html?from=s1.8-1-1.2 
46 This building was originally the Eastern Province Library. It was constructed in 1931, and later 
became the former Police Institute of Manchukuo. Many anti-Japanese Chinese were trialed and 
tortured here. The changed function of this building from the Police Institute of Manchukuo to a martyr 
memorial suggests a triumphant discourse by the Chinese officials. 
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the use of a remote control: the local officials stay tuned to the channel of the Russian 
contribution to the city, while the channel broadcasting the Japanese contribution is 
muted. Yes, it is there, but it takes the audience themselves to figure them out.  
With regard to minimalist buildings constructed during the Manchukuo period, 
the majority have been demolished. Only a few are preserved, such as Hongbao 
Newspaper Office47 and Qiantian Jewelry and Watch Store.48 Two other Japanese 
minimalist buildings, Wanshang Department Store and Dengxihe Store, which used to 
be huge and popular stores in Harbin, were demolished in 1997. A neoclassical 
commercial building was constructed on the site of the Wanshang Department Store.49 
This is an example of how Japanese minimalist buildings are being replaced with 
European neoclassical building. This change mirrors the officials’ efforts to 
reconstruct Oriental Moscow/Paris, while erasing the Japanese minimalist 
architectural memory in the city.  
According to a local architecture professor, Liu Songfu, many old buildings, 
whether they were Japanese or European style, were demolished and gave way to 
modern buildings. The old buildings are just victims of the market economy. The 
disappearance of these old buildings happens in the context of “bulldozing their past 
in the country’s rush to modernity; there is or was not a conspiracy campaign in 
regard to Japanese assets or memory in Harbin.”50 
If this is true, I wonder whether a potential political concern in the demolition of 
                                                                 
47 Established in 1938, it is the present Heilongjiang Daily Office on Jingwei Street.  
48 Built in 1918, it is the present Xinhua Bookstore on Stone Street. 
49 It is the present Golden Sun Shopping Mall.  
50 Personal conversation with Ben-Canaan in December 2017. 
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the Japanese buildings could be under the camouflage of aesthetics. According to 
Dong, Ding, and Liu,51 the demolition is due to the fact that the buildings are simply 
not beautiful; they are plain in style and, therefore, deserve no preservation. This 
implies a hierarchical perception of the aesthetic beauty of architecture. The grand 
and elaborate styles, such as art nouveau and Baroque, are regarded by the local 
people as more beautiful than the minimalist.  
Coincidentally, in his 1989 book Harbin Urban Planning (1898-1945), the 
Japanese author, Koshigawa, also claims that “the Western architecture built by the 
Russians in the end of the 19th century is the most beautiful in Harbin.”52 Exoticism 
plays a role for some Chinese and Japanese, who prefer Western architecture to the 
Eastern. But, aside from the economic value of real estate, is such aesthetic 
disparagement of the Japanese minimalist architecture the fundamental reason for 
demolishing its works? One is left wondering whether aesthetics has been 
unconsciously politicized and influenced by the dominant official discourse in China, 
which defines the Japanese during World War II as homogeneous invaders. Perhaps, 
there are not definite answers to these questions.  
Nevertheless, ideological appropriation does manifest itself in the preservation of 
Japanese barracks and the former site of Unit 731. Two barracks, a watchtower, a 
prison, and a warehouse of the former Japanese army were officially designated as 
immovable cultural relics in October, 2012.53 In 2017, the municipal government of 
                                                                 
51 Dong works at the Harbin Cultural Heritage Management Institute. Ding works at the Harbin Urban 
Planning Bureau. Liu was mentioned above. 
52 Koshigawa, Haerbinde chengshi guihua, 44. 
53 This is part of a national project, the Third National Investigation of Cultural Heritage. It happened 
between 2007 and 2011. 
142 
 
Harbin created plaques for these relics. For example, the statement on the plaque of a 
barrack says “Immovable Cultural Relics of Harbin – This was a barrack of the 
Japanese invaders.”54 The residences and businesses there have been relocated. 
Professor Liu Songfu’s team is engaging in the renovation of these barracks, which 
when completed will be for commercial use.55 The historical and commercial values 
of these buildings are intertwined and in tension.56 While the interior renovation or 
reconstruction transforms these two barracks to accommodate future businesses, the 
concern for their historical significance survives mainly on the plaques, which are 
hung on the walls of the barracks. To some extent, the plaque is more important than 
the building itself, given that it enables the architecture to “speak.” It is a “voiceless 
curator,” who tells the stories behind the building. As Bourdieu argues, “Heritage 
might be understood as a form of state-sponsored social control, a complex 
construction of social entities that are dominated by the narratives and representations 
of elite groups.”57 The plaques of the barracks are indispensable for representing the 
                                                                 
54 This is my translation. 
55 There is a tension between the historical significance of this building as memory of war and its 
commercial function at present. Heritage buildings are always faced with the threat from bulldozers, 
due to the booming of real estate market in China. The Japanese barrack used to be a complex, 
constituting one building on Maimai Street and several buildings behind it in the courtyard. Before this 
complex became a heritage site, the courtyard got demolished; only the two on Maimai Street are 
preserved. 
56 According to Zeng Yizhi, a local volunteer for cultural heritage protection, “The interior structure 
and windows of another heritage building, the former Japanese Kenpeitai Office, Daoli Branch, was 
destroyed.” The protection of heritage buildings is not taken seriously. Maybe the symbolic capital of 
these buildings is what the officials care about rather than the building itself. Yizhi Zeng, “Youyichu 
qinhua rijun zuizheng yizhi haerbin riben xianbingdui daoli fenbu jiuzhi bei weifa pohuai (Another site 
of the Japanese Imperialist Army: the Kenpeitai Office Daoli Branch was illegally destroyed).” Blog, 
July 29, 2014.  
57 Gegner and Ziino, The Heritage of War, 3; Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the 
Judgement of Taste. London, Routledge, 1984. 
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narratives of the groups in power, the municipal government of Harbin.  
Since the 2010s, the memories of the Sino-Japanese War in China have been 
emphasized more intensely than before. Establishing the Nanjing Massacre National 
Memorial Day in 2014 is the most obvious example. Before that, memorialization of 
the Nanjing Massacre was conducted mainly in Nanjing.58 In Harbin, since June 8, 
2011, dozens of plaques indicating “the Site of Revolution” have been hung on the 
buildings that were previously used by the CCP to conduct its revolutionary activity, 
including the resistance to the Japanese fascists during World War II.59 According to 
a local news report, these plaques are to promote patriotic education, develop Red 
tourism, and to strengthen the interpretation of Harbin as a historically and culturally 
famous city.60 These plaques signify the official efforts of “consignation” (the 
gathering together of signs).61 They crystalize the triumphant discourse of the CCP.  
To quote Noam Leshem, “The official public sign, in its various forms, holds 
great significance in the construction of the [h]egemonic collective memory. 
Signposting is… a means of establishing presence and control over a given space and 
                                                                 
58 The Nanjing government started to commemorate the massacre in 1996. Since then, the local official 
release an air defense alert on December13 each year. 
59 This project was initiated by the Committee for the Protection of the Site of Revolution in Harbin.  
60 Zhenyu Zhao, “Hashi dierpi shige geming yizhi guapai biaozhipai shouci yong erweima (The second 
batch of ten revolution sites were attached with official plaques; quick response code is used on the 
plaques for the first time),” Dongbei Net, Jan.1. 2013. “Red tourism” refers to transforming the 
historical sites, at which the revolutionary history of the CCP happened, into tourist sites. 
61 Noam Leshem, “Memory Activism: Reclaiming Spatial Histories in Israel,” in The Politics of  
Cultural Memory (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 160. Derrida argues that 
consignation aims to coordinate a single corpus, in a system or a synchrony, in which all the elements 
articulate the unity of an ideal configuration. Ibid; also see Jacques Derrida. Archive Fever: A Freudian 
Impression, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 3.  
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its inhabitants.”62 By reinscribing the martyrdom and heroism of the CCP into space, 
these plaques hung on the sites of revolution are political statement of survival, 
resilience, and pride. The systematic signposting engenders a collective identity 
through reinforcing the atrocities of the demonized Other, the Imperial Japanese 
Army. In this sense, these plaques commemorating the revolution not only tell a story 
of the past but also a contemporary story of the nation’s strategic use of its history to 
serve political ends. 
When a building has various historical layers, the memorialization of the CCP’s 
history is always prioritized. For example, the Modern Hotel is a national heritage 
building, and there are six plaques on its wall. One of the plaques states: 
Constructed between 1906 and 1913, the Modern Hotel is an art-
nouveau building of three floors. From September to November, 1948, 
the preparatory conference for establishing the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) was held in the Modern 
Hotel.63 
 The adjacent plaque notes that “The Modern Hotel is a patriotic education base; 
it opens to youngsters from 9:00 to 11:30 and from 13:30 to 16:00.”64 According to 
another plaque, the Ministry of Commerce of China entitled the Modern Hotel a 
“Time-honoured brand in China.” These plaques emphasize the political importance 
of the Modern Hotel in relation to the CCPCC, and claim this hotel as a Chinese 
brand, even in the past. In contrast, numerous citizens know the Modern Hotel 
because of its architectural beauty, as well as the fact that it was originally established 
                                                                 
62 Leshem, “Memory Activism,” 168. 
63 This is my translation. 
64 This is my translation. 
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by a Jewish businessman, Joseph Kaspe. Such disconnect exemplifies the contrast 
between the ideological appropriation of historical buildings by the officials and the 
affective memorialization of these historical buildings by the public. According to 
John B. Thompson, ideology not only “expresses” but also “represses,” excluding 
certain issues from discussion and creating a “public unconsciousness.”65 However, 
the different memories of the Modern Hotel between the officials and the public 
suggest that the officials’ attempt to “repress” and to be didactic turns out to be a 
failure. Affect challenges power, in Jie Yang’s words.66 The plaques on the wall of 
the Modern Hotel reveal the cultural hegemony exerted by the Chinese officials, who 
inscribe the Modern Hotel into the history of China, while silencing its foreign origin. 
On the other hand, the public’s different memories of and intimacy with the Modern 
Hotel signifies their anti-hegemony in terms of affect.  
Another similar example is the present Scala Club on Factory Street, which was 
the original Japanese Peace Plaza Cinema built in 1933. All three plaques hung on the 
wall of this building emphasize that this was the site for the Sixth National Labor 
Conference in 1948. According to one of the plaques, “China’s National Labor Union 
was resumed at this conference, which confirmed the important status of the working 
class. It is significant in the history of the working class movement in China.” The 
only thing mentioned in relation to Japan is that “This building is in Japanese style.” 
Probably local people are more familiar with this building as the former Japanese 
                                                                 
65 John B Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), 85. 
66 Jie Yang, ed., The Political Economy of Affect and Emotion in East Asia (London: Routledge, 
2017), 17. 
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Peace Plaza Cinema than as the site for a labor conference of the CCP. As more and 
more sites of revolution have been marked and (re-)branded, Harbin is on the way to 
reinscribe nationalism into space. Meanwhile, this hegemonic reinforcement of 
nationalism is challenged by the public, who have affective memories of these 
historical buildings. As Pierre Nora argues, “History and memory are opposite to each 
other. History is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no 
longer. Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal 
present.”67 The public memory of the Modern Hotel and the Japanese Peace Plaza 
Cinema confront the officially reconstructed Communist history of the two buildings. 
These two sites manifest the tension between history and memory, between the 
officials and the civil, between politics and affect.  
 
The New Remembering of Unit 731 
Unit 731 was a biological and chemical warfare research and development unit of the 
Imperial Japanese Army in the Pingfang District of Harbin. Officially established in 
1936, Unit 731 operated until Japan’s defeat in World War II.68 Unit 731 primarily 
conducted germ-warfare research and lethal human experimentation, such as bacterial 
inoculations, vivisection, frostbite, and poison gas. The majority of the 3,000 victims 
                                                                 
67 Nora, “Between Memory and History,” 8. 
68 What became Unit 731 was formerly the Togo Unit, a site based in Beiyinhe, a village about 100 
kilometers south of Harbin. Human experimentation began there in 1933. SeeTsuneishi Keiichi, “Unit 
731 and the Japanese Imperial Army’s Biological Warfare Program.” in Japan’s Wartime Medical 
Atrocities: Comparative Inquiries in Science, History, and Ethics, ed. Jing-Bao Nie, Nanyan Guo, 
Mark Selden, and Arthur Kleinman (London: Routledge), 24. 
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used in the human experiments were Chinese, but there were also Russians, Mongols, 
Koreans, and Allied prisoners of war. When the Japanese officials responsible for the 
unit realized the inevitability of their country’s defeat, they blew up large parts of 
Unit 731 before retreating to Japan, but some building ruins remain.69 “The former 
site of Unit 731 had been long abandoned and most of it was demolished in the late 
1960s. It was only in 1982 when the Japanese writer Morimura Seiichi visited the site 
to complete his Akuma no hoshoku (Devil’s feast), a disturbingly graphic portrayal of 
the biological experiment that might have happened at the site, that a movement 
started…”70 This movement established the first zuizheng chenlie guan (Crime 
Evidence Exhibition Hall) in 1985 in the former headquarters of Unit 731. 
Thereafter, the Chinese officials have been emphasizing the memorialization of 
Unit 731. This site became one of the One Hundred National-Level Patriotic 
Education Sites in China in 1997,71 and then a fully protected national heritage site in 
2006. A new exhibition hall was constructed on the site in 2015 to commemorate the 
70th anniversary of the victory in the anti-fascist war. Historical artifacts were 
                                                                 
69 Twenty-three of the ruins have been designated as National Cultural Heritage Sites in China. See 
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relocated from the original headquarters to the new exhibition hall.  
Architecturally, the new exhibition hall resembles in shape the “black box” used 
in airplanes. Metaphorically, this shape suggests that this museum has the function to 
reveal the “truth” of history. From a bird’s-eye view, the black box appears to have a 
“crack” through its middle, “as if it is cut by a scalpel.”72 This surgical allusion is 
intentional. The “wounded” building itself is meant to tell of the atrocities that 
occurred within Unit 731 under the Japanese military. The harsh crack or cut speaks 
an architectural language of trauma and denouncement; the building was conceived as 
“an evocative entity that is in dialogue with its content.”73 
 
Figure 1. The New Unit 731 Crime Evidence Exhibition Hall74 
Two twisted and withered trees outside the museum symbolize maruta (“log” in 
Japanese, a term used to refer to the subject of human experimentation). They create a 
                                                                 
72 Jingtang He, “Pingjing de taidu: qinhua rijun di qisanyi budui zuizheng chelie guan  (Tranquil  
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Japanese Army),” Arch Daily, June 13, 2017. 
73 Michaela Giebelhausen, ed., The Architecture of the Museum: Symbolic Structures, Urban Contexts  
(New York: Manchester University Press, 2003), 7. 
74 The red building behind this new museum is the old exhibition hall.  
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somber “mood of memory” before visitors enter the building.75 In fact, visitors are 
made to enter the first exhibition room through a dark corridor, to heighten within 
them “a sense of foreboding” and imply the start of a gloomy journey into Unit 731’s 
history.76 To further underline the somber mood, the exhibition hall in its entirety 
features no natural light with the exception of the final room, the Contemplation 
Room. In terms of size and lighting, the first exhibition room is small and dark, while 
the last one is big and bright. Such a layout provides “contrasting vocabularies of 
light/spaciousness and darkness/constriction [, relating] a story of hope in the face of 
despair.”77 It proffers visitors not only the embodied experience of a violent past but 
also a space to envision a better future.  
To evoke the imagery of blood or bloodiness, some internal walls and exhibition 
boards are rust-coloured: the bright red of any victim’s blood imagined as sedimented 
over time into the colour of rust. Moreover, in the section titled Human Experiments, 
an electronic screen is incorporated into the reconstructed scenario of vivisection in a 
lab. The juxtaposition of the cloth curtain with an electronic “curtain” in this re-
imagined space of the lab is meant to suggest the coexistence of Unit 731 and its 
modern, technological recreation. It suggests a sense of historical continuity in 
                                                                 
75 Kirk A. Denton, Exhibiting the Past: Historical Memory and the Politics of Museums in 
Postsocialist China (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press), 149; also see Edward T. Linenthal, 
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Reflecting on Interpretive Methods and Their Narration,” Journal of Management Inquiry 7, no.3 
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memorializing Unit 731. The blurry image of a person’s face projected on the 
electronic “curtain” signifies the hidden yet unveiled atrocities of Unit 731, and is 
likely to trigger in visitors the ambiguous feelings of both fear and curiosity, catching 
them in their attempts to walk toward yet step away from the figure and all it suggests 
about the past and the present of Unit 731. The new exhibition hall uses lighting to 
conspire with image to mediate visitors’ visual experience of the vivisection located 
within Unit 731. Besides, gloomy music hovers over this reconstructed scenario. The 
bleak music contributes to the production of an “auditory geography” that might 
augment visitors’ sensations of empathy and identification with the victims.78 The 
gloomy music contrasts yet also cooperates with the somber silence in the other 
rooms, evoking an auditory remembering or imagining of the vivisection and other 
atrocities conducted in Unit 731.  
In a reconstruction of the Japanese military poison-gas testing of victims in a 
field, the screen showing the victims tied to crosses is accompanied by the spoken 
testimony of a former Japanese member of Unit 731, and is placed close to actual 
crosses that visitors can touch. Such constructions enable visitors to experience an in 
situ feeling of victimization visually, aurally, and tactually. After the variously 
embodied experiences of the atrocities committed in Unit 731 in the major sections of 
this exhibition hall, visitors finally reach the bright Contemplation Room. Here, relief 
is provided from the oppressive mood, evoked in the other rooms. Nevertheless, the 
structure of this room carries an ideological message. Three independent showcases in 
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this room respectively display a medical book, a scalpel, and a piece of brick from the 
crematory of Unit 731. They suggest a silent denouncement: medical knowledge is 
not supposed to be used for unethical human experimentation and war. 
 At the end of the journey through the museum, a visitor notebook is available 
for tourists to sign. When I visited Unit 731 in June 2017, I saw that many notes 
admonished, “Do not forget the national humiliation” (wu wang guo chi) and 
reminded that “to not forget the past is to be master of the future” (qian shi bu wang 
hou shi zhi shi).79 Here, at the end of the journey, the individual “I” has affectively 
transformed into the collective “we”. The sentiment of humiliation plays a role in 
unifying the Chinese nation. The trauma of the three thousand victims’ families seems 
contagious, spreading to transform into a shared memory of “national trauma.”80 
The visitors’ patriotic notes illustrate the success of the apparent political agenda 
of the Chinese state to engineer “emotionally charged state-sponsored nationalism” in 
the Unit 731Crime Evidence Exhibition Hall.81 The museum’s framing through 
spatial layout, lighting, colour, and sound turns out to be ideologically loaded. These 
                                                                 
79 Also see Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Q. and A.: Gao Yubao on Documenting Unit 731’s Brutal 
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techniques, according to Thrift, “are not only being deployed knowingly, they are 
being deployed politically (mainly but not only by the rich and powerful) to political 
ends.”82 The spatial design in the new exhibition hall helps to engender a collective 
identity through facilitating visitors’ embodied experience of China’s dark moment in 
history and emphasizing the demonized Other, the Imperial Japanese Army.83  
Unit 731 represents, in Amy Sodaro’s terms, a “politics of regret”, which means 
“focusing on remembering the most violent, atrocious, darkest moments of the past in 
a way that attempts to come to terms with the past and learn from it.”84 This is 
indicated in the concluding statement of the exhibition in the new exhibition hall: 
“Being the largest site of germ warfare in the world, Unit 731 witnessed the anguish 
of human beings. The site of Unit 731 has the responsibility of recording that history 
and praying for peace.” This representation of the politics of regret has been in place 
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since the 1980s, when modern China history shifted from “victor narrative to victim 
narrative.”85 Since then, a “new remembering” of the Sino-Japanese War has been 
provoked.86  
In the Mao era, the atrocities committed by Japanese imperialists were 
downplayed, partly because their evocation did not fit well into the discourse of 
heroic resistance and victory.87 Mao did not bear a deep grudge against the Japanese 
imperialists. He said that “our ancestors once quarreled, fought with each other. All 
this can be forgotten now! All this should be forgotten because it is unpleasant stuff. 
What use is it to keep it in our minds? You have apologized. You cannot apologize 
every day, can you?”88 Mao also stated that “The Chinese owed ‘thanks’ to the 
Japanese imperialist Army,”89 in the sense that the latter made it possible for the 
former to unite in the fight for sovereignty. Mao’s statement is similar to that of 
Chalmers Johnson, who argues that the “Japanese invasion evoked a nationalist 
response which resulted not only in Japan’s ultimate defeat but contributed to the rise 
of the CCP.”90 In the Mao era, the CCP did not have to construct a foreign enemy to 
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legitimize its rule, especially in the first years after 1949; the party and the 
charismatic figure of President Mao enjoyed great support from the people. 
Nevertheless, after the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and the Reform and 
Opening-Up (1978), the CCP was faced with “what Jie Chen called the ‘three belief 
crises’: crisis of faith in socialism, crisis of belief in Marxism, and crisis of trust in the 
party.”91 The CCP then emphasized the victimhood of the Chinese, and reconstructed 
a foreign enemy to strengthen nationalism and to legitimize its rule. 
 
The Contestation of the New Exhibition Hall as a Lieu de Mémoire  
A museum staff member, Gao Yubao, defended the necessity of this new exhibition 
hall to me by claiming that “the former headquarters is no longer able to 
accommodate the increasing historical sources of Unit 731 that we have collected 
over time. It also protects the headquarters from potential damage by a large number 
of visitors.”92 Such a view is questionable because while the former headquarters 
may need protection, the new exhibition hall potentially puts this old building in 
jeopardy of isolation, because removing the artifacts from their original context takes 
away from their in situ meaning. There is also the potential danger of erasing the 
authenticity of Unit 731. Here, I mean authenticity, in Walter Benjamin’s sense, 
whose prerequisite is “the presence of the original.”93 
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Authenticity has long proven a concern in the preservation of historical sites. 
Proposals for the reconstruction of gas chambers in Auschwitz, for example, have 
been criticized by opponents, who suggest they would “render Auschwitz into a 
theme park, and make visitors into voyeurs.”94 Likewise, an opponent has disparaged 
the American Holocaust Memorial as “a fake Auschwitz.”95 By the same token, the 
modern construction on the site of Unit 731 invites questions of whether the historical 
and sacred aura of the original site is damaged or even lost, and whether it might 
transform and possibly distort people’s imagination of the milieu de mémoire (real 
environment of memory) in Pierre Nora’s sense.96 In that case, might visitors’ 
memories, and understandings, of Unit 731 be based more on historical reconstruction 
through a current lens than the original history of Unit 731? Might the latter one day 
be completely forgotten, with only its simulacra (and the embodied, ideological 
reconfiguration) remembered? 
The exhibition hall and the former headquarters represent two different kinds of 
lieux de mémoire. In Jane Kramer’s terms, the headquarters constitutes the “real lieu 
de mémoire”:97 It has been there and functions as a “historical testimony,” from 
which its authenticity and authority are derived.98 In contrast, the new exhibition hall 
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embodies history as a reconstruction. It lacks the ambience of the former 
headquarters and seems “out-of-place.”99 The new exhibition hall signifies a modern 
intervention and a constructed history that says more about the current interpretation 
of Unit 731 by Chinese officials than about the unit’s history. While the former tends 
to cultivate the sentiment of humiliation and value the pedagogical significance of this 
place, the latter focuses more on violence per se.  
Indeed, the relocation of individual exhibits in 2015 was not the first occurrence 
of its kind. According to Kirk Denton,100 “In 1995, a new building to house the 
exhibits was constructed down the road from this site, but then in 2001 the exhibit 
was brought back to the original site.” Denton suspects that this is because “the new 
museum building lacked the power and authenticity of a site where the atrocities 
described in the exhibits actually took place”.101 If this is true, I wonder whether the 
exhibits in the new exhibition hall will be relocated back to the former headquarters in 
the future. Contemporary museum officials corralled the history (or “ghosts”) of Unit 
731 several times to locate and relocate them between their original sites and the 
modern museum structures. Every one of these relocations entailed a reframing and 
retelling of the history of Unit 731, complete with edits, reorganizations, and possible 
deletions and additions. 
When I visited the Unit 731 complex in June and December of 2017, dozens of 
visitors crowded the new exhibition hall, but I did not see anyone in the historical site, 
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except some seniors, who were jogging on the square of Unit 731. As Yukiko Koga 
argues, “The past is confined to the museum, so that the present outside can forget the 
past.”102 This might explain why the traumatic history of Unit 731 has been forgotten, 
or ignored, on this square, which has been transformed into a place of leisure for local 
residents. The new exhibition hall also outdoes the former headquarters in attracting 
visitors, isolating the latter. It is the visitors who endow the historical site with vitality 
and create the presence of the past through their embodied experience, carrying it into 
the future. With fewer visitors, the former headquarters resembles an “archive,” in 
Aleida Assman’s words.103 It passively preserves memories of the past, rather than 
actively keeping the past present. In this sense, remembering history at a distance, or 
in the constructed space of a museum (rather than through its original buildings), puts 
the real site of memory in jeopardy of oblivion. What is remembered is a simulacrum 
housed in a modern building, rather than the embodied history of the original site. We 
can see the new exhibition hall as paradoxically and simultaneously communicating 
both historical continuity and a loss of memory. 
When I asked a museum staff member, who initiated the construction of this new 
exhibition hall and who provided the funding, he hesitated to answer. Eventually, he 
said that “this is a sensitive topic, especially because your readers are international. I 
do not recommend you include this part in your paper.” Nonetheless, he told me in a 
few words that the initiative to construct a new museum came from the central 
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officials and was supported by the Unit 731 Institute. He added that the funding was 
from the municipal, provincial and central governments, but he implied that the 
municipal government of Harbin was the major patron. If this is true, the pragmatic 
use of Unit 731 by the municipal government of Harbin is obvious. The local officials 
aim to develop local economy and culture under the guise of answering the call from 
the central government to strengthen nationalist memory and patriotic education.  
The trauma that Unit 731 embodies has a different connotation and significance 
for the central government of China, the municipal government of Harbin, and the 
Unit 731 institute. On the one hand, the central government intends to use the trauma 
embodied by Unit 731 to “create a common memory, as a foundation for a unified 
polis.”104 The central government’s concern is about the pedagogical and political 
connotation of Unit 731, and its significance in dealing with the diplomatic 
relationship between China and Japan. Moreover, Denton argues that the emphasis by 
the Chinese on the Japanese atrocities has ethical and economic implications. China 
seeks a kind of moral upper hand in Asia in its economic and political competition 
with Japan.105 
On the other hand, the local government plans to use Unit 731 to hold sway over 
the economic, cultural, and social development of the city. According to Sun Huijie,106 
“The government of Pingfang District set the goal for Unit 731 to apply for UNESCO 
World Heritage Site in 2000. This application is conducive to drawing international 
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attention to Harbin, and to the development of the city in economic, cultural and 
social terms.”107 Moreover, with Red Tourism gaining momentum, the Harbin 
municipal government attaches growing importance to Unit 731 not only as a site for 
patriotic education but also as a commodity to be consumed in the city’s tourist scape.  
In contrast, the Unit 731 Institute gives more consideration to the heritage site 
per se. For example, Gao stated that “our museum first and foremost serves as an 
exhibition of crimes. This is not for putting additional pressure on the Japanese. We 
prepare what we can for Unit 731 to be designated by the UNESCO.” The Institute 
also has pragmatic concerns, such as using the popularity of Unit 731 as a means for 
its officials to boost political prestige. Moreover, according to Gao, the original 
planning by the Unit 731 Institute was to open the new exhibition hall in 2017, a date 
that would have allowed for a detailed preparation of the exhibition. However, top 
officials wanted the whole project to be ready by August, 2015. Obviously, a 
pedagogical and political manipulation of Unit 731 by the top officials is at work 
here.  
There is no denying that the concerns from the three sectors are intertwined with 
each other. Nevertheless, there is a subtle difference between the purposes of 
preserving and promoting Unit 731. Within a so-called “centralized” regime of China, 
there are many heterogeneous concerns in the local area. In this sense, a centralized 
China is in the process of, more or less, being de-centralized in many ways, including 
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in heritage site preservation and museum construction. The new exhibition hall tells 
of the contemporary stake holders’ various motivations, in terms of politics, economy, 
and museology, as much as of the history of Unit 731. 
 
Conclusion 
In June, 2017, the International Conference of Former Foreign Residents in Harbin 
was organized by the Foreign Affairs Office of the Municipal Government of Harbin. 
The invited guests and their offspring came from many countries, including Russia, 
Israel, Poland, Lithuania, Canada, the U.S, and Australia, but no Japanese attended 
this conference. When I consulted Dan Ben-Canaan, who was a member of the 
organizing committee, about the reason for the absence of the Japanese in this 
conference, he replied that “this is a very sensitive political issue today, not just for 
Harbin. The Japanese occupation of China is an ongoing matter of conflict between 
the two countries, due to the Japanese lack of admission, remorse, and retributions. 
Personally, I would have liked to see here former Japanese residents (even if they 
would not fall into the same category as others) and hear their stories. But this is an 
ongoing political issue, here.”108 
I see a homogenizing perception of the Japanese in Ben-Canaan’s and the 
organizing committee’s concern. In the contemporary context of the precarious 
relationship between China and Japan, the former Japanese residents of Harbin might 
always fall into a different category from the other nationalities in the city. This is 
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even more perplexing when the distinctive Japanese and Western versions of the 
histories of Manchukuo and Harbin are taken into consideration.  
“Images of the past commonly legitimate a present social order and are used to 
justify present policy. It is in this manner that the control of memory is a type of 
political power.”109 Memory of the past is analogous to the dusty furniture under the 
coverage of cloth. While the local officials of Harbin unveiled some furniture, such as 
the Japanese barracks and Unit 731, they swept the others under the carpet, such as 
the absence of the original Japanese residents in the 2017 conference. Such contrast 
reveals the politics of hypervisibility and invisibility. Inscribing the nationalist 
ideology in history books, old buildings, and museums, and putting aside memories of 
the everyday life of the Japanese residents in Harbin is essentially a process of 
“construct[ing] the body of knowledge that is accessible to the inhabitants of a 
specific landscape, control[ing], and measure[ing] the exposure to it, and block[ing] 
out unwanted or competitive knowledge.”110 The presence and absence of the 
Japanese in the cultural memories of Harbin tells more about the cultural and identity 
construction of the city at present than about the history of the Japanese there. They 
serve the political agenda of the CCP. Here, we have nationalism manifesting itself in 
spatial practices.  
                                                                 
109 Herbert Hirsch, Genocide and the Politics of Memory: Studying Death to Preserve Life (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 23; also see Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember 
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Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 332; 
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, trans. Adrian Collins (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1957), 209.  
110 Leshem, “Memory Activism,” 168. 
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The different significances of Unit 731 to the central government of China, the 
municipal government of Harbin, and the Unit 731 Museum exemplify Assmann’s 
argument that cultural memory exists “in the mode of actuality, whereby each 
contemporary context puts the objectivized meaning into its own perspective, giving it 
its own relevance.”111 The cultural memory of Harbin’s Japanese in its mode of 
actuality implies a Chinese politicization of such memory that serves the CCP’s 
agenda to deal with Japan at present. It also demonstrates Harbin’s pragmatic 
utilization of this dark history of Japanese occupation to boost local tourism and 
communication with the international world. In this sense, the memorialization of 
Japanese atrocities in Harbin has economic connotations and suggests a concern for 
building a unique, local identity that goes beyond the construction of nationalism. 
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Chapter Five. Xiao Hong’s Paradoxical Memories of the Colonized Harbin 
 
Literature fills a niche in memory culture, because like arguably no other symbol 
system, it is characterized by its ability… to refer to the forgotten and repressed 
as well the unnoticed, unconscious, and unintentional aspects of our dealings with 
the past. — Astrid Erll1 
There is no doubt that literature is a medium of cultural memory.2 Astrid Erll 
suggests that literary works are “collective texts” that create, shape, and circulate 
cultural memories.3 Andrea Paris further pinpoints the parallel between literature and 
cultural memory, by stating that “the literary realm becomes a mimesis of the memory 
discourses of the time.”4 Anh Hua addresses the necessity of understanding fiction as 
an important means of cultural memory, when she compares fiction to “emotional 
geography [that] can be utilized as a site of public memory to commemorate and 
record voices repressed or suppressed by official history.”5 However, not all literature 
plays a positive role in arousing cultural memory. According to Aleida Assmann, 
“remembering has an active and a passive side. The institutions of active memory 
preserve the past as present, while the institutions of passive memory preserve the 
past as past” She refers to the former as “the canon” and the latter, “the archive.”6 A 
                                                                 
1 Astrid Erll, Memory in Culture, trans. Sara B. Young (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 153; 
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Response Criticism.” In Literature and Cultural Memory, ed. Mihaela Irimia, Dragoș Manea, and 
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5 Anh Hua, “‘What We All Long For’: Memory, Trauma, and Emotional Geographies,” in 
Emotion, Place and Culture, ed. Mick Smith, Joyce Davidson. Laura Cameron, and Liz Bondi 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 135. 
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local writer in Harbin, Xiao Hong, fits in the category of the canon.  
Xiao Hong (1911-1942) was a prominent writer in China. After her death, Xiao 
Hong’s friends and colleagues wrote many memoirs about her. Since the 1980s, there 
has been a boom in Xiao Hong studies, and many commemorations of her – such as 
establishing Xiao Hong research institutes, organizing Xiao Hong commemoration 
conferences, founding Xiao Hong poetry-reading seminars, and putting Xiao Hong’s 
house on display – were set in Harbin and Hulan. Monuments and films about Xiao 
Hong were also produced in the 2000s. To some extent, Xiao Hong and her literary 
works have been canonized in the region and even in China, as a whole. Xiao Hong’s 
capacity to “keep the past as present” is the first reason why incorporating her literary 
framing of the cultural memory of Harbin is in order.  
Moreover, I argue that Xiao Hong is the epitome of Harbiners who hold 
paradoxical perceptions of both exoticism (embracing Russian and European culture) 
and nationalism. My following analysis of her works, and her friends’ memoirs, 
shows that Xiao Hong is both an originator of exoticism and a patriotic writer. She 
was averse to Russian colonizers in Harbin but, at the same time, Russian material 
culture – food and dressing – appealed to her; Xiao Hong expressed her compassion 
towards the plight of common people in Manchukuo, yet she was indifferent to 
politics. In relation to the major thesis of this dissertation – viz., that contemporary 
Harbin is characterized by the paradox between promoting the city’s exoticism and 
complying with the state’s construction of nationalism – the analysis of Xiao Hong’s 
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ambivalent perceptions of Harbin offers a lens to see a meaningful, intriguing 
historical continuity in the cultural and ethnic identity struggle of the city. 
My methodology to study Xiao Hong in relation to the memories of Harbin is 
inspired by Stephen Knight, who understands “the myth of Robin Hood as a site of 
memory.”7 In his chronological study of Robin Hood from the fifteenth century to the 
present, Knight explores the diverse ways of remembering Robin Hood and the 
“contextual desires, or ideologies” that contribute to the various memories and 
representations of Robin Hood.8 By adopting Knight’s approach, I examine Xiao 
Hong as a lieu de mémoire for Harbin, and conduct a chronological and contextual 
examination of this site, which I categorize into three stages: Xiao Hong’s literary 
memory of a Russianized Harbin in the 1930s; her friends’ and colleagues’ memories 
of Xiao Hong in relation to the Russianized Harbin, from the 1940s to the 1980s; and 
the diverse re-imagining of Xiao Hong in Harbin by contemporary writers, film 
producers, and local officials. I address the first two stages in this chapter and the 
third stage in Chapter Six. In short, I focus on Xiao Hong’s memory of an exotic yet 
colonized Harbin and the commemoration of Xiao Hong, as both an exoticist and 
nationalist. I understand Xiao Hong as a hinge that connects the cultural memories of 
the Chinese, Russian, and Japanese legacies in Harbin. This hinge evokes 
contemporary people’s imagination of the once multi-ethnic yet contested Harbin, 
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which continues to shape the city’s present identity.  
 
Xiao Hong and Harbin 
Xiao Hong was born in 1911 in Hulan, a small town near Harbin. In 1927, she studied 
in the First Municipal Girls’ Middle School in Harbin. After her graduation from this 
school, her father prevented her from continuing her studies and arranged a marriage 
for her with Wang Enjia, the son of a wealthy warlord in Hulan. Being a progressive 
woman, pursuing knowledge and freedom, Xiao Hong escaped from home and, in 
1930, she went to study at the Beiping Women’s Normal School. Her fiancé, Wang, 
joined Xiao Hong in Beijing, providing her with financial support. Later, due to the 
cut off of financial support from Wang’s family, Xiao Hong and Wang left Beijing and 
stayed at the Dongxingshun Hotel in Harbin in 1931. Xiao Hong became pregnant 
half a year later, and Wang Enjia abandoned her. When this happened, they owed the 
hotel a rent of CNY 600, which she could not pay. As a result, Xiao Hong was locked 
in a warehouse of the hotel, becoming a hostage. Xiao Hong wrote letters to Harbin 
International Newspapers, asking for their help. Xiao Jun, one of the editors from this 
newspaper, was assigned to visit Xiao Hong in the hotel. Xiao Jun was attracted by 
Xiao Hong’s poems and paintings and they fell in love and, eventually, lived together 
for a time.  
 Harbin was both a city of opportunity and of darkness for Xiao Hong.9 It was the 
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imagined haven Xiao Hong resorted to, when she escaped from her oppressive family 
environment; the scene of bittersweet memories of her cohabitation with Xiao Jun; 
and the inspirational site for Xiao Hong’s becoming a modern, female writer. The 
significance of Xiao Hong for Harbin will be addressed in Chapter Six.  
Market Street is a literary autobiography by Xiao Hong, portraying her life with 
her lover Xiao Jun (Langhua and Sanlang, in Market Street) in Harbin from 1932 to 
1934. Published in Shanghai in 1936, Market Street is composed of forty-one short 
essays, which depict disconnected details of the couple’s life in Harbin. Xiao Hong’s 
fragmented narration reveals her non-linear and episodic reflection of modern life; it 
should be interpreted as opposed to “the grand narrative of modern Chinese history” 
and national identity-building that dominates early twentieth century Chinese modern 
literature.10 Indeed, fragmented everyday practice in modern cities finds its place in 
the works of several women writers of that time, such as Su Qing and Eileen Chang’s 
writings of Shanghai.11 In Rey Chow’s terms, “femininity-as-detail” is a means by 
which some woman writers have produced city literature in modern China.12 
Unlike Eileen Chang, who was born and grew up in a wealthy family in 
Shanghai, Xiao Hong was a poor migrant, who moved to Harbin from a culturally and 
economically stagnant town. Therefore, if Eileen Chang’s literary recreation of 
Shanghai offers a bourgeois insider perspective, Xiao Hong’s writing on Harbin lends 
                                                                 
10 Lee, Shanghai Modern, 291. 
11 See more details in Zhang, The City in Modern Chinese Literature and Film, 256. 
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itself to be read as from a poor outsider’s point of view. A large part of Market Street 
records the narrator and her lover’s sufferance of hunger and poverty in Harbin. 
Therefore, a sense of desolation and otherness is prevalent in Market Street. In the 
following, I examine how Xiao Hong’s layered sense of desolation and otherness is 
conveyed through her perception of the colonized, uncanny, and gendered space of 
Harbin. 
 
Xiao Hong’s Repulsion for the Colonized Harbin 
Harbin as a Colonial Russian Space 
In Market Street, one chapter recalls Xiao Hong’s short stay in the Russian-run 
Europa Hotel. As Chen Jieyi argues, Xiao Hong is critical of the Russians, whom she 
thinks of as the invaders of Harbin. After the Russian attendant takes away the 
bedding because Xiao Hong and her lover cannot afford its rent of fifty cents a day, 
“the room looked as though it had been pillaged.”13 Chen argues that Xiao Hong uses 
the word “pillage” as a metaphor to indicate that the Russians in Harbin resembled 
robbers.14 “Pillage” conveys the narrator’s criticism of the Russian colonizers. Here 
the Europa Hotel becomes a miniature of Harbin. Xiao Hong’s sense of confinement 
in her room within the Europa Hotel alludes to the Chinese nationals’ subjugation in 
the Russian-dominated, colonial city of Harbin. Xiao Hong identifies herself as an 
                                                                 
13 Xiao Hong, Market Street, trans. Howard Goldblatt (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986), 
5. 
14 Jieyi Chen, “Lun xiao hong shangshijie sige zhongyaode kongjian yixiang  (The four important 
spatial images in Xiao Hong’s Market Street),” Journal of Modern Chinese Literature Research, 2 
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outsider in the Russian hotel, as well as in the city. Using a simile to demonstrate 
Xiao Hong’s layered, spatial description of her isolation, I argue that Xiao Hong is 
like an “alien” atom in the molecule of the Europa Hotel within the organism of 
Harbin, where “the alien” does not feel at home. 
Xiao Hong’s portrayal of Harbin as a colonial Russian cultural space is further 
illustrated by her description of how she slips down in front of a movie theater. In 
Market Street, the narrator and her lover walk home in a cold winter night, because 
they do not have money for transportation. The narrator suffers from a stomachache 
and coldness. She slips on the ice and falls down in front of a movie theater, which 
symbolizes a Russian cultural space in Harbin.15 Xiao Hong’s description of her fall 
signifies that she is excluded from the Russian space in Harbin. There is a contrast 
between the warm and privileged interior and her position as an outsider. Moreover, 
Xiao Hong’s fall reemphasizes her inability to go to a movie theater, which she 
mentions in a previous chapter: after returning home from watching a movie, Xiao 
Hong’s neighbor asks whether Xiao Hong has seen that movie. When Xiao answers 
“no,” her neighbor pities her, saying that the movie is about a great romance. Xiao’s 
fall outside the movie theater evokes this earlier experience and reemphasizes her 
suffering from a double-sense of isolation in terms of ethnicity and poverty.  
A similar message is conveyed in a Chinese film sanmao liulang ji (An orphan 
on the streets) (1949). When the orphan, Sanmao, sees a children’s band parade on the 
street celebrating Children’s Day, he joins the parade. However, his barefoot and 
                                                                 
15 Movie theaters in Harbin before the 1930s were mainly run by the Russians.  
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ragged clothes contrast with the other children’s uniforms and “a gendarme throws 
him out of the ranks.” In Yomi Braester’s words, “Sanmao’s experience, limited to 
being an onlooker from the sidelines, stresses the spatial demarcations of class.”16 By 
the same token, Xiao Hong’s falling down outside the Russian-run movie theater 
signifies “the spatial demarcation” between the rich and the poor, and the colonizer 
and the colonized. Falling down outside the Russian cinema metaphorically signifies 
Xiao Hong’s status as an outsider in the colonial city of Harbin. 
 
The Uncanny Harbin 
In Market Street, the narrator’s hesitation to be involved in the city life also indicates 
that Harbin is an uncanny space for her. In his analysis of the uncanny in architecture, 
the art historian Anthony Vidler has noted that the uncanny arises “from the 
transformation of something that once seemed homely into something decidedly not 
so.”17 “The uncanny emerged in the late nineteenth century as a special case of many 
modern diseases, from phobias to neurosis, variably described by psychoanalysts, 
psychologists, and philosophers as a distancing from reality forced by reality…its 
symptoms included spatial fear, leading to paralysis of movement.”18  
Following Vidler’s argument, and the German word, “Unheimlichkeit,” I define “the 
uncanny” as a sense of unhomeliness. In the case of Xiao Hong, she used to be 
familiar with Harbin because that is where she enjoyed her middle school life from 
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1927 to 1930; but such a familiar city turned out to be a cold place for Xiao Hong 
from 1931 on, when she escaped from her family and lived a vagrant-like life in 
Harbin. Feeling unhomely in Harbin, a place that she ended up considering unfamiliar 
and even frightening, explains her misery and the sense of desolation pervasive in 
Market Street. Elaborating on Leo Ou-fan Lee’s view that, “The sense of real or 
imagined ‘unhomeliness’ was a mental state caused by living in a metropolitan island 
of capitalist splendor in a sea of rural cultural feudalism,”19 I argue that Xiao Hong is 
struggling between the colonial, metropolitan city and her roots in a feudal town, and 
that such struggle is caused by the tension between one’s life in a modern city and an 
unconscious sensibility that is shaped by the traditional rural culture.  
In regard to the uncanny in architecture, Lee argues that Shanghai’s buildings 
and spaces in the foreign concessions could be a perfect setting for the metropolitan 
uncanny.20 As discussed in Chapter One, Harbin resembles Shanghai in terms of its 
multi-ethnicity and diverse styles of architecture. The Europa Hotel is uncanny to 
Xiao Hong not only because she is culturally shocked at seeing its foreign tenants, 
such as “the odd-looking couples of gypsy woman and moon-faced and beard men,”21 
but also because the European-style architecture itself makes Xiao Hong feels 
unhomely.  
The following are a few more examples from Market Street that highlight Xiao 
Hong’s sense of unhomeliness in Harbin. When Xiao Hong and her lover move into 
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their new home at 25 Market Street, “the bedframe looked like a skeleton.…what a 
bed! How could I even think of touching that icy steel!”22 The comparison of a 
bedframe to a skeleton indicates Xiao Hong’s fear towards her new home; and her 
unwillingness to touch the icy steel of her bed implies the distance she keeps between 
herself and the new home (which looks like an eerie, sinister place). Xiao Hong 
compares her stay at home to that of “a duck that had fallen down a well.”23 Again, 
the similitude with a duck trapped in a well vividly implies the narrator’s fear and 
loneliness. The uncanniness of this new home is further hinted at when Xiao Hong 
compares it to “a public square at night, totally devoid of light and warmth.”24 Here 
John Welwood’s term “psychological space” can be applied to explain Xiao Hong’s 
spatial description of her feelings. According to Welwood, psychological space means 
“space-as-experienced, or lived space.”25 This scholar states that one kind of 
psychological space is feeling space (also called affective space), referring to “the 
spatial quality of the felt environment we create around ourselves.” In regard to her 
affective space, Xiao Hong feels cold, dark, and isolated, and homogenizes the 
domestic and the public spaces. She feels unhomely at home.            
Another experience that reinforces Xiao Hong’s sense of unhomeliness is the 
loss of companionship with her lover, Langhua, as he becomes busy as a martial arts 
tutor and middle-school Chinese literature teacher. The narrator feels that he does not 
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care for her as much as before. She compares Langhua to “a bird she’d been trying to 
catch for a long time, only to have it fly away as soon as she had it in her grasp.”26 
The narrator compares herself to a disabled person, given that she “has a mouth, but 
no one to talk to, legs, but nowhere to go, hands, but nothing to do. Her view is 
blocked by the walls and can’t see a thing.”27 For one thing, such similes emphasize 
the spatial constraint on the narrator that causes her immobility and provokes the 
reader’s contemplation of the politics of immobility, especially the relation between 
immobility and poverty. For another thing, the comparison to the mute and blind 
demonstrates the narrator’s loneliness and longing for companionship with Langhua. 
This shows that Xiao Hong’s desolation is due not only to the scarcity of food but also 
to her lover’s coldness. She feels emotionally unhomely.  
Moreover, Xiao Hong uses sound to delineate her sense of desolation in relation 
to Russian and male colonizers. One night, when the narrator and Langhua are still 
living in the Europa Hotel, their neighbor plays an accordion with a mournful tune. 
Xiao Hong interprets such mournful music as being “dedicated to the misery of 
life.”28 The mournful tune reflects as well as deepens Xiao Hong’s melancholic 
psychological state. Accordion music was commonly played by the Russians, in 
Harbin and, to some extent, the accordion could be regarded as a symbol of Russian 
recreational culture there.29 In this sense, the narrator plays the role of a silent listener 
to the Russian music that deepens her own misery.  
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The accordion is mentioned a second time. After a happy dinner outside when 
Langhua finds a job as a tutor, the couple go to bed. When they turn off the lamp, the 
accordion in the next room plays plaintive music. With that musical accompaniment, 
Langhua begins to tell stories about his former lover, Minzi. He enjoys the sweet 
memories of the time he spent with Minzi, missing her beautiful face and red lips. 
This scene is characterized by an obvious hidden tension between the narrator, a silent 
woman listener, and Langhua, a talkative man, who relates his previous love story.  
The accordion music reminds Xiao Hong of her identity as the double Other: 
both ethnically, as the Other of the Russian, and affectively, as the Other of man. 
When the musical instrument is mentioned for the first time, Xiao Hong is 
overwhelmed by its melancholic melody, which is a token of Russian culture; the 
second time she hears it, she is overwhelmed by Langhua’s story about his previous 
lover. Xiao Hong ends with sadness in her heart, her own voice unheard. She has been 
playing the role of a silent listener and gets overwhelmed by the powerful player and 
the story-teller, namely, the Russian colonizers and her insensitive, narcissistic 
partner, to whom she obviously defers and submits, in terms of gender expectations. 
Xiao Hong’s narrative voice is that of a woman in a colonial city. She represents the 
colonized of the colonized, the subaltern of the subalterns. 
 
Harbin under Japanese Hegemony  
There is another reason for Xiao Hong’s sense of being colonized: the oppressive 
administration by the Imperial Japanese Army in Manchukuo. The sense of horror is 
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prevalent in the essays “The Book,” “The Drama Troupe,” and “Pale Faces” in 
Market Street. Xiao Hong recalls that a book published by the couple got confiscated 
by the Japanese MPs (military police). A drama troupe the couple belonged to was 
questioned as well. One of its members, Xu Zhi, was arrested. Xiao Hong’s sense of 
fear and mockery is revealed when she states that a local student was also arrested 
because the Japanese MPs found a copy of War and Peace in his dormitory.30 
To save themselves from any trouble with the Japanese officials, the couple 
check all their books at home for any negative references to “Manchukuo,” and burn 
those that do. They even burn a photo of Maxim Gorky. Xiao Hong portrays her 
feeling of fear by writing that “I was throwing things into the fire as fast as I could, as 
though the Japanese MPs were on their way to arrest us at that very moment.”31 Even 
after burning all stuff that might enrage the Japanese MPs, the narrator is unable to 
sleep. She keeps her eyes wide open and barely dares to breathe.32 At night the 
couple get “frightened by the rattling of the metal gate of their home. Every time they 
heard the sound, they rushed out into the entryway to take a look.”33 They feel uneasy 
in their own home.34 
Xiao Hong’ indignation towards the Japanese colonizers is indicated by her 
labeling them “an evil totally alien to us,” “Japs, running dogs,” and “God-damned 
Manchukuo.”35 The couple plan to leave Harbin and to not return, as long as it is 
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under the regime of Manchukuo. But the idea of leaving also “brought a sense of 
sadness.”36 It suggests Xiao Hong’s complex, ambivalent, affective identification 
with Harbin as home, although she did not experience Harbin as home until the 
moment she left it.  
In her novel the Field of Life and Death, Xiao Hong portrays the Japanese 
atrocities in a village near Harbin. Golden Bough, a village girl, is another example of 
women experiencing double colonization by Japanese colonizers and by men. When 
she is seventeen, Golden Bough gets pregnant by a fellow villager, Cheng Ye, and 
later they marry. Cheng Ye turns out to be a violent and overbearing husband. He is 
not caring of Golden Bough and scolds her as being lazy, in spite of the fact that she 
has been busy with housework even during pregnancy. Cheng Ye also blames Golden 
Bough and the baby for their suffering poverty, and when Golden Bough fights 
against him for the first time, his anger reaches a peak – and he kills their baby. Later, 
Cheng Ye dies in the Anti-Japanese War. The Japanese rape and kill women in the 
village. Golden Bough has no choice but to escape to Harbin. When she stands 
outside the window of a Russian pastry shop and sees its displayed piglet, “her hatred 
for the Japs flared up again. If not for the Japs wreaking havoc in the village, her own 
sow would long ago have given birth to piglets.”37 Xiao Hong portrays the atrocities 
of the Japanese military by showing the life-and-death struggle of human beings and 
animals. 
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 In Harbin, Golden Bough is raped by a man when she is hired to do needle- 
work for him. While the hope to survive from the Japanese occupation motivates 
Golden Bough to come to Harbin, the humiliation by her male employer pushes her 
back to her village. Harbin turns out to be a city of darkness for a helpless rural 
woman. When Golden Bough returns to her village, her neighbor persuades her to go 
back to the city because “Harbin must be a lot better than here in the countryside. The 
Japs are getting worse and worse. Now they’re slitting open the bellies of pregnant 
women.”38 If the village symbolizes colonization by the Japanese, then Harbin 
symbolizes colonization by men. Golden Bough wants to escape both. She plans to be 
a nun. However, the nuns have abandoned the temple and run for their lives. She 
states “I used to bear grudge against men. Now I resent the atrocious Japanese… 
Actually, I resent nobody other than the Chinese.”39 Xiao Hong’s fictional portrayal 
of people’s suffering during the Japanese occupation has led to her being canonized as 
one of the left-wing, patriotic writers in China. Nevertheless, Xiao Hong’s repulsion 
for the colonized Harbin contrasts with her embrace of the city’s Russianized 
(colonial) cultural space.  
 
Xiao Hong’s Embrace of the Russianized Harbin through Eating and Dressing 
Xiao Hong enjoyed Russian food and fashion. In the following, I create a “memory 
map” of Xiao Hong’s and Xiao Jun’s consumption of food and dress in Harbin and 
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during their displacement in several cities,40 such as Qingdao, Shanghai, Wuhan, 
Linfen, and Chongqing, in the 1930s and 40s. This memory map is based on the 
published commemorative articles for Xiao Hong by her writer friends in the 1940s. 
Through this mapping, I aim to explore the impact of Harbin’s Russian material 
culture on Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun, and the symbolic function of food and clothes as 
regards the couple’s identity as Harbiners. I argue that the couple’s practice of home-
city culture during their displacement can be interpreted as an attempt to be 
affectively connected with their home city. Food and clothes are the “tangible 
expression of [their] cultural identity”41 as Russianized Harbiners.  
In her writer friends’ memories of Xiao Hong, there are numerous descriptions of 
Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun’s choice of Russian-style food and clothes, such as sausage, 
khleb, and the Cossack shirt. All these are a typical expression of the material culture 
in Harbin in the 1930s. Through tracing a pattern of Xiao Hong’s and Xiao Jun’s food 
and dressing habits during their displacement, I argue that the Russian food and dress 
culture in Harbin had been internalized by the couple; this, in turn, illustrates Xiao 
Hong’s and Xiao Jun’s identification of Harbin as home city. Both khleb and the 
Cossack shirt, for instance, became “visible representations and manifestations of the 
couple’s imaginings of, and personal relationships [to,]”42 their home city, Harbin. By 
preserving and practicing the food and dress culture of Harbin, Xiao Hong and Xiao 
Jun became representatives of Harbin, when they were in other places.  
                                                                 
40 Tamanoi, Memory Maps: the State and Manchuria in Postwar Japan . 
41 Anna Pechurina, Material Cultures, Migrations, and Identities: What the Eye Cannot See  (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 115. 
42 Ibid., 4. 
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Moreover, Xiao Hong’s attachment to khleb and Russian restaurants in Shanghai, 
for example, implicates her nostalgia for the semi-colonial/international environment 
of Harbin. Such nostalgia is partly due to the fact that Harbin is where she had her 
romance with Xiao Jun. Her longing for Harbin is strengthened by the fact that the 
couple’s romance did not last long after they left Harbin; it seriously deteriorated in 
Shanghai by 1935, and they finally broke up in 1938. Besides, the Japanese 
occupation of Harbin expelled Xiao Hong from her home city, strengthening Xiao 
Hong’s “sensation of a lingering belonging to a place to which there is no hope of 
return.”43 To practice the food and dress habits of Harbin in other places is a way for 
Xiao Hong to commemorate the bygone love and the home city that she cannot return 
to. Such commemoration of Harbin by Xiao Hong in Other places solidifies her 
identity as a Harbiner. As Pechurina argues, “people recreate the feeling of belonging 
to their ‘imagined community’ with the help of material objects, whether this is 
intentional or not.”44 Xiao Hong lived with “Harbin” by consuming the city’s 
specialty. Xiao Hong’s nostalgia for the real or imagined Harbin also speaks to Ackbar 
Abbas’ concept of Déjà Disparu, which means “the feeling that what is new and 
unique about the situation is always already gone, and we are left holding a handful of 
cliché, or a cluster of memories of what has never been.”45 The Harbin, to which 
Xiao Hong maintains, despite its uncanniness, a perpetual sense of belonging, has 
                                                                 
43 Lital Levy, “Self and the City: Literary Representations of Jewish Baghdad,” Prooftexts 26, no. 1-2 
(2006), 195. 
44 Pechurina, Material Cultures, 4. 
45 Ackbar Abbas, “The New Hong Kong Cinema and the ‘Déjà Disparu’,” Discourse 16, no.3 (Spring 
1994): 67; “Déjà Disparu: The Art of Hong Kong in The 1990s,” Culture Trip, January 27, 2016. 
https://theculturetrip.com/asia/hong-kong/articles/d-j-disparu-the-art-of-hong-kong-in-the-1990s/ 
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been changing and even disappearing. Therefore, her choice of sausage, khleb, and 
Cossack shirt are the “cliché,” by which Xiao Hong reminisced and kept alive “her” 
Harbin.  
 
Food 
The following addresses the details in the memory map of Xiao Hong’s and Xiao 
Jun’s food and dressing habits, “drawn” by Xiao Hong’s writer friends. Liang 
Shanding (1914—1997) was a famous writer in Northeast China. In “The Shiny Star 
on Night Post,”46 Liang recalls that the first time he met Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun was 
in their home on Market Street in Harbin in 1933. Liang remembers Xiao Jun wore a 
Russian-style skirt with a belt and a small hat. According to Liang, this was a typical 
fashion in Harbin then; Russian sausage was common for lunch and they had dinner 
in a Russian restaurant in a basement on Central Street with two other writer friends, 
Luo Feng and Bai Lang.47 Another writer, Li Rong, also recalls that during his first 
visit to Xiao Hong’s place on Market Street in March 1934, Xiao Jun bought back 
                                                                 
46 Haining Zhang, ed., Xiao Hong yinxiang: jiyi (Xiao Hong impression: memory) (Harbin: 
Heilongjiang University Press, 2011), 140; also see Shanding Liang, “Yeshao shang de liangxing (The 
shiny star on Night Post),” Changchun 6 (1980). The Night Post was a literary supplement to the 
Datong Newspaper, a Manchukuo official newspaper, but Night Post collected literature with 
ambivalent, anti-Japanese, symbolic meanings. Xiao Hong published several writings in the  Night Post, 
such as “Two frogs” and “The old mute,” to make readers aware of the hard life of the common people 
in Northeast China under Japanese colonial control. The Night Post ran from August 6, 1933 to 
December 24, 1933. Japanese officials closed it, due to its political criticism of Manchukuo.  
47 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 144. 
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sausage, khleb and kwas.48 Moreover, according to Huang Shuying,49 when Xiao 
Hong was confined in Dongxingshun Hotel in 1932, the Songhua River overflowed 
its banks and flooded Harbin; as a result, people had to use boats in the streets; Xiao 
Jun swam to the hotel, with sausage and khleb, helping Xiao Hong to escape from the 
hotel.50 These are among the examples that illustrate how Russianized Xiao Hong 
and Xiao Jun had become in terms of food culture.  
 This echoes Xiao Hong’s essay “Black Khleb and Salt” in Market Street. Xiao 
describes in detail that during the poor couple’s honeymoon, the only food they had 
was black khleb and salt. The narrator laughed at Sanlang, who dipped too much salt 
so that he had to gulp down some water. Sanlang replied, “This is no good, no good at 
all. This sort of honeymoon will get us both pickled.”51 Black khleb signifies the 
happy days the couple had in Harbin, although they were poor. As Ma argues, “Khleb 
and salt were both the line of life and of emotion” for Xiao Hong.52 
The Russian cultural space of Harbin is revealed in some writers’ memories of 
                                                                 
48 Kwas is a kind of Russian soft drink. Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 201; also see Li Rong, 
“Chongjian xiaojun yi xiao hong (Meeting Xiao Jun and Reminiscing about Xiao Hong),” Creation 
Communication by Heilongjiang Writers Association 4 (1981). Li Rong first met Xiao Jun and Xiao 
Hong in 1934. Li Rong saw Xiao Jun again in 1946, in Jia-musi. This article is about Li’s memory of 
Xiao Hong, after seeing Xiao Jun in 1946. 
49 Huang is the wife of Pei Xinyuan, the vice-editor of the International Newspaper, Literature and Art 
section. Pei is the one to whom Xiao Hong wrote when she was confined in Dongxingshun Hotel, when 
she could not pay the 600-Yuan rent. When Xiao Hong escaped from the hotel, she lived in Pei’s house 
for a while before she moved to the Europa Hotel with Xiao Jun. 
50 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 150. 
51 Xiao, Market Street, 36. 
52 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 203; also see Yun Ma, Zhongguo xiandangdai zuojia zuopin yanjiu  
(The study of modern and contemporary Chinese writers and their works). Beijing: People’s Literature 
Publishing House, 2007. “Khleb and salt” were traditional food items for Russians. They were used to 
greet newcomers and visitors, and also for wedding ritual.  
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Xiao Hong. In his article “Meeting Xiao Jun and Reminiscing about Xiao Hong,” Li 
Rong depicts the streetscape he saw on his way to Xiao Hong’s place on Market 
Street in 1934. Being a youth from a small town, Li is impressed by the metropolitan 
features of Harbin. In particular, he is struck by the Russian fashion on Central Street. 
According to Li, more Russians were seen on the streets when he passed New Town 
Street; Russian men were in leather clothes, and women wore shirts and felt caps. Li 
recalls that Central Street had both Chinese and Russian name-boards. The east side 
of Central Street was called Chinese Streets, the west, Foreign Streets.53 Such street 
names appear in the work of another writer, Sun Ling, when he commemorates Xiao 
Hong. Sun states that in the winter of 1932 he visited Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun when 
they lived on Foreign Fourth Street, which refers to Market Street. Sun remembered 
the last time he met Xiao Hong was on China Thirteenth Street.  
It is rare that in a Chinese city a street is named “China Street.” Such a street 
name suggests that Harbin was once a colonial and cosmopolitan city. China 
Thirteenth Street is the present Daoli Thirteenth West Street. Foreign Fourth Street 
was the unofficial name of Market Street. It is the present Hongxia Street. The young 
generation of Harbiners rarely know the former names of these streets. Li and Sun’s 
memoirs of Xiao Hong evoke memories of Old Harbin and draw readers’ attention to 
the politics of street naming.  
In the first two decades of the last century, many streets in Harbin were named 
after foreign nations and cities, such as Korean Street, Japan Street, Belgium Street, 
                                                                 
53 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 204; also see Li, “Chongjian xiaojun.” 
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Romania Street, Kazakh Street, Albazin Street, and Warsaw Street. Some of these 
streets acquired such names because they were the location of the corresponding 
consulates of the foreign nations. The street names indicated the multi-ethnicity of 
Harbin then. Nevertheless, there was by no means a street called Russia Street, 
although Russians constituted the major population of Harbin. The “Russianness” of 
the city was so dominant that it needed no particular naming.  
Another example of the political significance of street naming in Harbin is 
Khorvat Street. Named after the Russian director of the CER, it was the main road 
adjacent to Harbin Railway Station, which was located in the center of the city. To 
name an important road in the center of the city Khorvat Street implies the colonial 
authority of Khorvat and the Russians in Harbin. The name was changed to Railway 
Station Street in 1925, when the Chinese government established the Eastern Province 
Special Zone in Harbin, which took over the administration of the CER from the 
Russians. In 1932, after the Japanese took over the city, the name Railway Station 
Street was changed into Three Officers Road, referring to Kenji Doihara, a general in 
the Imperial Japanese army, Jirō Tamon, a lieutenant general in the Imperial Japanese 
Army, and Jinghui Zhang, the Prime Minister of Manchukuo.54 The changed street 
name suggests that the Russians had given place to the Japanese as the new authority 
in Harbin. In 1946, part of this road was changed to Yat-sen Road, (i.e., it was 
renamed after Sun Yat-sen), and another part was changed to Red Army Road in 1949. 
Such changes symbolize the Chinese government’s assertion of their ownership of the 
                                                                 
54 Guangyuan Yu, “Xuanya: laizi haerbin huoer wate dajie de gushi (Cliff: a story from Khorvat Street 
in Harbin),” January 21, 2012. club.kdnet.net.  
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city. Street (re)-naming is a gesture that displays power and is an arena for Russian, 
Chinese, and Japanese officials to demonstrate their own authority over the city. In 
Noam Leshem’s words, street (re)-naming is a “symbolic enactment of ownership” 
and “a script of position,” which transforms a street into a “political- ideological 
battlefield.”55 The plaques with street names that people encounter in everyday life 
function as a voiceless constructor that shapes residents’ perceptions of the city’s 
political and cultural identity. Therefore, street (re)-naming already affects people’s 
seeming ‘apolitical’, everyday life, even before it is explicitly used as a means to 
politicize and control urban space.56 
The uniqueness of Harbin was also illustrated by Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun during 
their displacement. Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun became moving symbols of Harbin, 
given that they carried with them the typical food and dress culture of Harbin when 
they moved to other cities. In “Commemorating Xiao Hong,” Mei Lin recalls that 
Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun worked together with Mei at the Qingdao Morning 
Newspaper in 1934 after the couple escaped from Harbin. Xiao Hong used to cook 
borscht and fried bread in Qingdao.57 Borscht is a kind of popular, Russian soup. 
Fried bread was also a particular food in North China. The eating habits Xiao Hong 
acquired in Harbin were continued in Qingdao and other cities. As Miller and 
                                                                 
55 Leshem, “Memory Activism,” 243.  
56 In his analysis of walking in the city, de Certeau argues that “proper names carve out pockets of 
hidden and familiar meanings. They ‘make sense.’ They are the impetus of movements…these names 
create a nowhere in places; they change them into passages.” Michel de Certeau, The Practice of 
Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 104. To some 
extent, walkers are not only directed but also controlled by street names. 
57 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 15; also see Mei Lin. “Yi Xiao Hong (Remembering Xiao Hong),” 
Meilin wenji (Collection of Mei Lin’s works). Shanghai: Chunming Bookstore, 1948. 
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Pechurina argue, “Food can help define the feeling of being at home for people living 
in societies characterized by high mobility and migration, since through practices of 
cooking and eating, migrants reproduce and reinvent cultural traditions and 
reconstruct home as a ‘sensory totality’.”58 Borscht and fried bread became 
“mediators that represent the attachment and feelings” of Xiao Hong towards 
Harbin.59 
When Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun moved to Shanghai in November 1934, their new 
writer friends included Lu Xun and his wife, Xu Guangping, and Hu Feng and his 
wife, Mei Zhi. Mei recalls that Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun invited her and Hu Feng for 
dinner in a Russian restaurant. According to Mei, when Xiao Hong, Xiao Jun and Mei 
were in Lu Xun’s place, Xiao Hong asked Xiao Jun to buy a gift for Lu Xun’s son, 
Haiying, and what Xiao Jun bought back was a string of khleb.60 Mei complains that 
Xiao Jun did not take Xiao Hong’s request seriously and bought something at random, 
but his choice of khleb is, nonetheless, an indication of his food habit. According to 
Xu Guangping, once when Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun visited her family, they brought 
black khleb and sausage as gifts.61 As mentioned before, khleb and sausage were 
representative foods in Harbin. Choosing food from the home city as a gift to their 
important host family suggests Xiao Hong’s and Xiao Jun’s identification with the 
food culture of Harbin. 
                                                                 
58 Pechurina, Material Cultures, 115; also see Daniel Miller, ed. Home Possessions: Material Culture 
behind Closed Doors. Oxford: Berg, 2001. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 29. 
61 Ibid., 10. 
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According to Mei Zhi, Hu Feng saw that Xiao Hong frequented a Russian 
restaurant by herself in Shanghai. Mei implies that Xiao Hong suffered an emotional 
crisis with Xiao Jun, so she went by herself. Harbin was similar to Shanghai in terms 
of multi-ethnicity and diversity of commodities. “Many Russian immigrants moved to 
Shanghai from Harbin in the 1930s.”62 A new Russian cultural space thus appeared in 
Shanghai. Being at a Russian restaurant in Shanghai must have evoked Xiao Hong’s 
memory of Harbin. According to Pechurina, “the practice of going to Russian 
restaurants can be defined as a specifically diasporic activity through which migrants 
maintain their identity and re-establish their sense of belonging to their imagined 
community.”63 Xiao Hong’s visit to a Russian restaurant in Shanghai implies her 
nostalgia for the old days in Harbin, and for the bittersweet time with Xiao Jun. Xiao 
Hong tried to re-experience those old days, by eating the same food that they used to 
eat and by visiting restaurants, similar to the ones that they had frequented in Harbin. 
In this sense, black khleb, sausage and Russian restaurants in Shanghai became 
symbols of Harbin, its food culture, and the memory of love between Xiao Hong and 
Xiao Jun. Similarly, it was during this period of emotional crisis between the couple 
that Xiao Hong wrote Market Street in Shanghai. Market Street recalls the details of 
the couple’s life in Harbin. “What a writer writes is what he/she attaches importance 
to.”64 In the deteriorating relationship with Xiao Jun, Xiao Hong consoles herself by 
                                                                 
62 Heran Jiao, “Xiaohong de xiaoshuo sanwenji qiao yu minguo shiqi haerbin chengshi kongjian (Xiao 
Hong’s novel and collection of short essays, Bridge, and the urban space of Harbin in the Republic of 
China),” Journal of Yibin University 17, no.2 (February 2017): 24.  
63 Pechurina, Material Cultures, 129. 
64 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 200; also see Ma, Zhongguo xiandangdai zuojia .  
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going back to the happy days in Harbin through writing.  
 
Clothes 
Liang Shanding, Mei Lin, and Xu Guangping all recall that Xiao Jun often wore a 
Cossack-style shirt in Harbin, Qingdao and Shanghai. Xu states that such a shirt was 
quite common in Harbin.65 Cossack shirts became a signifier of the dressing culture 
in Harbin. Xiao Jun also recalls his Cossack shirt in his memory of Xiao Hong. 
According to Xiao Jun, the couple were extremely excited to receive a letter from the 
eminent writer, Lu Xu, who agreed to meet with them in Shanghai in November, 
1934. Xiao Hong made Xiao Jun a new plaid shirt in order to meet Lu Xun. The 
model she used to make this new shirt was one of Xiao Jun’s old Cossack shirts from 
Harbin. Moreover, Xiao Jun wore a yellow scarf together with this new shirt. 
According to Xiao Jun, the scarf was embroidered in Russian letters. This was a gift 
Xiao Jun and Xiao Hong received from their Russian teacher when they left Harbin in 
March, 1934.66 Such dressing implies the deep influence Russian fashion exerted on 
Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun, even after they left Harbin. Wearing this new shirt, Xiao Jun 
and Xiao Hong took a photo before they met Lu Xun. 
                                                                 
65 Ibid., 5. 
66 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 227; also see Xiao Jun, “Women diyici yingyao canjia luxun 
xianshengde yanhui (At the invitation of Lu Xun, we attended his banquet for the first time),” in 
Huainian Xiao Hong (Commemorat ing Xiao Hong). Harbin: Heilongjiang People’s Press, 1981.  
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Figure 1. Xiao Jun and Xiao Hong 
Li Huiying, a writer from Jilin province in Northeast China, states that he met 
Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun in Shanghai in 1937 after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.67 
A group of writers planned to create a work together in support of Shanghai, objecting 
to its occupation by the Japanese. Li comments that Xiao Hong was slim and white, 
embodying the notion of beauty and fashion current among Harbin girls.68 The style 
of dress in Harbin was known to be modern and yang qi (exotic); this was partly due 
to the persistence of Russian fashion in Harbin.  
Moreover, according to Sun Ling, Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun did not stop learning 
Russian after they left Harbin. Sun recalls that when Xiao Hong returned to Shanghai 
from Japan in January, 1937, several friends had dinner to welcome her back; during 
the dinner Xiao Hong sang a Russian song, which she had learned from a Russian 
                                                                 
67 On the night of July 7th, 1937, the Japanese and Chinese army exchanged fire in Wanping, a county 
in the Southwest of Beijing, because the Japanese claimed that one of its soldiers had disappeared and 
they thus were required to enter Wanping, to search that soldier – such request was declined by the 
Chinese army. This Marco Polo Bridge Incident is the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War.  
68 The dressing style in Harbin was commonly regarded as fashionable and exotic. Zhang, Xiao Hong 
Impression, 100; also see Huiying Li, Sanyan liangyu (A few words). Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
Literature Research Institute, 1975.  
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film when she was in Japan.69 Moreover, during a banquet arranged by Lu Xun, 
together with six other writers in Shanghai in 1934, Xiao Jun talked about some 
customs in Northeast China and said that he wanted to buy several Russian books.70 
Russian became an identity marker in terms of language that tied Xiao Jun and Xiao 
Hong to Harbin, the original place where they acquired Russian. As Collins and 
Pechurina argue, “Encounters with familiar language exemplify migrants’ efforts to 
reconnect living ‘here’ with lives ‘at home’.”71 
Aside from the practice of home-city culture and language, Xiao Hong voiced 
her homesickness during her displacement. According to Gao Lan, when Xiao Hong 
was in Chongqing, a city in Southwest China, she asked him: “Don’t you miss the 
snow of our hometown? I miss it a lot. ”72 According to Mei Zhi, when the group of 
writers moved from Wuhan in Central China to Linfen in North China, Xiao Hong 
was excited. Mei Zhi understands that this was because Xiao Hong liked North China, 
the snow and hot kang (bed) there.73 Sun Ling also recalls that a group of writers, 
who escaped from Harbin to other Southern cities, talked about going back to Harbin 
after the victory in the Anti-Japanese War. As Gupta and Ferguson argue, “As 
                                                                 
69 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 104; also see Ling Sun, “Daonian Xiao Hong (Commemorat ing Xiao 
Hong),” Wenxue bao (Literature newspaper). Shanghai, 1942. 
70 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 224; also see Xiao, “Women diyici yingyao.” 
71 Pechurina, Material Cultures, 21; also see Francis Leo Collins, “Connecting ‘Home’ with ‘Here’: 
Personal Homepages in Everyday Transnational Lived.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35 
6(2009): 840. 
72 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 81; also see Lan Gao, “Xueye Yi Xiao Hong (Remembering Xiao 
Hong in a snowy night),” Northeast China Civil Newspaper, December 6, 1946. 
73 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 33; also see Mei Zhi, Huajiao hongle (The pepper turns red). 
Beijing: the Chinese Overseas Publishing House, 1995. Lin Fen is more similar to Northeast China 
than Wu Han. Kang is a special bed used in Northern China. It is made of bricks. It gets heated by 
burning wood under the bed. 
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displaced peoples cluster around remembered or imagined homelands, ‘imagined 
communities’ come to be attached to imagined places.”74 Imagined communities, 
according to Anderson, “are not necessarily based in one locality or place.”75 In this 
sense, for the displaced Harbin writers, including Xiao Hong, Harbin did not only 
mean a geographical place, but also an imagined home, in which their souls dwelled, 
and an affective haven they yearned for. Home becomes “a mythic place of desire in 
the diasporic imagination.”76 
Yuan Yin, a student in Fudan University in 1939, remembers meeting Xiao Hong 
in Chongqing. Both sought refuge in Chongqing from the Japanese occupation of 
their home cities. Xiao encouraged Yuan, saying “Don’t be sad. Sooner or later we 
will go back home.”77 Xiao Hong has been looking for “home.” This is not only 
revealed in her nostalgia for snow and North China, but also in her complaint of being 
alone: “I am always alone. It is true when I was in Northeast China, in Shanghai, 
Japan, and in Chongqing. I am destined to be alone.”78 In this sense, the home Xiao 
Hong craved was not only a physical place but also an emotional belonging.  
Harbin was represented not only in the Russian food and clothes Xiao Hong 
embraced, but also in the writings she produced during her displacement, such as the 
Field of Life and Death in Qingdao, Market Street in Shanghai, and Tales of Hulan 
                                                                 
74 Pechurina, Material Cultures, 4; also see Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, “Beyond ‘Culture’: 
Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference.” Cultural Anthropology 7, no.1 (1992): 6-23. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Pechurina, Material Cultures, 21; also see Collins, “Connecting ‘Home’ with ‘Here’,” 840; Avtar 
Brah, Cartographies of Diaspora: Connecting Identities. London: Routledge, 1996. 
77 Pechurina, Material Cultures, 177. 
78 Ibid., 20. 
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River in Hong Kong. Xiao Hong’s physical journey began when she left home from 
Hulan, to Harbin, Qingdao, Shanghai, Wuhan, Chongqing, and finally to Hong Kong; 
but her literary journey conveys an attempt to go home. At the end of her life, she was 
in Hong Kong (ironically another “colonial” space) but she returned home in another 
way – by writing Tales of Hulan River in Hong Kong, a novel about her “original” 
hometown, Hulan.  
Xiao Hong’s life seems to be a journey away from “home”, but it is actually a 
journey of returning home. My analysis of Xiao Hong’s food and dressing habits, as 
well as of her literary production during her displacement, leads me to argue that Xiao 
Hong never left “home,” which to her means a sense of belonging. Hulan and Harbin, 
the memories of her original Chinese hometown and of an adoptive, (semi)colonial, 
Russianized Harbin were always with her, wherever she went. In other words, Xiao 
Hong performed “a simultaneous experience of ‘home and away’,”79 telling a 
cyclical story of leaving and returning. Her life and writing always involve the 
concept of “home,” which could be signified by Hulan, Harbin, North China, and 
even snow, but she has to leave home before she even develops the consciousness of 
“home.” Her writings about home have to be in and from other places. As the writer 
Zhang Kangkang said, “Xiao Hong is the daughter of Hulan, but if she had not left 
Hulan to go into the big and black world, she would not have become the Xiao Hong 
that we know.”80  
                                                                 
79 Pechurina, Material Cultures, 17; also see Steven Vertovec, “Three Meanings of ‘Diaspora’, 
exemplified by South Asian religions,” Diaspora, 6(3) 1999: 277-300. 
80 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 358; also see Kangkang Zhang, “Zaibeifang, youyike xianrenshu 
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The rootedness to the land and place of Northeast China is also addressed by 
another local writer, Shanding Liang, in his novel Green Valley. The main character, 
Lin Xiaobiao, is a youth in the village in the valley of Langgou. Later, he moves to 
the city of Nanmanzhan (a station of the South Manchurian railway) with his mother 
and stepfather, a comprador of a Japanese company in the city. Xiaobiao “regards the 
valley as his true mother against the one who remarried and left for the artificial and 
corrupt city.”81 In the end, he decides to return to the valley. Xiao Hong’s literary 
returning home by writing Tales of Hulan River, at the end of her life in Hong Kong, 
tells a message of identification of home with Northeast China, similar to what 
Shanding’s Green Valley does. By focusing on the locality of Northeast China, Tales 
and Green Valley are native place literature (xiangtu wenxue), denoting and evoking a 
sense of “cultural authenticity” of this region,82 and telling of Xiao Hong and Liang 
Shanding’s literary journey to their home in the Northeast.83  
 
Conclusion 
Xiao Hong’s ambivalence between repulsion for the Russian and Japanese colonizers 
and her embrace of the Russianized Harbin, alongside her indifference to the politics 
                                                                 
(There is a cactus tree in the North),” Nü zuojia (Woman writer), 1985. 
81 Duara, “Local Worlds,” 29. 
82 Ibid., 13. 
83 Also see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(New York: Harper, 1962), 79-80, 233 (H53-54, 188). Heidegger’s notion of being-in (as in being-in-
the-world) reworks the spatiality of such “in-ness” into a lived spatiality of be-ing-at-home – with the 
accompanying notion of “uncanniness” (un-heim-lich-keit, “un-home-li-ness”) always lurking 
throughout.  
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of Manchukuo, represents the dilemma of Old Harbin. Xiao Hong, as a writer and a 
person, is both a nationalist and an originator of exoticism. Xiao Hong’s plight – 
having no “home” to return to – speaks to the identity-confusion of Harbin. Located at 
the periphery of China and adjacent to Russia and Japan, Harbin was a contact zone, 
which embodied hybrid cultural and political traditions. Consequently, Harbin was 
home to many people who, like Xiao Hong, held contradictory attitudes towards the 
Russian and Japanese residents, regarding some as hostile and others as friendly. 
Indeed, the nationalist consciousness in the Northeast was not as strong as represented 
in the present Chinese official discourse. As Rana Mitter argues, “In China – nation or 
social reality – the imagining of community is that much harder when the periphery is 
at a great distance, as in the case of Manchuria…The concept of loyalty to a nation 
with its capital at Nanjing [1927-37] was that much vaguer to those living in the 
Northeast.”84 The historical fact that the Northeast “had been keen to keep as 
autonomous as possible until 1931” partly explains Xiao Hong’s and many other 
Harbiners’ ambivalent sense of nationalism and contradictory perceptions towards the 
Russian and Japanese colonizers of that time.85 How the self-divided Xiao Hong and 
the ambivalent nationalist tradition in Old Harbin shape the city’s contemporary 
identity is to be explored in the next chapter. 
                                                                 
84 Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration in Modern China  
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 187. 
85 Ibid., 131. 
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Chapter Six. Xiao Hong in Writings, Films, and Official Discourses 
The contexts of dialogue are without limit. They extend into the deepest past and 
the most distant future. Even meanings born in dialogues of the remotest past will 
never be finally grasped once and for all, for they will always be renewed in later 
dialogue. At any present moment of the dialogue there are great masses of forgotten 
meanings, but these will be recalled again at a given moment in the dialogue’s later 
course when it will be given new life. For nothing is absolutely dead: every meaning 
will someday have its homecoming festival. — Mikhail Bakhtin1 
 
To continue the last chapter’s argument that Xiao Hong is a lieu de mémoire for 
Harbin, this chapter examines the commemoration and representation of Xiao Hong 
by contemporary writers, film producers, and local officials. In other words, this 
chapter examines Xiao Hong, in relation to Harbin, in three overlapping senses: there 
is the sense of Harbin as a physical place (where Xiao Hong used to live, a site to 
which contemporary writers pay homage); the sense of Xiao Hong’s Harbin, in filmic 
space; and the sense of Xiao Hong’s relation to Harbin in the official discourses.  
It is my contention that Xiao Hong is memorialized, as much as she is branded 
and consumed. In Bourdieu’s terms, some locals support “the autonomous principle 
(for example, art for art’s sake),” and are nostalgic for Xiao Hong and the Harbin 
portrayed in her works; in contrast, others stay with “the heteronomous principle,” 
which favours those who dominate the field economically and politically,”2 and 
define Xiao Hong as the representative of the cultural capital that contributes to the 
                                                                 
1 Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World (London: Routledge, 1990), 39; also see 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Works, ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim 
Liapunov, trans. Vadim Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 173. 
2 Pierre Bourdieu, The Rules of Art, Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field , trans. Susan Emanuel 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 216.  
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city’s economic and social development. This chapter frames the memorialization of 
Xiao Hong in Harbin in Svetlana Boym’s concepts of reflective nostalgia and 
restorative nostalgia and Michel Hockx’s concept of force field.  
First, the memorialization of Xiao Hong by contemporary Chinese manifests 
both reflective nostalgia and restorative nostalgia. According to Boym, “restorative 
nostalgia puts emphasis on nostos [, which] proposes to rebuild the lost home and 
patch up the memory maps, while reflective nostalgia dwells in algia, in longing and 
loss. [It] lingers on ruins, the patina of time and history, in the dreams of another place 
and another time.”3 Reflective nostalgia is past-oriented, an emotional lingering on 
the fantasy of the past, having no necessary impact on the actions at present. In 
contrast, restorative nostalgia is present and future-oriented. It uses nostalgia to serve 
the present and the future. This also relates to the distinction between nostalgia as an 
individual affect and nostalgia as a commodity or, in Dalia Kandiyoti’s words, 
“commodified nostalgia.”4 
Second, to complement my analysis of the two intertwined yet different types of 
nostalgia for Xiao Hong, I adopt Michel Hockx’s concept of force field, which derives 
from his critique of Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of literary field. Unlike Bourdieu, who 
highlights the reverse relationship between the literary and economic capital of a 
writer and his/her work,5 Hockx understands the Chinese literary field as “structured 
                                                                 
3 Boym, the Future of Nostalgia, 41. 
4 See Dalia Kandiyoti, “Consuming Nostalgia: Nostalgia and the Marketplace in Cristina García and 
Ana Menéndez.” MELUS 31, no. 1(Spring, 2006): 82; William Cunningham Bissell, “Engaging 
Colonial Nostalgia,” Cultural Anthropology 20, no. 2 (May, 2005): 215-248. 
5 Here, “reverse” means that if a writer’s literary capital is high, then his economic capital is low, and 
vice versa. 
196 
 
around three principles: the literary, the political, and the economic,” and he argues 
that although individual agents highlight each of the three capitals differently, the 
three capitals are not necessarily reverse to each other.6 Xiao Hong is an example of 
an artist whose work possesses, at once, all three types of capital. I adopt Hockx’s 
concept of the three-dimensional force field to examine the intertwined literary, 
economic, and political significations of contemporary nostalgia for Xiao Hong and 
her work in Harbin.  
Situated in the methodological framework of Boym’s notion of nostalgia and 
Hockx’s concept of force field, my examination of the commemoration of Xiao Hong 
by contemporary writers, film producers, and local officials is structured as follows. 
In the first part of this chapter, I explore the ways in which four contemporary writers 
conduct imaginative dialogues with Xiao Hong about Harbin and Hulan. I examine 
how they contemplate the relationship between the historical and contemporary 
Harbin in terms of physical space and literary texts. The writings of Wang Binggen 
and Hong Ke are characterized by reflective nostalgia for Xiao Hong, lingering on the 
romantic fantasy of an imagined Harbin across time that belongs to both Xiao Hong 
and themselves. In contrast, Qiu Subin and Ji Hongzhen manifest restorative nostalgia 
for Xiao Hong, because Qiu and Ji use nostalgia as a lens through which they address 
in critical terms issues of modern urban development, such as moral decline and the 
replacement of heritage sites by modern constructions in Harbin and Hulan. Wang and 
                                                                 
6 Michel Hockx, eds., The Literary Field of Twentieth-Century China (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii, 1999), 17. 
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Hong focus on Xiao Hong’s symbolic capital (the literary), while Qiu and Ji 
underscore her political and economic capital (the non-literary).7 
In the second part of this chapter, I compare two recent films about Xiao Hong, 
Falling Flowers (2012) by Huo Jianqi, and The Golden Era (2015) by Xu Anhua 
(Ann Hui On-wah). I focus on two different representations of the ethnic space of 
Harbin and the role of films in producing the social space of Harbin. Falling Flowers 
is an outsider film, which means that it amplifies the beautified and idealized 
imageries of the city, in order to attract tourists and investors. Falling Flowers 
reconstructs a Russianized Harbin, shrouded in an atmosphere of romanticized 
desolation. Initiated by the Propaganda Department of Heilongjiang Province and the 
municipal government of Harbin, Falling Flowers contributes to the city’s overall 
plan to revitalize its cosmopolitan tradition, in order to develop the city’s cultural 
economy. It hints at the film producers’ restorative nostalgia for Xiao Hong, the 
nostalgia that is utilized for developing the present Harbin.  
In contrast, The Golden Era aims to “faithfully represent history.”8 It creates a 
vernacular flavour of people’s everyday life. Both films are created for consumption. 
Nevertheless, The Golden Era suggests a sense of reflective nostalgia for Xiao Hong. 
This is illustrated by director Xu’s claim that she had dreamed about producing a film 
about Xiao Hong for forty years before she finally made it.9 While Falling Flowers 
                                                                 
7 See Hockx, ed., The Literary Field, 3. 
8 Zi Chuan. “Zhuanfang Xu Anhua: Huangjin shidai bu tuichong ‘minguo faner’ (Exclusive interview 
to Anhua Xu: The Golden Era does not promote the style of the Republic of China,” BBC Chinese net, 
August 26, 2014. 
9 Yunyun Tang, ed., “Xu Anhua cheng Xiao Hong hen wanqiang: tade shidai qingsong you canku (Xu 
Anhua states that Xiao Hong was perseverant: her era was both relaxing and cruel),” Nanjing Daily, 
198 
 
craves for the economic capital of Xiao Hong, The Golden Era values more of her 
literary capital.  
In the third part of this chapter, I analyze the cultural and economic discourses 
embodied in local officials’ branding of Harbin as the home city of Xiao Hong. Xiao 
Hong is identified by local officials as a cultural heritage to be rejuvenated and 
consumed at present and in the future. They highlight the economic capital of Xiao 
Hong. The common question that all three parts answer is, “How does the nostalgia 
for Xiao Hong influence people’s perception and construction of Harbin at present?” I 
argue that Xiao Hong and Harbin are mutually representative of each other. They are 
each other’s “identity marker.”10 The memorialization of Xiao Hong suggests the 
cooperation and contention between the literary, economic, and political capital that 
she embodies. The nostalgia for Xiao Hong is both past-oriented and future-oriented.  
 
“Dialogue” with Xiao Hong in the  “Lieux de Mémoire,” Harbin and Hulan 
Many contemporary readers of Xiao Hong visit Harbin and Hulan to “go beyond their 
intellectual exchanges with texts and long for some kind of material contact with the 
author of those texts or the places where they originate.”11 The physical space where 
                                                                 
April 17, 2014. 
10 Levy, “Self and the City,” 184. 
11 Harald Hendrix, eds. Writers’ Houses and the Making of Memory (New York, London: Routledge, 
2008), 1. Hendrix summarized the previous scholars’ insights on the various motivations for people to 
visit the places where famous writers used to live, including “the admiration for ‘illustrious men’ that 
since early modern times, was integrated into a discourse of “first local, and later national” pride; the 
romantic interest in personality, especially in genius, and the desire to identify with such extraordinary 
persons; the need to get in touch with the world of the past and of the imagination directly and physically, 
in the places where history was made or ideas were conceived.” Hendrix, ed., Writers’ Houses, 7. 
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Xiao Hong lived is a substitute for her own physical presence. Harbin and Hulan may 
also trigger contemporary readers’ affective connections with Xiao Hong. As Boym 
argues, “Nostalgia depends on materiality of place… locale is not merely a context 
but also a remembered sensation and the material debris of past life.”12 In this sense, 
Harbin and Hulan become les lieux de mémoire of Xiao Hong, for contemporary 
readers and such lieux, supposedly, allow them to be in touch with her intellectually, 
physically, and affectively. Several writers have produced articles about their 
pilgrimage to the places where Xiao Hong lived in Harbin and Hulan. In this way, the 
two cities are sites not only for commemorating Xiao Hong, but also for producing 
new meanings. Memorialization through a place looks to the past, as well as 
producing the social spaces of the present and future.  
What follows is my analysis of four contemporary writers’ memorialization of 
Xiao Hong in Harbin and Hulan. Their works speak to Xiao Hong’s writings in one 
way or another, constituting an intertextuality across time. According to Kristeva, 
intertextuality proposes “the text as a dynamic site in which relational processes and 
practices are the focus of analysis instead of static structures and products.”13 
Intertextuality requires that we understand texts not as self-contained systems but as 
differential and historical.14 Shaped by Xiao Hong’s writing of Harbin, contemporary 
writers imagine Harbin into a snow world, a hybrid between black soil culture and the 
                                                                 
12 Boym, The Future of Nostalgia. 
13 Maria Jesus Martinez Alfaro, “Intertextuality: Origins and Development of the Concept,” Atlantis 18, 
no. 1/2 (1996): 268; also see Julia Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue, and Novel,” Desire in Language: Approach 
to Literature and Art, ed. Leon S. Roudiez, trans. Thomas Gora (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1980): 67. 
14 Ibid. 
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modern, European culture;15 in their works, one can detect nostalgia for Old Harbin, 
and melancholy over the perceived present moral decline and loss of the city’s poetic 
nature and material heritage. Xiao Hong’s portrayal of Harbin, and these 
contemporary writers’ imagining of Xiao Hong in Harbin through reading her works 
(such as Market Street, the Field of Life and Death, Tales of Hulan River), constitute 
“dialogues” across time between the literary, the imagined, and the physical city. 
These dialogues manifest an ongoing process of a textual production of the city into a 
real and imagined space. In this way, literature is not a memorial reservoir. 
Contemporary writers’ rewriting of Xiao Hong’s Harbin contributes to the literary 
inheritance and (re)imagination of the city.  
 
Wang Binggen — Harbin as a World of Snow 
In Xue li Xiao Hong: qinlin zuojia guju (Xiao Hong in snow: visiting the writer’s 
house), the author Wang Binggen recalls his visit to Harbin and Hulan in 1999. Wang 
imagines Harbin to be a snow world. As he states, “The snow world occupied more 
than half of Xiao Hong’s short life; although she left the world of snow, snow is 
always falling in her works.”16 For example, in Tales of Hulan River, Xiao Hong 
depicts how “after the harsh winter has sealed up the land, the earth begins to crack 
and split.”17 Wang was born and grew up in Fujian province in South China, where it 
                                                                 
15 Black soil culture refers to the indigenous culture of Northeast China. Its literal name is because of 
the fact that this region is characterized by black soil. See Jingyang Yan, “Heitu wenhua de xingcheng 
he fazhan (The formation and development of black soil culture),” Fendou no.7, 2017. 
https://wenku.baidu.com/view/5cd158ef3086bceb19e8b8f67c1cfad6195fe91f.html 
16 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 403.  
17 Xiao Hong, The Field of Life and Death and Tales of Hulan River, trans. Howard Goldblatt. Boston: 
Cheng and Tsui Company, 2002. 
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rarely snows. Wang states that his impetus to visit Harbin is to see land cracks in cold 
winter and light snow as described in Tales of Hulan River, and to visit the street in 
Harbin at night as portrayed in Market Street. 
Wang intertwines his experience of Harbin with Xiao Hong’s. In the imagined 
space, Wang crosses the boundary of time, going back and forth between the real 
Harbin and the one in Market Street. The Harbin he describes in “Xiao Hong in 
Snow” is both contemporary and of the past, both of his and of Xiao Hong’s, and both 
of the real and the imagined. As Xiao Hong portrays in Market Street, she suffers 
hunger and coldness, waiting for Lang Hua to come back home. “The snow made me 
uneasy, terrified me…A litter of piglets falling into a pit of snow. Sparrows frozen to 
death on telephone wires.”18 Such description by Xiao Hong shapes Wang’s 
imagination of Harbin. As he states, “These words fall onto Harbin like freezing 
snow… Hunger and coldness are all what Xiao Hong tells me about Harbin.”19 
In Market Street, Xiao Hong depicts a sense of fear and strangeness about night. 
In order to feel close to Xiao Hong, Wang goes into the cold and snowy night in 
Harbin. The snow falling under his collar reminds him of the light snow portrayed in 
Market Street. Wang further intertwines contemporary Harbin with the historical one, 
in which Xiao Hong lived. When he is on the bank of the Songhua River, Wang 
imagines that the river bursts its bank and floods the city, and Xiao Hong is trapped in 
Dongxingshun Hotel, as in 1932. Wang uses the Songhua River as a means to provoke 
the memory of Old Harbin and Xiao Hong in 1932. His writing is about the Songhua 
                                                                 
18 Xiao, Market Street, 41 
19 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 404. 
202 
 
River in both 1932 and 1999. Songhua River becomes the means to bridge the 
temporal gap and to tie together Xiao Hong’s Harbin of the past and Wang’s of the 
present, constituting a simultaneous temporality in the literary space of Harbin.  
Similar to Wang’s approach, another contemporary writer, Zhang Kangkang, 
creates intertextuality between her writings of Harbin and Xiao Hong’s. Zhang 
records her visit to Hulan in 1985 in her article “There is a Cactus Tree in the North.” 
In this article, Zhang imagines the historical space of Hulan in the 1930s by means of 
her “dialogue” with the sixty-year old cactus tree in Hulan, which has witnessed the 
historical changes of Hulan since Xiao Hong’s era. In this way, the old cactus tree 
becomes the tie that connects Xiao Hong’s Tales of Hulan River with Zhang’s “There 
is a Cactus Tree in the North.” Zhang’s and Wang’s writings of Xiao Hong are 
“double’’ in Kristeva’s terms, i.e., they live “within the literary space of [Xiao Hong], 
and within the space of texts across time.”20 Snow, the Songhua River, and the cactus 
tree are the interfaces, through which the old literary spaces of Harbin and Hulan 
mingle with their new physical space, to produce Harbin and Hulan as a renewed 
literary imagination, enriching the temporal and spatial layers of the two places. 
 
Hong Ke — Harbin as a Hybrid Space 
Hong Ke is a writer from Shanxi province in Northwest China. Hong Ke visited 
Harbin in the winter of 2007 because of his affection for Xiao Hong’s writings and for 
snow, and he wrote the article, “Zai Xiao Hong de chengshi (In Xiao Hong’s city).”  
                                                                 
20 Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue, and Novel,” 65. 
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Hong Ke identifies Harbin as a multi-ethnic, exotic, and romantic city. Hong Ke’s 
impression of Harbin is based on his visit to Central Street, St. Sophia Church, and the 
Ice Lantern Entertainment World, which are all important landmarks and tourist sites 
of Harbin. Hong Ke offers a historical reading of these sites. He considers Harbin as a 
hybrid place, being both a frontier of modernity and a place with unique, traditional, 
cultural features. Hong Ke emphasizes what he considers the unique hybrid culture in 
Northeast China, i.e., a combination of European culture, black soil culture, fishing 
and hunting culture, Manchu, and Shaman culture. After visiting the Ice Lantern 
Entertainment World, Hong Ke suggests that it is snow and ice that enrich people’s 
imagination; the cold climate is another contributor to the unique culture of Harbin.  
 Hong Ke sees Harbin as being both modern and indigenous, international and 
local, down-to-earth and romantic. He tends to argue, quite deterministically, that it is 
this unique culture and climate that produce the great works of Xiao Hong. He states, 
for instance, that both black soil culture and modern art prevail in Tales of Hulan 
River. However, I argue that the opposite could be true as well – Xiao Hong’s 
portrayal of Harbin’s exotic space, black soil culture, and cold climate, shape Hong 
Ke’s perception of Harbin. According to Parkins and Haworth, “Subjectivity and 
space are mutually constitutive.”21 The physical and the imagined space of Harbin 
intertwines with each other, working together in the continual social (re)production of 
the city’s (social) space, as lived and abstract. 
                                                                 
21 Ilya Parkins and Lara Haworth, “The Public Time of Private Space in ‘Dior by Dior’,” Biography 35, 
no. 4 (2012): 673. 
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Qiu Subin — Moral Decline in the Contemporary Harbin 
“Xun bujian guilu de Xiao Hong (The Xiao Hong who could not find the way of 
returning)” is an article by Qiu Subin, published in the journal, Zuojia (Writer), in 
1997. This article is in the form of an imagined dialogue between Qiu and Xiao Hong. 
Qiu tells a story of contemporary Harbin and Hulan to Xiao Hong, and tries to re-
experience the Harbin of Xiao Hong’s time. Qiu tells Xiao Hong that she sees 
“Golden Bough” in Harbin – she is the village girl who makes a living by sewing in 
the Field of Life and Death. According to Xiao Hong, Golden Bough is sexually 
harassed by her male client. In contrast with the naïve Golden Bough, who escaped 
from Harbin to her village after the humiliation, in Xiao Hong’s novel, the “Golden 
Bough” that Su sees is well-off and settles down in Harbin. According to Qiu, the 
contemporary “Golden Bough” is comfortable with her sexy and revealing clothing 
and her job as sex worker. Here, Su satirizes the moral decline and worship of money 
that she noticed among contemporary women in cities.  
The Golden Bough of Xiao Hong’s work is reproduced by Qiu in her writing of 
contemporary Harbin. According to Kristeva, the “literary word” (in this case, 
“Golden Bough”) is an “intersection of textual surfaces rather than a point (a fixed 
meaning), as a dialogue among several writings.”22 The imaginative dialogue 
between Qiu and Xiao Hong breaks the boundary between the past and the present, 
between the literary space and the physical space of Harbin. 
                                                                 
22 Alfaro, “Intertextuality: Origins,” 268; also see Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue, and Novel,” 65. 
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Moreover, Qiu tells Xiao Hong that many writers of Xiao Hong’s generation 
have given up writing and engaged in business. Wang Enjia was Xiao Hong’s fiancé, 
who abandoned her when she was pregnant. Qiu says that in Harbin she sees many 
“Wang Enjia,” who enjoy sexual pleasure with several women. Qiu’s article implies a 
nostalgia for Xiao Hong’s era. As Koga argues, “Nostalgia for Old Harbin is a 
displaced form of social criticism of contemporary Harbin.”23 Qiu’s nostalgic 
narrative should be read in Koga’s terms, as an indictment against the worship of 
money and the moral decline of man and woman at present.24 
According to Qiu, Xiao Hong’s tomb in Hulan is locked within a fence.25 She 
argues that Xiao Hong fought to shed the fetters imposed by “feudalism” on family, 
gender, and marriage; however, her fellow townsmen lock Xiao’s tomb in the name of 
loving and protecting her. Qiu argues that fence and lock are symbolic fetters for Xiao 
Hong’s soul. Qiu also satirizes the fact that Xiao Hong has become a brand and a 
money tree for her hometown to attract visitors and consumers. Qiu criticizes this 
commercialization of Xiao Hong, which might distort people’s imagination of her 
milieu de mémoire (real environment of memory).  
 
Ji Hongzhen — the Disappeared Material Memory of Xiao Hong 
Ji Hongzhen, the author of Xiao Hong zhuan (Xiao Hong’s autobiography), visited 
                                                                 
23 Koga, “The Double Inheritance,” 58. 
24 Similarly, William Cunningham Bissell proposes regarding nostalgia as a means of measuring the 
present. Bissell, “Engaging Colonial Nostalgia,” 226. 
25 A wisp of Xiao Hong’s hair is in her tomb in Hulan. Her remains were buried in Yinhe Cemetery in 
Guangzhou and St. Stephen’s Girls’ College in Hong Kong. 
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Harbin and Hulan in 2009, and wrote her experience there in “Xiao Hong guli (The 
hometown of Xiao Hong).” Ji evokes the memories of the changed political situation 
in Harbin by pointing out the changed names of the middle school where Xiao Hong 
used to study. The name of the school changed many times: from Worshipping 
Morality Women’s Middle School in 1924, to First Municipal Girls’ Middle School in 
the Eastern Province Special Region in 1926, to Harbin No. Seven Middle School in 
1949, to the present Xiao Hong Middle School, since 1992. Moreover, Ji states that 
Xiao Hong used to be regarded as a rebellious student, who was scolded and even 
expelled by this school. However, ironically, such a “bad” student becomes the model 
for the contemporary students in Xiao Hong Middle School. The changed attitudes 
towards Xiao Hong over time reveals the changed expectations of womanhood in 
China. Ji suggests that naming the school after Xiao Hong is also a symbolic political 
act that implies the school’s respect for women and an embrace of liberalism, equity, 
and freedom.  
Moreover, seeing the disappearance of the material legacy of Xiao Hong in 
Harbin, Ji conveys her nostalgia for Xiao Hong’s Old Harbin and her melancholy over 
the transformed urban space of the city: “The cinema and pawnshop that Xiao Hong 
visited exist only in old photos; the rickshaw which took Xiao Hong to hospital before 
she delivered a baby is transformed into a sculpture on the side of Central Street.”26 Ji 
comments that “Xiao Hong becomes a legend of the city, but the material memory of 
                                                                 
26 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 382; also see Hongzhen Ji, “Xiao Hong guli (The hometown of Xiao 
Hong),” Sanwen (Short essay), 2009. 
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her disappeared.” Similarly, in her visit to the town of Hulan, Ji argues that the poetic 
nature of Hulan has disappeared, due to the prevalence of urbanization and market 
economy.27 By pinpointing the poetic nature of Hulan embodied in Tales of Hulan 
River, Ji conveys nostalgia for the pastoral life of Xiao Hong’s time and criticism of 
modernization. These contemporary writers’ and readers’ imaginations of Xiao Hong 
and of the Old Harbin in Xiao Hong’s writings is not only nostalgic for the past, but 
also a modernist revision of it. This is a process of objectifying Xiao Hong, her 
literary works, and her Old Harbin, as the Other. Such revision of the past tells more 
about the present than about the past itself. Xiao Hong and her Harbin become a 
means for contemporary writers to express their critique of the city at present.  
 
Xiao Hong on the Silver Screen: Falling Flowers versus The Golden Era 
Falling Flowers (2012) and The Golden Era (2015) were produced partly to 
commemorate the 100th anniversary of Xiao Hong’s birth. The two films have similar 
structure, presenting chronologically Xiao Hong’s life story in several places, from 
Hulan to Beijing, Harbin, Qingdao, Shanghai, Wuhan, Chongqing, and Hong Kong. In 
the following, I explore how the Harbin of the 1930s is imagined differently in the 
two films, especially in terms of the city’s ethnic space. I argue that although both 
films represent Harbin in the 1930s as multiethnic, Falling Flowers reconstructs a 
Russianized and upscale Harbin and, in contrast, in The Golden Era, Old Harbin is 
constructed as a cultural space dominated by the Chinese. I examine how complex 
                                                                 
27 Ibid., 378. 
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historical, political, economic, and architectural factors shape the different 
imaginations and representations of Harbin. Films, here, are utilized as “rich maps of 
social-cultural, political, economic, and architectural discourses” in representing (or 
not representing) the Chinese and the Russian ethnic space of Old Harbin.28 
The presence of St. Sophia Church and snow in both films illustrates, to some 
extent, how branding Harbin as Oriental Moscow and Ice City shapes film directors’ 
imaginations of the city. In turn, the two films contribute to “fuel an emerging urban 
discourse” of the exotic, romantic, and cold Harbin by “reinforcing stock images,” 
such as St. Sophia Church.29 Harbin in film is a lens, through which I examine how 
film production in and about a city is influenced by the physical cityscapes, the 
strategies of the city’s branding, and its economic concerns. Furthermore, I examine 
the heterogenic memories of the city’s past on the screen, and how a film is integrated 
within and impacts on a society, and contribute to the social production of Harbin. 
 
The Usage of Snow and Church in the Cinematic Harbin 
In recent years in Harbin, ice and snow have become increasingly appealing to 
tourists. Ice lanterns and snow sculptures are among the city’s icons. In this sense, it is 
not a coincidence that both films, discussed in the previous section, choose winter as a 
major season to shoot Xiao Hong’s life in Harbin. Snow is recognized by both film 
directors as an indispensable element that represents Harbin. This is partly due to the 
                                                                 
28 Richard Koeck and Les Roberts, eds. The City and the Moving Image: Urban Projections (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 19. 
29 Braester. Painting the City Red, 229. 
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climate of this city, but the branding by local government of Harbin as Ice City also 
contributes to the high profile given to snow in the two films. Winter is the hot season 
for tourists to visit Harbin. Harbin International Ice and Snow Festival is an annual 
winter festival that officially starts on January 5th and lasts a month. The city’s snow 
and ice culture draw attention from local, national, and international news reports and 
television programs. In 2017, part of the National Spring Festival Gala was held in the 
Ice Lantern Entertainment World, a theme park in Harbin.30 Ice and Snow are cultural 
signifiers as well as tourist sources of Harbin. They are incorporated in many films 
about Harbin.   
Falling Flowers and The Golden Era present snow in differing ways: the 
foregrounding of snow is obvious in Falling Flowers, whereas snow functions more 
often as a background in The Golden Era. That is to say, scenes of falling snow are 
shown in Falling Flowers, whereas there are several shots of public space covered by 
snow in The Golden Era. Snow itself is a spectacle, shaping audiences’ imagination of 
a mythic and romantic Harbin. Snow in the two films is also a potential visual 
advertisement to the audiences who might, in turn, become tourists visiting Harbin in 
winter.  
Specifically, Huo uses a lot of images of falling snow, especially at night. Snow 
becomes a “jie pai qi (metronome)” in Dai Jinhua’s term,31 functioning as a link that 
connects the cinematic narrations of Xiao Hong’s life experiences in Harbin. Huo 
utilizes snow to create a sense of romanticized desolation. In other words, snow 
                                                                 
30 Watching this gala with family is a tradition on the Chinese New Year. 
31 Dai Jinhua, Dianying piping (film critique) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2015), 64. 
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signifies romance as well as cold and difficulty. In Falling Flowers, when Xiao Hong 
returns to Harbin from Beijing with her fiancé, Wang Enjia, the first image of Harbin 
is the streetscape outside a classical building under heavy snow, in the dim light of 
road lamps, together with a horse-drawn carriage passing by. Such imagery adds a 
poetic atmosphere to the city, whereas the voiceover endows the scene with a sad 
tone: “Wang and I used up all the money in Beijing, having no choice but to go back 
to Harbin. Our two families canceled the arranged marriage, and they broke up with 
Wang and me. We are unable to return home, living half a year in Dongxingshun 
Hotel.”32 The tension between the poetic images and the melancholic voiceover 
indicates the “double faces” of Harbin for Xiao Hong, a mythic world and a dark hell 
at the same time. In this sense, Huo endows snow with a paradoxical connotation. 
The sense of romanticized desolation is also spatially created by Huo when the 
small and tender world of the couple is situated in a larger context of desolation: an 
abandoned factory. In Falling Flowers, after Xiao Jun finds a job, the couple celebrate 
this success by dancing in front of St. Nicholas Cathedral and outside of an 
abandoned factory. In the following shot, the couple go into this empty factory. When 
Xiao Jun tries to kiss Xiao Hong, Xiao Hong runs away and Xiao Jun chases her. The 
next shot is a close-up of a wide hole on the wall of the factory, through which snow 
falls. Due to the strong light outside, the hole is nothing but a bright, white emptiness. 
Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun end up kissing each other under this bright stream of snow. 
                                                                 
32 Snow as a metaphor of difficulty is presented in another scene, in which Xiao Jun walks sadly on his 
way home in a snowy night, because he fails to find a job or borrow any money for food. In another 
shot, several prostitutes are relaxing on the balcony, while Xiao Hong walks in the heavy snow.  
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For one thing, the cold atmosphere in the abandoned factory is strengthened by the 
falling snow and a kiss in snow “expresses Xiao Hong’s passion and love.”33 For 
another thing, the bright stream of snow that surrounds Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun 
creates a small romantic world for the couple. It could be a visualization of the 
couple’s psyche, symbolizing the light, hope, and romance they feel with each other. 
The stream of snow, in which the couple are bathing, contrasts with the empty and 
desolating space in the abandoned factory. Such a panoramic view of the empty 
factory offered to the audience contrasts with the limited vision of the couple, to 
whom the mythic world created by the stream of light and snow is everything. This 
scene lends itself to be read in metaphoric terms: if the stream of snow signifies the 
romance and love between the couple at this moment, then the desolating space that 
surrounds the snow stream in the abandoned factory hints at the possible 
unharmonious relationship between the couple in the future. This hidden problem 
between the couple is instantly revealed in the next shot, in which the voiceover by 
Xiao Hong introduces their new home on Market Street and Xioa Hong’s fear that 
Xiao Jun might have an affair with their neighbor, Wang Lin.  
                                                                 
33 Min Wu, “Song Jia: yan xiaohong wo fangfu yanle yibeizi (Song Jia: playing the role of Xiao Hong 
seems to take my whole life),” Southern Daily, March 2, 2013. 
http://epaper.southcn.com/nfdaily/html/2013-03/02/content_7169631.htm 
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Figure 2. The Poster for Falling Flowers 
Unlike the many shots of falling snow in Falling Flowers, several scenes of 
Harbin after snow are shown in The Golden Era, and snow serves as a background for 
the filmic narration of Xiao Hong in Harbin. For example, the first shot depicting 
Xiao Hong’s arrival in Harbin shows a back view of her walking in a public space that 
is covered by snow. Later, a snow-covered park, the locale where Xiao Hong says 
farewell to her brother, is shown. In another scene, her fiancé goes to an opium house, 
located in the courtyard house in Daowai. There is a close-up shot of the snow-
covered stairs in this courtyard. The only shot of falling snow in The Golden Era is 
the one in which Xiao Hong walks onto the top floor of the Europa Hotel and watches 
the heavy snowflakes through the small skylight. Her face shows excitement. Then, 
from Xiao Hong’s point of view, a panoramic shot of the city is presented. In this 
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case, director Xu uses snow to create a cheerful atmosphere and a sense of hope, 
signifying Xu’s interpretation of Xiao Hong’s positive character. This contrast with 
Falling Flowers, where snow is a source not only of romance but also of melancholy. 
St. Sophia Church is shown in both films, even in the same chronological order – 
after Xiao Hong escapes from Dongxingshun Hotel and before she delivers a baby in 
a hospital. However, a slight difference in the representation of St. Sophia Church in 
the two films is indicated in the following: in Falling Flowers, doves are shown flying 
across the dome of St. Sophia Church; in The Golden Era, the shot of the church in 
falling snow is accompanied with the clamour of the church bells. In this way, the 
same church signifies different meanings in the two films. In Falling Flowers, the 
doves flying across the dome of St. Sophia Church can be read as a metaphor of Xiao 
Hong, who gains her freedom from the confinement of Dongxingshun Hotel. In The 
Golden Era, the sound of church bells from St. Sophia Church is juxtaposed with the 
cry of a baby, indicating Xiao Hong’s delivery of a baby – a ritualized symbol of time 
and the beginning of a new life. St. Sophia Church covered by snow demonstrates two 
popular tourist sources in Harbin, namely the European style architectural heritage 
and winter tourism. In both films, the inclusion of St. Sophia Church and snow, either 
as background or as foreground, is partly due to the fact that they are the icons of 
Harbin. This church and snow shape the two directors’ imaginations of Harbin. To 
film Harbin, St. Sophia church and snow are too indispensable to be omitted. 
Moreover, in The Golden Era, the representation of Harbin as a place covered by 
snow creates an image of the city as peaceful and clean, whereas in Falling Flowers, 
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the representation of Harbin as a place where snow is always falling creates a sense of 
romanticized desolation. In either case, snow facilitates the audience’s imagination of 
Harbin as peaceful and romantic. Such cinematic imaging, in turn, may motivate 
some audiences to become potential tourists to visit Harbin in winter.  
 
Different Representations of Harbin’s Ethnic Space  
Both films present Harbin as a multi-ethnic city. The mixed ethnicity of the Chinese 
and the Russians is hinted at by the bilingual plaques in Russian and Chinese in the 
two films. Nevertheless, Falling Flowers shows a more Russianized and modern 
Harbin, while The Golden Era presents Harbin mainly as a Chinese cultural space. 
The different representation of Harbin’s ethnic space is illustrated in the Europa 
Hotel. The adaptation of “the Europa Hotel” from Market Street in the two films 
differs. In Market Street, Xiao Hong describes how, when she and Sanlang move into 
the Europa Hotel, a Russian hotel attendant walks into her room, followed by a 
Chinese attendant, and takes away all the bedding because the couple cannot pay its 
rent of fifty cents per day. This event is presented in both films, but in Falling 
Flowers only a Russian attendant comes to take the bedding, while in The Golden 
Era, a male Chinese attendant is followed by a female Russian attendant, and it is the 
Chinese attendant who takes away the bedding. In Market Street, Xiao Hong states 
that “the room looked as though it had been pillaged.”34 The different portrayals of 
the ethnicity of the servants who take away the couple’s bedding in the two films 
                                                                 
34 Xiao, Market Street, 5.  
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could be interpreted as Xu’s and Huo’s different understandings of who the 
“pillagers” are in terms of ethnicity. Moreover, in The Golden Era, when the couple 
enter the Europa Hotel, a Chinese receptionist asks the couple to check in, but such a 
scene is absent in Falling Flowers. The Europa Hotel becomes a contentious place, in 
which the power relationship between the Russian and the Chinese is interpreted 
differently in the two films. This inconsistency conveys the different understandings 
of the ownership of the Europa Hotel: while Falling Flowers suggests the Russian 
ownership of this hotel, The Golden Era portrays its Chinese ownership. Such 
difference metaphorically suggests different representations of the ownership of 
Harbin.  
Both films show the streetscapes in which the couple walk on their way to the 
Europa Hotel after Xiao Hong delivers a baby, but the streetscapes differ. Falling 
Flowers presents an exotic, clean, artistic, and gentrified streetscape, while in The 
Golden Era, the couple walk in a decaying Chinese neighborhood. Automobiles and 
rails of street cars, signifiers of modernity, are major props in Falling Flowers, but 
they are rarely seen in The Golden Era. Instead, in the latter bicycles and carriages are 
major props. Moreover, in contrast to the pedestrians in western uniforms in Falling 
Flowers, in The Golden Era pedestrians wear plain cotton-padded jackets, a style 
unique to the commoners in North China in winter. It portrays a vernacular flavour of 
Chinese commoners’ everyday life and creates a lived space of memory, capturing the 
native city - “ugly, rough, beautiful, [and] exciting, all at once.”35 
                                                                 
35 Braester, Painting the City Red, 224. 
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In Falling Flowers, the prevalence of Westernized store names constantly 
reminds the audience that Harbin was an international city. For instance, there are the 
Chinese-Russian, bilingual plaques of “Yalishanda zhubaodian 亚历山大珠宝店
Александр  ювелирный магазин” (Alexander’s Jewelry store), “Beila rihuadian 贝
拉日化店 Белла косметический магазин” (Bella’s cosmetic store), and “ Liliya 
huadian莉莉娅花店 лилия  цветочный магазин (Lilia’s flower shop ).” There is 
also a Chinese-English, bilingual plaque “万福珠宝 Lucky Jewelry,” implying the 
multi-ethnic nature of Harbin. 
The dominance of Russian cultural space is further illustrated in Falling Flowers, 
when some famous Russian stores (to some extent, cultural icons) of old Harbin are 
presented. For example, among the props are huae daosheng yinhang华俄道胜银行
Русско-Китайский банк (the Russo-Chinese Bank) and aoliante shudian 敖连特书
店 книжный магазин (the Orient bookstore). The Russo-Chinese Bank Harbin 
branch was established in 1898 and closed in 1929. The prop of the Orient Bookstore 
must be adapted from “aoliante dianyingyuan 敖连特电影院, восток кино” (the 
Orient Cinema), which was a Russian-run cinema established in 1908 in Harbin.  
The Russo-Chinese Bank and the Orient Cinema are known to many local people 
at present. Representing these old cultural icons in Falling Flowers demonstrates 
Huo’s intention to provoke the contemporary audience’s cultural memory of the 
Russianized Harbin. Moreover, the fact that the Russo-Chinese Bank was closed in 
1929 but is a prop in a film about the Harbin of 1932 demonstrates the representation, 
and even fabrication, of Old Harbin as a Russian-dominated social space in Falling 
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Flowers. I assume that one of its purposes is to answer the local officials’ call for 
restoring the bygone glory of Harbin as Oriental Moscow in order to develop local 
culture and economy.  
In contrast, a Chinese cultural space, in a multi-ethic Harbin, is the focus in The 
Golden Era. Many store names are from a Chinese cultural background, such as 
“Dexin shizadian德信食杂店 (Virtue and honesty grocery store),” “wushenghao 
yaodian五盛号药店 (Five prosperity pharmacy).” Moreover, another prop, 
“wenquan yuchi温泉浴池 (hot spring public bathhouse)” suggests Japanese cultural 
flavour and its localization in Harbin. It also serves as a hint of the Japanese-
controlled Manchukuo era, the historical time when the story of Xiao Hong is 
narrated. Images of frozen cabbages stored outside residential buildings represent this 
particular local phenomenon that was prevalent until the late 1980s. By using 
indigenous props, The Golden Era might provoke local audiences’ memories of the 
old way of living. In this sense, this film becomes a site of memory not only of Xiao 
Hong but also of the Chinese commoners in Old Harbin.  
The vernacular flavour of everyday life is portrayed not only through streetscape 
and buildings but also through the internal space of a restaurant, where Xiao Jun and 
Xiao Hong have a dinner to celebrate Xiao Jun’s success in finding a job. This 
restaurant is frequented by rickshaw drivers and workers. Right outside the entrance 
of this restaurant is a stove, where a man is selling steaming potatoes. Such vending 
was popular among local Chinese in Old Harbin. The restaurant is small, shabby, and 
crowded; its staff and customers are Chinese. Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun have to share a 
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table with many other customers. A focus on the customer next to Xiao Hong shows 
that he has a patch on his clothes, indicating his poverty. In The Golden Era, Xu 
presents the details of Chinese commoners’ everyday life, and she set the venue in 
deteriorating buildings. Harbin in Xu’s film is endowed with vernacular flavour and a 
sense of vitality, embodied in lived experience. I argue that The Golden Era is an 
insider film; its narrative perspective is that of a local commoner, and it expects the 
audience to identify with the authentic representation of everyday life on the screen. 
In contrast, Falling Flowers is an outsider film, highlighting a Russianized cultural 
space, and provoking the audience’s imagination of an exotic Old Harbin. Sandra 
Tawake’s analysis of the fictional narrations about the Pacific and Pacific Islanders, 
who are depicted as exotic objects of European desires, pinpoints a Euro-centric 
perspective.36 In contrast, Falling Flowers tends to show a Europeanized Harbin that 
is an “object of [Chinese] desires” for the director of the film and the municipal 
government of Harbin. 
As mentioned above, in The Golden Era Xiao Jun’s success in finding a job is 
celebrated in a shabby restaurant, frequented by Chinese rickshaw drivers and 
workers. In contrast, in Falling Flowers the couple dance in celebration in front of the 
replica of St. Nicholas Cathedral. The magnificent church contrasts with the 
dilapidated restaurant. This reveals that Huo aims at constructing Harbin into a 
Russianized and romantic cityscape, while Xu aims to represent a Chinese working-
                                                                 
36 Sandra Tawake, “Transforming the Insider-Outsider Perspective: Postcolonial Fiction from the 
Pacific,” The Contemporary Pacific 12, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 155. 
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class space in an everyday life context. The St. Nicholas Cathedral presented in 
Falling Flowers is the replica constructed in 2007. As we have seen, this replica has 
been criticized by some local audiences as being too modern and anachronistic in a 
film telling a story of the 1930s. However, I can imagine the rationale for Huo, and 
the film producer, the Propaganda Departments of Heilongjiang Provincia l 
Government and of the Harbin municipal government, to present this old/new 
landmark of Harbin in Falling Flowers. Putting the reconstructed St. Nicholas 
Cathedral on the screen suggests local officials’ desire to display Harbin as a 
romantic, Russianized city. This new cathedral could be compared to a commercial 
advertisement embedded in a historical film. It functions more as a selling point for 
promoting contemporary Harbin than as a historical background, in which Xiao 
Hong’s life in Harbin is represented. 
The flood of 1932 is an important memory of Harbin and, as expected, it was 
included in both films. However, the streetscapes in waist-deep water after the flood 
are portrayed differently in the two films. In The Golden Era, an upbeat background 
music highlights a scene, in which children splash water on each other; police patrol 
leisurely, riding horses; and a foreign photographer take photos for the pedestrians. In 
contrast, in Falling Flowers, within solemn background music, the streetscape is 
inserted into a melancholic scene, with gloomy sky and pouring rain. In The Golden 
Era, Xiao Hong is happy to take advantage of the flood and escapes from 
Dongxingshun Hotel, where she had been confined, whereas in Falling Flowers, 
anxiety and panic are shown on Xiao Hong’s face, when she sees the deep water on 
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the street. Also, there are more Caucasian pedestrians shown in Falling Flowers than 
in the Golden Era.37  
This by no means suggests that no Chinese elements are included in Falling 
Flowers or no Russian elements in The Golden Era. Indeed, both films represent a 
mixed ethnic space in Harbin, although they have different emphases. It would be too 
simplified to argue that Huo presents a romanticized and exotic Harbin, while Xu 
presents a messy, but lively, Chinese cultural space of the city. However, it is safe to 
conclude that Huo amplifies the non-Chinese cultural elements of 1930s’ Harbin, 
while Xu pays more attention to the Chinese neighborhood. The texture of daily life 
constructed in Falling Flowers is not as rich as in The Golden Era. Falling Flowers 
represents a mythic, modern, Russianized Harbin, a utopia shrouded in a desolate, 
romantic, and poetic atmosphere. It is analogous to an exhibited art work, expected to 
be observed at distance. In contrast, The Golden Era constructs Harbin as a vigorous 
living space, dominated by Chinese commoners, which is expected to resonate with 
and be imaginatively experienced by Chinese audiences. 
The similar yet different cityscapes of Harbin constructed in the two films reveal 
the complex factors that shaped their production, such as the funding institutes’ 
expectations and directorial taste. Moreover, the unique history of Harbin (the 
connection and contention between a Russian Kharbin and a Chinese Haerbin) is 
another important factor that shapes contemporary film producers’ different 
                                                                 
37 In Xiao Hong’s work and memoirs, there is no record about how she escaped from the hotel. 
According to the narration of Xiao Hong Digital Museum, it was Xiao Jun and a few other friends who 
helped Xiao Hong to escape from the hotel when Harbin was flooded. Xiao Hong Digital Museum, 
“Shengping jianjie (The bibliographical introduction),” January 11, 2013.  
http://xiaohong.dbw.cn/system/201301/102882.html 
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imaginations of this city’s past. The different construction of ethnic space in the two 
films echoes the historical debates on whether Harbin was a Russian city or a Chinese 
one in terms of culture throughout the first two decades of the 20th century.38 It also 
suggests the continuation of this debate up to the present. The contentious history of 
Harbin has been haunting and shaping contemporary people’s construction of the city, 
both physically and intellectually.  
The emphasis on a Russianized cultural space in Falling Flowers, and a Chinese 
one in The Golden Era, finds a parallel with the competition between St. Sophia 
Church and the Confucian Temple and, again, between the reconstruction of Dao-taifu 
and St. Nicholas Cathedral, discussed in Chapter One. Both film and architecture 
reveal the continued competition in claiming the Chinese or non-Chinese tradition of 
Harbin. In this way, film and architecture constitute a set of layered dialogues 
between the physical and the cinematic space of the city, between the Harbin of the 
early decades of the twentieth century and the one at present, contributing to a 
transmedia and cross-time production of Harbin as real and imagined.  
 
The Official Memorialization of Xiao Hong in Harbin 
Xiao Hong was downplayed in the official discourse for decades in China before the 
1980s. Ironically, it is the American scholar, Howard Goldblatt, who played an 
important role in drawing people’s attention to Xiao Hong and initiating the boom of 
Xiao Hong studies in China, beginning in the 1980s. Goldblatt published The 
                                                                 
38 James Carter, “A Tale of Two Temples: Nation , Region, and Religious Architecture in Harbin, 1928-
1998,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 99, no.1 (Winter 2000): 97-115. Duke University Press. 
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Biography of Xiao Hong in 1976, and the Chinese translation of this book has been 
available in China since 1980. Goldblatt was one of the earliest to write a biography 
of Xiao Hong after Luo Binji’s Xiao Hong xiaozhuan (Brief biography of Xiao Hong) 
in 1947. Another important event that initiated the contemporary Xiao Hong studies 
was the academic conference in 1981 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of Xiao 
Hong’s birth in Harbin. Since then, commemorative conferences have been held every 
ten years in Harbin and Hulan. Numerous publications and research institutes, 
dedicated to Xiao Hong, have come into being since the 1980s. This trend reached its 
peak around 2011 during Xiao Hong’s 100th birth anniversary. I will not go into the 
details about the memorial activities. Instead, I will analyze the cultural and economic 
discourses embedded in the commemorative activities for Xiao Hong.  
 
The Cultural and Economic Discourses of Memorializing Xiao Hong 
The 1981 conference on Xiao Hong was approved by the Propaganda Department of 
the CCP, who defined Xiao Hong as a Left-Wing, patriotic writer. 1980 was not long 
after the Cultural Revolution was officially declared over in 1976 and the official 
launch of China’s Reform and Opening Up policy in 1978. For these reasons, strict 
censorship and high sensitivity to the political ideology of literary works were still 
dominant. A more diverse interpretation of Xiao Hong’s works did not begin until the 
1990s.  
The central and the local governments differed in their motivations to 
commemorate Xiao Hong. While the central government of China defines Xiao Hong 
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as a patriotic writer, the Heilongjiang provincial government defines Xiao Hong as a 
cultural symbol and a brand to develop local culture.  
In July 2009, the Heilongjiang Provincial Literature Research Institute was 
renamed Xiao Hong Research Institute. At its opening ceremony, the former director 
of the Heilongjiang Party Committee Propaganda Department, Yi Junqing, and the 
secretary of the Chinese Writer Association, Li Bing, delivered speeches. Yi said that 
they would take Xiao Hong as the literary archetype, to develop local literature in 
Heilongjiang Province. They plan to develop the brand of Xiao Hong as the primary 
cultural project. Two attitudes toward the past are, as Hargreaves suggests, “simply to 
remember it” and “to glorify the past for the benefit of the present.”39 Yi’s speech is 
an illustration of the latter. Memorialization of Xiao Hong is “not innocent.”40 The 
commemoration of Xiao Hong is no longer “a merely transparent expression of the 
past. Instead, memory had become a cultural enterprise that needed to be actively 
produced, represented and contested.”41 In this sense, the memory of Xiao Hong is 
(re)produced to serve the cultural and economic agenda in Harbin. 
Li Bing’s speech at this opening ceremony further emphasizes the pragmatic 
concern of memorializing Xiao Hong in Harbin. Li said that Xiao Hong is the 
daughter of black soil and brings repute to Heilongjiang province. The establishment 
of this research institute can not only increase wider attention to the literature of 
                                                                 
39 Alec G. Hargreaves, eds., Memory, Empire, and Postcolonialism: Legacies of French Colonialism 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005), 94. 
40 Jeannette Marie Mageo, ed., Cultural Memory: Reconfiguring History and Identity in the Postcolonial 
Pacific (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), 29. 
41 Kusno, Behind the Postcolonial, 14. 
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Heilongjiang, but also can improve the local people’s taste for literature and motivate 
contemporary local writers to develop Heilongjiang regional culture and formulate the 
uniqueness of Heilongjiang literary writing. Li Bing emphasizes Xiao Hong’s being a 
writer of native place literature (xiangtu wenxue) in Heilongjiang province. The 
commemoration of Xiao Hong, according to Li Bing, is not past-oriented but future-
oriented. Xiao Hong is incorporated into the project of local identity-construction. 
Apart from the political and cultural agenda in reviving Xiao Hong, the intention 
to use Xiao Hong in promoting the local economic development is also revealed. In 
2011, at the commemoration conference for the100th anniversary of Xiao Hong’s 
birth, Zhang Xiaolian, the director of the Propaganda Department of Heilongjiang 
Province, delivered a speech, in which he said that “by highlighting such a ‘name 
card’ as Xiao Hong, we wish to strengthen the regional culture and increase the 
cultural reputation of Heilongjiang, motivating the cooperative development between 
culture and economy in Heilongjiang province.”42 Henceforth, the Heilongjiang 
Provincial Propaganda Department initiated the program of “Creating a Cultural 
Brand of Xiao Hong”. At present, Xiao Hong has become a heritage to be revitalized 
and consumed. As Anders Hogberg argues, “Heritage is what we make of it today and 
how we choose to give meaning to the past in the present. In this sense, heritage is 
more of today than of the past.”43 Xiao Hong becomes a cultural capital of the city. 
                                                                 
42 Xiaogeng Song, “Huigu yu zhanwang: jinian Xiao Hong danchen bainian xueshuyantaohui zongshu 
(Reflecting and envisioning: a review of the conference commemorating the 100th anniversary of Xiao 
Hong’s Birth),” Xuexi yu tansuo (Study and exploration), 4 (2011): 262. 
43 Peter F. Biehl et al., eds. Identities and Heritage: Contemporary Challenges in a Globalized World  
(New York: Springer, 2014), 74. 
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To a certain extent, she initiates a cultural industry that constitutes part of the 
economic and cultural development of Harbin. 
 
Criticism of Developing Xiao Hong Cultural Industry by the Public  
Some aspects of the official promotion of the Xiao Hong cultural industry are 
criticized by the public. For example, Xiao Hong’s renovated house has been open to 
the public since 1986. Several visitors claimed that it is too tidy to be true. Ji 
Hongzhen contended that “the pig trough is too clean; it is like a picture designed by a 
computer.”44 Xiao Fuxing argued that it becomes a place for those who have a 
pretentious interest in art; Xiao Hong’s house was refashioned into a tourist site rather 
than for the sake of this heritage building itself. Xiao Hong “had become not only a 
literary, but also a tourist celebrity.”45 “The architecture of the past in the present is 
not an issue of inheritance. Instead, it is a symbolic act that helps construct a 
collective desire for a new time.”46 This claim by Kusno about the heritage building 
in Indonesia is, to some extent, true in the case of Xiao Hong’s house. Preserving 
Xiao Hong’s house denotes the collective official (and many commoners’) desire to 
restore this region’s cultural tradition and to construct a unique local identity, in order 
to adapt to as well as confront contemporary market economy and globalization. 
However, for the many others, such as Ji Hongzhen and Xiao Fuxing, one of the 
problems in “inheriting” the legacies of Xiao Hong is that Xiao Hong’s house is 
                                                                 
44 Zhang, Xiao Hong Impression, 382; also see Hong zhen Ji, “Xiao Hong guli.” 
45 Hendrix, ed., Writers’ Houses, 45. 
46 Abidin Kusno, The Appearances of Memory, 126. 
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turned into a spotless museum, a lieu de mémoire that effaces the actual memory of 
Xiao Hong herself. 
 Moreover, Xiao Fuxing contrasted the popularity of Xiao Hong with the decline 
of Northern Literature, a local magazine established in 1950. Xiao argues that 
Northern Literature is also a brand of the city, but it has been ignored by the local 
government. According to Xiao, the Northern Literature is faced with a strong 
financial crisis, such that its staff did not get paid for salary eight months in a row. 
There is an obvious imbalance in the local official’s support for the development of 
different cultural undertakings in Harbin.  
The preservation of certain pieces of cultural heritage, while ignoring the others, 
entails more complex issues than just financial concerns. One of the reasons for the 
boom of Xiao Hong studies is the fact that Xiao Hong and her works appeal to many 
contemporary readers. Many volunteer to do research on Xiao Hong. Zhang Haining 
and Ye Jun are two examples. Both moved to Harbin from distant cities, due to their 
interest in Xiao Hong. Zhang Haining was a journalist in Jiangsu province before he 
came to Harbin, where he fully devotes his time to Xiao Hong research. His personal 
collections of Xiao Hong studies constitute most of the material of the Xiao Hong 
Literature Institute. He is also the initiator of the Hulan River Reading Group and one 
of the major organizers of the activities commemorating Xiao Hong in Harbin. Ye Jun 
is a literature professor at Heilongjiang University in Harbin. His hometown is in 
Hubei province in Central China. His major reason to move to Harbin also has to do 
with Xiao Hong research. Zhang Hainiang and Ye Jun identify Harbin as the 
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hometown of Xiao Hong; Harbin for them is the authentic place to do Xiao Hong 
research, shortening the physical and affective distance from Xiao Hong.  
 
Conclusion 
The memorialization of Xiao Hong in relation to Harbin crosses temporal and media 
boundaries. While some people are nostalgic for the loss of Xiao Hong, Old Harbin, 
and Hulan, others use Xiao Hong to “manufacture” nostalgia as a product and a 
calling card for the contemporary city. As Bissell argues, “We need to engage with 
[nostalgia] as a social practice that mobilizes various signs of the past in the context 
of contemporary struggles.”47 Memorialization of Xiao Hong capitalizes upon her 
literary capital, as much as her political and economic capital. By juxtaposing Boym’s 
and Hockx’s concepts – reflective and restorative nostalgia and force field – this 
chapter reveals the intertwining and tensions of the literary, political, and economic 
significance, of memorializing Xiao Hong. The memoria lization and representation of 
Xiao Hong tells more of contemporary story-tellers than of Xiao Hong per se. Xiao 
Hong remains a ghost who haunts the city in one way or another, not only reminding 
of Old Harbin but also functioning as an engine that channels the city, in constructing 
its cultural identity in the future.  
 In the diverse lieux de mémoire analyzed above, a multifaceted Harbin is 
revealed, i.e., the physical, the represented, and the imagined; its ethnic and cultural 
space has been contested, as it is perceived to oscillate between the Russianized and 
                                                                 
47 Bissell, “Engaging Colonial Nostalgia,” 218. 
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the Chinese; it has experienced divergent ideologies of development between past-
oriented and future-oriented, and between culturally-privileged and economically-
privileged. Harbin has undergone immensely diverse tensions. It is these tensions 
across time-and-space and across literary, political, and economic boundaries that 
contribute to the social production of a dynamic Harbin, as real as it is imagined. 
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Chapter Seven. The Tension in Constructing a Nationalist versus Local 
History of Harbin on the Screen: Russia and Japan as the Others 
This chapter continues the examination of literature, film, and official discourses 
as lieux de mémoire in relation to Harbin. In this chapter, the focus is on the analysis 
of several historical dramas and films about Harbin. This is to explore the 
contemporary cinematic construction of the city, particularly from the perspective of 
Russia and Japan as two Others. The power contestation and ideological negotiation 
involved in the relationship between Harbin and the two Others, are explored as well. 
The rationale for focusing on historical dramas and films about Harbin is that such art 
forms offer the possibility of seeing Harbin through a space-time kaleidoscope. 
Historical dramas and films offer visual perceptions of the city as a palimpsest by 
means of a temporalization of space and spatialization of time on the screen.1 By 
focusing on Russia and Japan in relation to Harbin, the importance of the “significant 
others” and the “dialogical” process of identity-making for the non-typical Chinese 
city of Harbin can be highlighted and comprehended.2 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, Russia and Japan have played 
paramount roles in the identity-making of Harbin and Manchuria at large. On the one 
hand, the Russians and the Japanese were among the pioneers who constructed the 
urban space of Harbin from scratch. On the other hand, the Russian and Japanese 
                                                                 
1 See Zhang, The City in Modern Chinese Literature and Film, 128, 163. 
2 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 32; also see George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and 
Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934. 
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imperialists, as they are defined by the Chinese official discourse, facilitated the 
growth of Chinese nationalism.3 The indispensable role of Russia and Japan in 
shaping the identity of Harbin was not only a factor in the early decades of the 
twentieth century but also at present. The history of the Russians and the Japanese in 
Harbin has haunted the city. The tension and interaction among Russians, Japanese, 
and Chinese in Harbin are represented in several contemporary Chinese films and 
television dramas. How is the history of the Russians and Japanese in Harbin, 
from1898 to 1945, represented and imagined in contemporary Chinese films and 
television dramas? How do such works contribute to the imaging and reshaping of 
Harbin in cinematic space, and how do they redefine the identity of the city? These 
questions, much as those related to Xiao Hong’s memorialization discussed in the 
previous chapters, are crucial because historical films and television dramas not only 
reflect the city’s past but also reconstruct it, to serve the interests of film producers, 
local officials, investors, and censorship institutions.4 As pointed out by Ban Wang, 
historical dramas in China are not “historical.” They are “predetermined from a 
hindsight” and characterized by a “strong moral element,” “appropriating historical 
data in the service of entertainment, often in the form of cathartic release of 
                                                                 
3 See Carter, Creating a Chinese Harbin; Chiasson, Administering the Colonizer. 
4 According to the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television of The 
People’s Republic of China, a film is not allowed to enter into production without putting its script 
outline into the official file. Unless a film passes censorship, it is not allowed to be distributed, 
screened, and exported. If the main characters and plot of a film involve diplomacy, ethnicity, religion, 
military, public security, historical and cultural celebrity, the film producer is required to provide three 
copies of the script, and to seek advice from relevant administrations at the provincial or central level. 
http://www.sarft.gov.cn/art/2006/5/28/art_107_4597.html 
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emotion.”5 Nevertheless, history on the screen does not exist only for consumption 
and to meet the emotional needs of audiences. Its ideological connotation requires 
unfolding.6 As Braester argues, filmmaking is a form of negotiation with power;7 
filmmakers in China confront the same obstacles that architects are acquainted with as 
“planning in the face of power.”8 The production of Chinese historical dramas and 
films are both shaped by, as well as resistant to, the shackles of politics. 
In the first part of this chapter, I map a cinematic reconstruction of Old Harbin as 
a contact zone, full of ambivalent inter-ethnic relationships, which cannot simply be 
reduced to either Self or Other, enemies or friends. This mapping is done through an 
analysis of two Chinese television dramas, Yu Huo Wei Cheng (Fire Saves the City in 
Danger) (2012) and Ma Die Er Bin Guan De Qiang Sheng (The Gunshot at the 
Modern Hotel) (2011). These are two representative historical dramas that discuss the 
power contestation between Tsarist Russians (later the Soviets), Chinese, and 
Japanese in Harbin. While mapping the main features and contradictions of the 
nationalist discourse in the selected dramas, I focus on the portrayal of Russia and 
Japan as differentiated Others, and on the heterogeneous reconstruction of the 
Russians and the Japanese as both political and apolitical figures. In this way, I 
explore how politics and ideology relate to the imaging of the ethnic space of Old 
                                                                 
5 Ban Wang, “Trauma and History in Chinese Film: Reading ‘The Blue Kite’ against Melodrama.” 
Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 11, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 125-7. 
6 See Tina Mai Chen, “Propagating the Propaganda Film: The Meaning of Film in Chinese Communist 
Party Writings, 1949-1965,”Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 15, no. 2 (Fall 2003):157; Ban 
Wang, The Sublime Figure of History: Aesthetics and in Twentieth-Century China. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997. 
7 Braester, Painting the City Red, 14. 
8 Ibid, 6; John Forester, Planning in the Face of Power. Berleley: University of California Press, 1993.  
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Harbin on the screen and its present political implications.  
In the second part of this chapter, I compare two sets of works: first, two 
versions of an anti-Japanese film set in Harbin, Zhao Yiman in 1950, and Wo De Mu 
Qin Zhao Yi Man (My Mother Zhao Yiman) in 2005; then, another television drama, 
the 1984 Ye Mu Xia De Ha Er Bin (Harbin under the Night Curtain), with its 2008 
remake. By comparing films and television dramas in different eras, I aim to explore 
the evolving representations of the Japanese “demons” and the Chinese nationalist 
heroes, in relation to the cinematic imaginations of Harbin over time.9  The turn to 
romance and femininity and the spotlight on the exotic urban space of Harbin suggest 
a turn towards visual consumption and market economy in the cinematic 
memorialization of anti-Japanese history in Harbin and China at large.  
At the end of this chapter, I present the Japanese memories of and nostalgia for 
Harbin and the positive memories local Chinese have of Japanese Harbiners. They 
contrast with the demonization of the Japanese in Chinese historical dramas and films. 
Such contrast problematizes the memorialization of a nationalist Harbin on the screen, 
and reveals the political ideology embedded in the cinematic representation. It 
provides an alternative, if not radically different, understanding of the dichotomy 
                                                                 
9 Among the many contemporary Chinese historical dramas and films that represent the power 
contestation among the Chinese, the Soviets, and the Japanese are Gong Xun (Immortal Feats) 2007 by 
Hao Cheng, and Yuandong 1932: fengyun madieer (Fareast 1932: The Vicissitudes of the Modern 
Hotel) produced by Xinwu Zhang in 2012. Among the many anti-Japanese historical dramas shot in 
Harbin are Meili de qiutu (A Beautiful Prisoner) (1986) by Jianhua Lu and Zhongxiao Yu, -38℃ (2013) 
by Kaiyang Jiang , Xuanya (Cliff) (2012) by Jin Liu, Hei tai yang 731 (Men Behind the Sun) (1988) by 
T.F. Mou, 731 da kuitao (the Escape of Unit 731) (1992) by Yan Chang, Haerbin wangshi zhi fenglei 
dong (Old Stories of Harbin: Action of Wind and Thunder) (2013) by Kaiyang Jiang. Moreover, Eluosi 
guniang zai haerbin (Russian Girls in Harbin) (1993) by Sha Sun is a Chinese TV drama about a group 
of Russian girls making businesses in Harbin, and about the heroine Olya’s love story with a local 
Chinese man. Huayuan jie wu hao (No.5 Garden Street) (1984), by Shusen Jiang and Shi Zhao, takes 
the residential house of a former Russian duke as that of the contemporary governors of t he city. This 
location symbolizes the power contest between tradition and modernization in various ways. 
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between Self and Other, between victimizer and victim in the Chinese official 
discourse. It also encourages or confuses the audience’s idea of a friendly as well as 
hostile ethnic space in Harbin and contributes to the construction of the ambivalent 
identity of the city.  
It is my contention that the heterogeneous images of Russia and Japan embedded 
in the nationalist discourses imply both conformity with and dissent from power.10 
The selected works suggest a tension between reconstructing a Chinese Harbin and a 
non-Chinese one, in terms of ideology and culture. Specifically speaking, on the one 
hand, the nationalist discourse in the selected films and television dramas showcases 
the CCP’s efforts to reclaim the territory of history, to re-present the history of Harbin 
(1898-1945) into China.11 On the other hand, the emphasis on the foreignness of 
Harbin in the selected works denotes a strategic countermeasure by “local patriots”12 
and pragmatists, who want to promote a unique identity of Harbin, making the city 
competitive in attracting audiences, tourists and investors from home and abroad.13 
The once-suppressed memories of a cosmopolitan Harbin cooperate and compete, on 
                                                                 
10 As Deleuze and Guattari argue, “In a book, as in all things, there are lines of articulation or 
segmentarity, strata or territories; but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and 
destratification.” Applying this insight to the Chinese cultural context, Berry explains that “there are 
systems of order and there are areas or zones that work against the repressive structures of an order to 
open up difference and heterogeneity.” Chris Berry, Postsocialist Cinema in Post-Mao China: the 
Cultural Revolution after the Cultural Revolution  (New York: Routledge, 2004), 20.  
11 See Clausen and Thogersen, The Making of a Chinese City, 10. 
12 Lahusen, “Manchurian Conflicting Memories,” 26; Mitter, The Manchurian Myth, 2. Lahusen uses 
the term “local patriotism” to refer to the resistance to the collective Chinese memory. 
13 As Yu Hongmei suggests, the conversion from propaganda to consumerism is one of the most 
crucial steps toward postsocialist ideological consolidation. Yu, “Visual Spectacular, Revolutionary 
Epic, and Personal Voice: The Narration of History in Chinese Main Melody Films,” Modern Chinese 
Literature and Culture 25, no. 2 (2013):166-218. 
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the screen, with the communist version of the city’s past, telling a contradictory 
history of Harbin, as well as an equally ambivalent official ideology in developing the 
present city. 
The motifs of nationalism and apolitical interpretation of history in films and 
dramas are relevant to the analysis of the cultural memories of Harbin, because in 
China both cinema and the city are producers as well as products of postsocialist 
politics. Cinema in and about the city is a means of seeing the political and 
ideological connotations that are embedded in the memories and the memorialization 
of Harbin. 
My exploration of the relationship between nationalism and the city is inspired 
by earlier scholarship. James Donald (1999) understands “the city” as a historically 
specific mode of seeing. One of the modes of seeing is that of Michel de Certeau, who 
observes the city ‘from above and down below.’14 The former suggests an “imaginary 
totalization,” such as seeing the city through the eyes of urban planners, while the 
latter refers to the regard of the practitioners of everyday life.15 De Certeau presents 
both a “Concept City” and a lived one, an “anthropological experience of space.”16 
This chapter takes the camera as a metaphorical “eye” that sees the reconstructed Old 
Harbin from both “above” and “below”. More precisely, by “above”, I mean that the 
camera presents a grand narrative of nationalism that dominates the selected works; 
by “below,” I focus on individual characters and their practices of everyday life: 
                                                                 
14 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 93. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Donald, Imagining the Modern City, 69. 
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individual characters tell apolitical stories in their communication with the ethnic 
Other, especially in interethnic romance and marriage. In other words, the city of 
Harbin, on the screen, is constructed as both a Concept City of Chinese nationalism as 
well as a lived one, inhabited by individuals whose urban practices manifest a 
multiethnic cultural space of Harbin that has nothing to do with politics. The two 
perspectives contradict each other, revealing ambiguity and contradiction in 
(re)defining the ethnic and cultural identity of Harbin.17 Similar to what Robert 
Burgoyne argues in his analysis of historical films’ role, i.e., that they both unify and 
divide social unisonance in Oliver Stone’s JFK, the selected historical dramas and 
films of Harbin both convey “a desperate need for history as the foundation of 
national identity”18 and reveal a fracturing historical narrative, which suggests “the 
absence of a unified national narrative.”19 Such contradiction suggests the pragmatic 
concern of local officials and film producers who aim to construct an exotic and 
multi-ethnic narrative of Harbin for visual consumption, despite the fact that their 
works are disguised as nationalist stories.  
 
Harbin: An Arena amongst Russia, Japan, and China 
According to Zhang, in the 1990s “Chinese ethnographic cinema showcases exotic 
                                                                 
17 Yu contends that “Postsocialism is an ideological map to read the ambiguities, contradictions, and 
uncertainties at this particular historical moment.” Yu, “Visual Spectacular,” 170. The ambiguous and 
contradictory imaging of the Japanese and the Russians in Harbin (1898-1945) in the “repressive 
structure” of Chinese nationalist films and TV dramas and its relation to the identity of Harbin are the 
main issues to be addressed in this chapter.  
18 Robert Burgoyne, “Modernism and the narrative of nation in JFK,” in The Persistence of History: 
Cinema, Television and the Modern Event , 113-125, 119. 
19 Ibid., 114. 
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landscape and architecture and exhibit sexuality and gender oppression,”20 catering to 
international audience. Zhang suggests that a case in point is Zhang Yimou’s Raise 
the Red Lantern. I classify such ethnographic cinema as Othering China.21  I argue 
that this ethnographic turn of Chinese cinema does not only happen on the national 
level, as illustrated by Zhang Yimou’s work, but also on the provincial or local level. 
Unlike the filmic practice of “Othering China” on the international stage by Zhang, 
films and television dramas about Harbin showcase a reverse trend of inducing the 
exotic Other into the identity of the city, catering to domestic audiences. The Russians 
and the Japanese are the two popular Others that are commonly seen in films and 
television dramas about Harbin.  
 
Russia and Japan as the Evil Other? 
Fire Saves the City in Danger (2012) is a Chinese television drama directed by Deng 
Yinghai. This work was co-produced by the Propaganda Department of the Harbin 
Municipal Government and the Central China Television (CCTV) Administrative 
Center for TV Drama. It tells the story of the defeat of the plague by Doctor Wu Lien-
teh in Harbin in 1910. This television drama is partly based on an actual historical 
event – the 1910 plague. Wu (1879-1960) was a Malayan-born Chinese and a 
                                                                 
20 Yingjin Zhang, Chinese National Cinema (New York: Routledge, 2004), 286; also see Yingjin  
Zhang, Screening China: Critical Interventions, Cinematic Reconfigurations, and the Transnational 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 220-39. 
21 A similar term with “Othering China” is “reversed Chinese Orientalism” in Xiaoying Wang, “Time 
to Remember: The Reinvention of the Communist Hero in Post-Communist China,” New Literary 
History 34, no.1 (Winter 2003): 136. 
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graduate from the University of Cambridge. In 1910, when a plague epidemic broke 
out in Northeast China, Wu was selected by the Qing government as Chief Medical 
Officer and entrusted with the control and elimination of the epidemic. Wu arrived in 
Harbin on October 25, 1910, and the plague was eliminated by January 8, 1911. 
Based on these historical facts, Deng enriches the narrative of this drama by adding 
the tensions between the Russian consul, the Japanese consul, and the Chinese 
officials in Harbin. The three sides strive to be the dominating power in Harbin under 
the pretext of plague control. The narrative is further complicated by a love 
triangle involving Wu Lien-teh, Lida, and Polynov. Lida is a Russian female doctor 
who loves Wu. Polynov is the director of a Russian hospital in Harbin and a plague 
expert, and he loves Lida. At the end of this series, Wu and his team achieve victory, 
eradicating plague and crushing the plan of Russia and Japan to invade Harbin.  
 
Put Plague Control on Stage to Perform the Play of Politics  
In this television drama, plague is represented as an arena, in which the three 
ethnicities compete in both the medical and political fields. Before Wu’s arrival, it is 
mentioned that there is only one professional Chinese doctor. In comparison, the 
Russians and Japanese have modern hospitals.  The assumed impotence of the 
Chinese in terms of medical research is accentuated when Polynov and the Japanese 
doctor, Shibata, look down upon Wu at first. Shibata refuses to shake hands with Wu 
on their first meeting because of Shibata’s assumption that Chinese doctors have but a 
limited understanding of the epidemic.  Later, Wu manages to change their prejudice 
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and turns out to be the only one who figures out effective solutions to control the 
plague. The resulting changed attitude of Polynov and Shibata towards Wu conveys 
a fluidity of power in the medical arena among the three, and signifies a triumphant 
discourse of the Qing China.  
Moreover, due to the fact that the Chief Medical Officer has the power to deploy 
soldiers to Harbin, it is metaphorically implied that whoever controls the plague 
epidemic can get the upper hand in the leadership of the city. The political tension is 
illustrated by the competition for the position of Chief Medical Officer between 
Doctor Wu and the Russian-supporting, French Doctor Masny. When the Qing 
government agrees to assign Masny as the new Chief Medical Officer, due to the 
pressure from both the Russian and the French consulates, Wu appeals to the Japanese 
consul in Harbin. The latter says “China and Japan are similar in terms of culture and 
race. We will support you as the Chief Medical Officer.” In the next shot, the consul 
tells his assistant, Kawasaki, that he wants war between the Russians and the Chinese, 
from which Japan will be the beneficiary. Behind a cooperation agreement, a strategy 
of divide and rule and mutual containment is revealed. 
The tension among the three sides is visualized at a meeting, attended by Eugene 
from the Russian consulate, Kawasaki from the Japanese consulate, and Wu’s 
assistant, Lin.22 At the meeting, Lin hints at the primary role played by Wu by saying 
that “neither of our three sides has created the vaccine for the plague yet, but Wu has 
controlled the plague effectively. Thanks for your support!” Such an ironic thanks 
                                                                 
22 Wu is absent because he is infected with the plague, but he recovers soon. 
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implies that it is the mutual containment of the Russian and the Japanese consulates 
that facilitates Wu’s progress in controlling the plague. Eugene replies, “We did invent 
the vaccine, but it was destroyed when someone (the Japanese) set our hospital on 
fire.” Kawasaki replies with anger, “Even if Wu dies, Polynov will not be the next 
Chief Medical Officer. Japan is the plague control leader in Manchuria.” The victory 
of Wu and his team in controlling the plague is a political message conveyed by film 
director Deng, hinting at the victory of the Chinese in claiming their leadership of 
Harbin. Deng presents the war on plague in a way that resembles the political 
competition between the three nations in Harbin. A nationalist discourse has 
been illustrated throughout this series by demonizing the Russian and Japanese 
consuls in Harbin. 
Nevertheless, Fire shows different portrayals of the two Others: Japan is an 
absolute demon, while Russia changes from a demon into an ally of China. By the end 
of the series, Polynov no longer wants to get involved in the competition with Wu. He 
plans to go back to Russia. Before he leaves, Polynov assists Wu with the plague 
control.23 In contrast, Kawasaki attempts twice to assassinate Wu. Wu survives 
thanks to his bodyguard Zhu Jiang. Zhu Jiang and Kawasaki die in their fight. The 
underlying message of this ending is that Russia and Japan are (and should be) 
differentiated in their degree of evilness. The Japanese imperialists as represented by 
                                                                 
23 In order to eradicate the plague, Wu proposes cremation for the deceased patients, but is faced with 
the resistance from the Chinese citizens and the Russian Orthodox Christians, for whom cremation is 
disrespectful to the dead. Wu resorts to Polynov’s help, and Polynov convinces the Orthodox 
Christians to agree on burning the corpses. Metaphorically, Polynov’s help suggests not on ly the 
rapprochement, even alliance between Chinese and Russians in the power contest over the authority of 
Harbin, but also the fact that religion compromises to support science and modernity. 
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Kawasaki are the true “demons,” whereas the Russian imperialists as represented by 
Polynov eventually cooperate with the Chinese. The Russians are “matey 
imperialists” in Manchuria, in Quested’s terms.24 
But why are the Japanese portrayed as more evil than the Russians, despite that 
arguably not being true in 1910? The Japanese implemented relatively tolerant 
policies as well as major investment in commerce and industry in Manchuria in the 
first two decades of the twentieth century. As stated by William C. Summers,  
In 1906, Goto was the president of the South Manchurian Railway (the 
SMR), a central vehicle for state policy [of Japan] in Manchuria. 
Goto’s approach to Manchuria was, in outline, good relations with the 
local peoples, recruitment of young, highly qualified personnel, and a 
heavy dose of ‘research’. The SMR infiltrated the towns and villages 
adjacent to its lines by the construction of roads, sewage systems, 
bridges, water supplies, hospitals, parks, and cemeteries.25  
Having said that, contemporary cinema and television representations of the 
Japanese in Manchuria show a trend towards erasing the positive memory of the 
Japanese and accentuating the negative. I argue that memories of the Japanese 
atrocities during World War Two may influence the onscreen image of the Japanese 
in 1910 as more evil than the Russians, although their atrocities in Manchuria did not 
become widespread until 1932. The demonization of the Japanese is not entirely 
based on historical fact, but on a contemporary Chinese perception, or stereotype, of 
the Japanese. As Tamanoi argues, “memory is always imbedded in a time, a society 
                                                                 
24 Quested, “Matey” Imperialist?. 
25 “The Japanese cultural invasion of Manchuria began in earnest when Goto established the Research 
Office of the SMR in Dairen and Tokyo in January 1908.” William C. Summers, The Great 
Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911: the Geopolitics of an Epidemic Disease (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2012), 45. 
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and a culture, and is influenced by other memories.”26 The prevalence of anti-
Japanese films and television dramas in contemporary China may contribute to a 
homogeneous image of the demonic Japanese, which are not differentiated over 
historical times. Historical films tell less about history per se than about the film 
producer’s society. History in historical films and television dramas is essentially an 
“in-between space that innovates and interprets the performance of the present.”27 
 
Whose History? Whose Harbin? 
One of the posters advertising Fire states that “This TV drama faithfully represents a 
historical disaster.” Is this television representation “faithful”? If not, what is the 
motivation for misconstruing this historical event? I argue that the political tension 
involved in the plague control as well as the contribution of Wu are amplified to serve 
a nationalist discourse. There is no denying the fact that the 1910 plague was likely to 
become a diplomatic matter. According to Shi Zhaoji, who at the time was secretary 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing government, “Russian and Japanese 
authorities threatened that unless the Chinese Government adopted stringent measures 
to control the epidemic, they would send their own medical officers to take over the 
management.”28 According to Roger Greene, the American consul in Harbin in 1910, 
“the Chinese fear that if they invite Russian sanitary assistance, it will result in 
                                                                 
26 Lahusen, “Manchuria: Conflicting Memories,” 2; also see Mariko Tamanoi, Crossed Histories: 
Manchuria in the Age of Empire (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻ i Press, 2005), 19-20;  
27 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 7. 
28 Lien-teh Wu, Plague Fighter: The Autobiography of a Modern Chinese Physician  (Cambridge: W. 
Heffer & Sons Ltd., 1959), 280. 
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Russian police control in Fu chia-tien.”29 Although the Chinese were sensitive to the 
threat from the Russian and Japanese authorities, the process of plague control was 
not as politically charged as reconstructed in Fire. More medical cooperation than 
political tension was recorded in Dr. Wu’s autobiography.  
According to Wu, “The Russian authorities cooperated heartily.”30 Collaboration 
between Wu and Russian doctors, such as Dr. Boguchi and Dr. Zabolotney, is 
recorded.31 Wu also received a loan of twelve train wagons from the CER General 
Khorvat to be used for quarantining the patients. Wu states that a Japanese doctor was 
assigned by the South Manchuria Railway to come to Harbin from Mukden to assist 
Wu with the plague control, but this Japanese doctor was not very helpful, because he 
believed that the plague was caused by rats, disagreeing with Wu, who claimed that 
this was a pneumonic plague. Later, the Japanese doctor disappeared.32 With regard 
to the responses of the consuls, Wu felt an attitude of indifference among the many 
consuls in Harbin, including the Russian and the Japanese, who “appeared too 
politically-minded, though both spoke as if they were aware of the need of the 
Chinese medical mission.”33 
In Fire, Wu is represented as the major contributor to the eradication of the 
plague; Polynov, Shibata, and other non-Chinese doctors are not very helpful. This is 
                                                                 
29 Summers, The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911, 63; Greene, “Consular Report No. 115, 15 
December 1910,” file 158.931/56, RG 59, NA.  
30 Wu, Plague Fighter, 25.  
31 Ibid., 25; Yu-lin Wu, Memories of Dr. Wu Lien-teh, Plague Fighter (Singapore: World Scientific, 
1995), 44. 
32 Wu, Plague Fighter, 13. 
33 Ibid, 15. Besides, British and French consuls gave Wu little welcome or offer of help. The only 
helpful one was the American consul Roger S. Greene in Harbin. 
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not consistent with Wu’s account of the “substantial assistance”34 he received from 
Russian doctors. Moreover, according to Summers, the plague control in Manchuria 
was achieved by “hodgepodge efforts.”35 He also emphasizes the role of the Russian 
doctors in controlling the plague: “In Harbin, anti-plague measures were undertaken 
quickly because the local Western physicians, mostly associated with the Russian 
railway company, at least had knowledge if not direct experience with small plague 
outbreaks in villages along the railroad in Transbaikalia.”36 
In comparison with these historical accounts, the political tension between Russia, 
Japan, and the Qing China, as well as the heroic contribution of Wu, are amplified in 
Fire. Through such exaggeration, this television drama contributes to “patriotic 
education.”37 As already mentioned, the drama was jointly produced by the 
Propaganda Department of the Harbin Municipal Government and the CCTV 
Administrative Center for TV Drama, and was first broadcast on the Central China 
Television, targeting audiences across China. Both the producer and the media, on 
which Fire was broadcast, imply the affiliation of this series with official political 
ideology at the central and municipal level. As Brian Henderson argues, “Finally the 
operation of a myth – both its construction from actual conflicts and its impact on 
audiences – always has to do with the time [in] which the myth is told, not with the 
time that it tells of.”38 
                                                                 
34 Wu, Memories of Dr. Wu Lien-teh, 68. 
35 Summers. The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911, 149. 
36 Ibid., 78. 
37 Yun Gao, “Yuhuo weicheng1910 chongwen haerbin wangshi (Fire Saves the City in Danger: 
reviewing the old story of Harbin in 1910).”New Evening Newspaper, December 7, 2012. 
38 Brian Henderson, “The Searchers: An American Dilemma,” in Movies and Methods: An Anthology, 
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The Spirit of Harbin  
Fire presents Wu’s figure as larger than life. Wu takes on an iconic stature, 
symbolizing courage, intelligence, perseverance, and dignity. These virtues are 
summarized as “the Spirit of Wu Lien-teh” by director Deng. According to Deng, 
“Many people out of the medical field do not know the history of the plague in 
Harbin. This TV drama aims to sing high praise of Wu, the city’s hero. The Spirit of 
Wu Lien-teh belongs to Harbin. It should be carried on.” In this way, the Spirit of Wu 
is claimed to be a special legacy and characteristic of Harbin. Wu’s virtues are 
presented as symbolic of Harbin. Moreover, Wu is portrayed as a Chinese nationalist 
who defeats the foreign invaders. In this way, the Spirit of Wu becomes a 
nationalist symbol that exceeds the boundary of Harbin. In other words, by presenting 
Wu Lien-teh as a nationalist hero and a representative of Harbin, Fire remolds 
Harbin’s history into a component of the nationalist narrative of China. By the same 
token, the Chinese triumphant discourse in Fire suggests the producer’s efforts to 
represent Harbin as a Chinese-leading city, not only now but also in the past. The 
politicized representation of plague control in Fire suggests that history is not only to 
be remembered, but also to be reproduced and renewed for the present. 
 
A Television Drama Of and For Harbin 
In Fire, Harbin is represented as “exotic,” combining a hybrid cityscape (a mixture of 
                                                                 
ed. Bill Nichols (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 434; Yu, “Visual Spectacular, 
Revolutionary Epic, and Personal Voice,” 166. 
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the Chinese and the European) and indigenous cultural elements, such as kang, furry 
hat, dialect, bandit culture, and heavy snow. It is important to note that the local 
dialect and bandit culture are not purely Chinese. The dialect in Northeast China is 
usually mocked by people from other parts of China; it is thought to be rustic, which 
suggests that this dialect is not from mainstream Chinese culture. Indeed, the 
Northeast was rarely impacted by traditional Chinese cultural standards. Unlike the 
central and southern parts of China, where traditional Chinese culture has been 
entrenched for centuries, the Northeast, or Manchuria, was outside zhong yuan 
(central plain), one of the literal meanings of zhong guo (China). To some extent, the 
non-Chinese Harbin itself is one of the main characters in Fire.  
At the end of the film, Deng creates a synthesis between the past and the present 
by juxtaposing photos of some buildings that no longer stand with those of the classic 
buildings that have survived; the photos of European-style buildings are combined 
with those of the Chinese, especially the ones used during the plague control in Fu 
chia-tien. Through such montage, Deng merges the old Harbin cityscape with the 
present one, blending the European part of Harbin into the Chinese part. The current 
cityscape is situated in “a cinematic dialogue with the visual precedents.”39 In this 
way, Deng crafts a miniature of a historical Harbin into the cinematic space, in which 
the 1910 plague is memorialized and integrated as part of the present. Harbin becomes 
a “‘filmic simultaneous city’ in which time and space implode into a geographical 
urban montage.”40 The simultaneity of time and space and the juxtaposition between 
                                                                 
39 Braester, Painting the City Red, 192. 
40 Graham Cairns, “Berlin on Film: A Mediated and Reconstructed City,” in Filming the City: Urban 
246 
 
past and present create the effect of a spatialization of time and temporalization of 
space, representing the city on the screen as a time-space palimpsest that embodies 
both continuity and rupture with the actual city.  
Deng’s synthesis of the city’s past and present is further illustrated by the 
voiceover that concludes this series: “Wu Lien-teh belongs to China as well as to the 
world; he belongs to history, as well as to the present.” In the context of Harbin, 
emphasizing the significance of Wu to the city suggests Harbiners’ present efforts to 
glorify the city’s past, to use the heritage (the Spirit of Wu) to construct the city’s 
contemporary identity. Director Deng, Screenwriter Xiu, and many members of the 
crew are Harbiners. To some extent, Fire is made in, about, and for Harbin by 
Harbiners. Harbin itself is a spectacle, on which Fire puts a spotlight.  
 
A Triumph of Chinese Masculinity or a Deconstruction of Ethnic Boundary? 
The tensions among the Russian, the Japanese, and the Chinese are by no means 
clear-cut, as illustrated by the interracial romance between Lida and Wu. By blurring 
the ethnic boundaries, this romance provides a heterogeneous signification of the 
nationalist discourse that dominates this series.  
Lida is a Russian female doctor who loves Wu and assists him in the plague 
control. Meanwhile, Polynov, the director of a Russian hospital and a plague expert, is 
in love with Lida. Polynov and Wu are rivals in plague control and in romance. 
                                                                 
Documents, Design Practices and Social Criticism through the Lens, ed. Edward M.Clift, Mirko 
Guaralda and Ari Mattes (Bristol: Intellect), 145-161. 
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Polynov tries to convince Lida to marry him. “You are so beautiful and elegant; how 
can you fall in love with an inferior Chinese, of the most stupid race in the world.” 
Lida slaps Polynov, saying “I do not allow you to vilify him. He is benevolent, 
fighting for the people in plight. I admire him. As long as Wu can defeat the plague, I 
would like to sacrifice all, even my life.” Lida’s response signifies Wu’s triumph over 
Polynov in what Lu describes as the “libidinal arena.”41 Relevant historical 
documents do not mention any romance between Wu and Lida. The fictional nature of 
Lida’s affection for Wu is not only designed to cater to the audience but also to signify 
the imagined triumph of Chinese nationalism through the lens of masculinity. 
According to Lu, “The victory that Chinese men are able to score with foreign women 
symbolizes not only the resurrection of Chinese masculinity but also a triumph of the 
Chinese nation itself.”42 Even when Lida is infected by the plague, she continues to 
work as much as she can. When Wu asks her to rest and to not worry about him, Lida 
replies, “OK, I comply with your instruction for all things.” This indicates not only 
the romance but also a masculine discourse, the symbolic relationship between the 
Chinese masculine leader and the Russian female subject. A sense of supremacy of the 
former is conveyed.  
The triumphant discourse of Chinese masculinity is further constructed in Wu’s 
decline of Lida’s request to be his wife, because Wu is already married. Returning a 
book to Wu, Lida finds a jade in the book. She asks, “Could you give it to me as a 
                                                                 
41 Sheldon H. Lu, “Soap Opera in China: The Transnational Politics of Visuality, Sexuality, and 
Masculinity,” Cinema Journal 40, no. 1 (Autumn 2000): 39.  
42 Ibid., 37. 
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gift? I want to take it as my amulet.” Wu replies, “I’m sorry. This is from my wife. 
Whenever I miss her, I have a look at this jade.” Later, Lida is infected with the 
plague. Near the end of her life, Lida hopes to propose to Wu, but Wu declines, 
although he feels affection for her. Lida requests cremation after she dies to support 
Wu who had suggested that patients’ corpses be burned to eradicate plague. Before the 
cremation, Wu cries and puts the jade into Lida’s hands. The melding between Lida 
and Wu’s heart, as symbolized by her cremation with Wu’s avatar of love, the jade, 
suggests the deconstruction of the racial boundary as well as that of Russia as a 
monolithic and evil Other. There is a paradox, though, in the platonic romance 
between Lida and Wu: this romance constructs Chinese nationalism through Chinese 
masculinity – a Chinese man wins the love of a Russian girl – but this romance, at the 
same time, deconstructs nationalism through presenting international and interracial 
love and friendship.  
The romance between Lida and Wu echoes the historic fact that many interracial 
marriages between Chinese men and Russian women happened in Harbin. According 
to Konstanty Symonolewicz, a high official of the Polish consulate in Harbin during 
the 1920s and 1930s, “I saw foreign women, who sincerely loved their Chinese 
husbands and usually found in them some hidden qualities. As to the reverse, to enjoy 
a Chinese woman is a matter of taste.”43 The paradoxical meaning of the romance 
between Wu and Lida suggests the struggle of director Deng and the Propaganda 
                                                                 
43 Lahusen, “Manchuria: Conflicting Memories,” 10; also see Konstanty Symonolewicz, Moi 
Chinczycy; 18 lat w Chinach (My Chinese: 18 Years in China) (Warsaw: Biblioteka Polska, 1938), 12.  
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Department of Harbin Municipal Government, in defining the history of Harbin: Did 
the prevalence of such interracial marriage transform Harbin into a nationalist city, 
flaunting the charm of Chinese masculinity, or did it make it a “stateless” city, where 
race and politics did not matter? 
 
From Invader to Comrade  
The Gunshot at the Modern Hotel (2011) is a television drama, co-produced by 
Guangxi TV station, Heilongjiang Tonglida Film, and Television Investment 
Company Limited. This television drama was created to celebrate the ninetieth 
anniversary of the establishment of the CCP and commemorate the Chinese and 
Russian veterans of the Second World War.44 Such a political motivation explains 
why The Gunshot is characterized by a nationalist discourse, a representation of the 
Soviets as friends and of the Japanese as demons. This is further implied by the fact 
that the Chief Consultant of The Gunshot is Xiaolian Zhang, the Minister of the 
Propaganda Department of Heilongjiang Province. Within such a political context, 
this section explores the tension in The Gunshot between consenting to and dissenting 
from the Chinese official discourse. I understand this tension as a disruptive force that 
complicates and reconstructs the nationalist framework of representing anti-Japanese 
history in Harbin. To achieve this goal, I first analyze the nationalist discourse of the 
CCP heroism, and address the alliance between the Chinese and the Soviet communist 
                                                                 
44 Si Si, ed., “Madieer lvguande qiangsheng yangba shoubo guangxi shiyue jiangbo  (The Gunshot at 
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party through the lens of romance. Then, I explore the imaging of the Japanese, which 
is somewhat more nuanced than a monolithic, demonized Other. Further, I understand 
the Modern Hotel as a miniature of the city, a hybrid space, through and in which I 
analyze the cinematic highlight of an exotic and contested Harbin for visual 
consumption. 
In The Gunshot, in 1938 the Japanese officials plan Operation Bear: the 
assassination of Joseph Stalin in Matsesta, Sochi. The Chinese communist spy, Gao, 
whose code name is “Manchurian Fox” and who works with the Tokumu Kikan 
(Special Service Agency) in Harbin, reveals the Operation Bear plan to the Soviet 
Communist in order to prevent the assassination. But the telegraph code used between 
Chinese and Soviet Communists is deciphered by the Tokumu Kikan. The main story 
of this film plots how the Soviet communist, Ivanovic, meets the Chinese communist, 
Sun Bowen in Harbin to inform the latter of the new telegraph code. Two groups of 
Japanese, the Tokumu Kikan and the Kenpeitai (the military police), compete to arrest 
Ivanovic and Sun.  
 
Martyrdom in Constructing a Nationalist Discourse 
As Yang argues, “Martyrdom has been a crucial trope in PRC accounts of revolution. 
Revolutionary martyrs define perfectly the communist virtues of sacrifice, loyalty, and 
heroism. In Mao Zedong’s words, they have ‘great lives and glorious death’.”45 The 
                                                                 
45 Haosheng Yang, “Myths of Revolution and Sensual Revisions: New Representation of Martyrs on 
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CCP’s martyrdom is highlighted in The Gunshot. Sun Bowen is assigned by the CCP 
to meet Ivanovic at the Modern Hotel to acquire the telegram code, and Zhao Shirong, 
a senior communist member, volunteers to be Sun’s guard to ensure his safety in 
meeting Ivanovic. Zhao knows this means death for himself, because the Japanese 
know the plan of this meeting and are ready to ambush him at the Modern Hotel. 
“Songhua River,” the Communist party leader, agrees that Zhao should be Sun’s 
companion. This is an extremely difficult choice for “Songhua River,” because Zhao 
is her husband! – but she accepts Zhao’s request to die for the CCP. Moreover, in 
order to save Gao from being identified as the communist spy by the Tokumu Kikan, 
Sun kills himself during a firefight with Gao, making it appear as if Gao had shot him. 
In this way, Gao wins the trust of the Japanese and continues to work as a spy for the 
CCP.  
  The exaggerated emphasis on the sacrifice of numerous individual 
communists for the victory of the revolution is part and parcel of the means used by 
the CCP to legitimize its rule and its efforts in “controlling national memory in 
China.”46 Clausen states that the role of Harbin’s CCP in leading the revolution since 
1921 “become an all-important part” of the city gazetteer writing in the 1990s.47 He 
argues that “Considering the relative insignificance of CCP’s presence in Harbin prior 
to 1946 – as compared to other large Chinese cities – the emphasis is striking.”48 
Mitter makes a similar argument, and defines the promotion of the idea of the 
                                                                 
46 Soren Clausen, “Autobiography of a Chinese City: The History of Harbin in the Mirror of the 
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demonized Japanese and the great sacrifice of the CCP as “resistancialism,” which in 
this scenario means “exaggerating the role of the CCP in resisting the Japanese 
imperialists.”49 The Gunshot and many other anti-Japanese television dramas reveal 
an attempt to construct the CCP as the savior of Harbin, by accentuating the 
martyrdom, intelligence, and benevolence of communist heroes in winning the war 
against the Japanese, the homogeneous and demonized Other. 
 
The Marriage between China and the Soviet Union 
The ideological alliance between the Soviet Union and China is delineated in The 
Gunshot through the romance between Ivanovic and Zhang Yiping, a Chinese girl. 
Ivanovic and Zhang are a couple and both are members of the Communist 
International in the Soviet Union. Zhang finally decides to stay in Harbin and work 
with the Chinese communists. Ivanovic protects Zhang from being shot by the 
Tokumu Kikan, and in so doing dies himself. The romance between Ivanovic and 
Zhang as well as his death for Zhang symbolize the friendship between Chinese and 
Soviet communists. When Ivanovic is dying, he tells Zhang, “We should remember 
the Chinese communists. The anti-Japanese guerrilla died to protect me.”50 And he 
tells Sun, “Let’s be comrades again in the next life.” The history of the Soviet Union 
being China’s “elder brother” is suggested by the fact that Sun used to be Ivanovic’s 
student in the Soviet Union. The ideological alliance between Soviet and Chinese 
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Communists against the imperialist Japanese is emphasized.  
 
The Heterogeneous “Demon,” Japan 
The Gunshot does not homogenize all the Japanese. It reveals the internal conflicts 
among the Japanese and the sentimental aspect of Ryoko, a female Japanese 
intelligence agent. The internal conflict on the Japanese side is epitomized in the 
relationship between the Tokumu Kikan and the Kenpeitai. While the Tokumu Kikan 
wants to discover who the “Manchurian Fox” is, the communist spy in its group, and 
therefore implements Operation Bear, the Kenpeitai contends that the priority should 
be given to Operation Zero, which means arresting Sun, a communist leader in 
Harbin, as part of the plan to further the military occupation of South China. In other 
words, this series presents the cleavage within the Japanese imperialists and their 
hesitation about whether they should attack the Soviet Union51 or expand their 
occupation in China. Through the description of Operation Bear and Operation Zero, 
The Gunshot portrays an evil Japan, in opposition to both China and the Soviet 
Union.52 Meanwhile, the Japanese Other is by no means a united front. 
                                                                 
51 It is symbolized by the plan to assassinate Stalin. 
52 The assassination team is composed of several White Russians who bear grudge against Stalin and 
the Soviet. Although both the White Russian assassin candidates and the Japanese are in the “enemy” 
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The demonization of the Japanese is illustrated in many details: in order to test whether Gao is a 
communist spy, the Tokumu Kikan bury alive, in front of Gao, a White Russian, who fails in the 
training, as well as a common person who accidentally happens to see this training. Showing no 
sympathy towards the victims, Gao passes the test. The communists are represented as benevolent, the 
Japanese imperialists as inhumane.  
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The film director avoids a homogeneous presentation of Self and Other by 
constructing certain communists and Japanese as ambiguous in terms of ideological 
belief. For instance, Jiang Feng used to be a communist spy inside the Kenpeitai, but 
he betrays communism and then works for the Kenpeitai. Hashimoto in the Tokumu 
Kikan turns out to be a spy for the Kenpeitai. Through the creation of various spies, 
The Gunshot metaphorically blurs the boundaries between friend and enemy, between 
Self and Other. The Self is in the Other, and vice versa. Meanwhile, Jiang Feng’s 
betrayal signifies turning the Self into the Other. Harbin is portrayed as a city of spies; 
it suggests that the city is a contact zone, where ethnic and ideological boundaries are 
by no means rigid. 
Gao, Ryoko, and Hashimoto are the three senior assistants of Yamura, the head 
of the Tokumu Kikan in Harbin. Yamura suspects that one of the three is the 
communist spy, “Manchurian Fox.” Hashimoto likes Ryoko, while Ryoko likes Gao. 
Ryoko has been on the side of Gao, suggesting to Yamura that Hashimoto is the spy. 
Ryoko is portrayed as two-faced: On the one hand, she is a cold-blooded killer, when 
it comes to persecuting communists. On the other hand, she is a sentimental and brave 
woman, who loves Gao and does not care that he is Chinese.53 Gao is calm and smart, 
revealing no flaw, which makes Yamura suspect him of being the spy. Hashimoto 
turns out to be a spy but for the Kenpeitai. He also suspects Ryoko of being the 
“Manchurian Fox.” Ryoko kills Hashimoto in revenge for slander. In this way, 
director Jiang not only displays the conflict between the Tokumu Kikan and Kenpeitai 
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but also within the Tokumu Kikan itself. Meanwhile, through the presentation of 
Ryoko’s affection for Gao, the boundaries between the Japanese and Chinese, 
between enemy and friend, are further blurred. In the last episode, Gao, the 
“Manchurian Fox”, kills Ryoko in cold blood. Such an ending suggests that Jiang’s 
efforts to explore the heterogeneous voices within the oppressive structure of the CCP 
narration, nevertheless, end up with an uncompromising nationalist discourse of 
victory.  
 
The Modern Hotel—Telling a Story of the Cosmopolitan Harbin with Ideological 
Connotation 
 
The Modern Hotel is an icon of Harbin. It is an art nouveau building constructed in 
1906, originally owned by a French-Jewish businessman, Joseph Kaspé. The 
kidnapping of his son, Simon, by fascist Russian criminals in Harbin in 1933 was an 
intimidating incident still known to many locals. The Modern Hotel embodies the 
history of international Harbin. The history and the architectural style of the Modern 
Hotel endows The Gunshot with a sense of exoticism, fantasy, and tension. This 
building is the epitome of the cosmopolitan Harbin. By putting the Modern Hotel in 
the spotlight, as suggested by the title of this drama, the producers attempt to highlight 
a Europeanized cultural space of Harbin for the audience’s visual consumption.  
Moreover, the Modern Hotel is a major setting where gunfights happen. The 
hotel symbolizes an arena where the Chinese and Soviet Communists forge an 
alliance against the Imperial Japanese Army, and where they contest the authority of 
the city. The competition to occupy the Modern Hotel is further illustrated in The 
Gunshot, when both Sun and the Japanese Kenpeitai ask Rosschild, the Jewish 
designer of the Modern Hotel, for the blueprint of the hotel. Later, Rosschild is killed 
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by the Japanese soldiers, when he tries to protect Sun from being arrested. The 
cinematic representation of an inclusive Harbin and the interethnic friendship is 
limited to that between the Chinese and the Westerners, with the exclusion of the 
Japanese.  
Something similarly occurs in another film, Fareast 1932: the Vicissitudes of the 
Modern Hotel, which features the Modern Hotel as its major venue. This film takes 
the Lytton Commission’s investigation of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1933 
as its historical background. In Fareast 1932, the Modern Hotel is where the 
representatives of the Lytton Commission reside, when they come to Harbin for this 
investigation. The Japanese Kwangtung Army creates excuses to expel these 
representatives and prevent any Chinese communists from getting information and 
seeking help from them. As a result, the Modern Hotel is portrayed as a place of 
tension and resistance. The Chinese communists obtain compassion and help from the 
international representatives, and the Japanese Kwangtung Army is highlighted as a 
demon against China and the League of Nations. The Modern Hotel on the screen is 
represented as a contact zone for China, Japan, the Soviet Union, the League of 
Nations, and the demonized Japan. Such ideological differentiation between allies and 
enemies was by no means based on historical facts. Rather, it implies contemporary 
Chinese film producers’ submission to the CCP’s highlighting the Japanese atrocities 
during the war.   
 
Evolving Representations of Japanese “Demons” and Chinese Heroes  
In August 2012, widespread anti-Japanese protests took place in many cities in China, 
due to the controversy between China and Japan over Diaoyu Island. With a bicycle 
lock, Cai Yang, one of the protesters in Xi’an, smashed the skull of the owner of a 
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Japanese car. In a news interview, Cai’s mother commented that “When we turn on 
TV, most of the dramas are about the Anti-Japanese War. How would it be possible 
not to hate the Japanese?”54 
Anti-Japanese television dramas are very common in China today. As part of the 
former Japanese-occupied Manchukuo, Harbin is a popular location to shoot these 
dramas. Before providing a detailed analysis of the case in Harbin, some brief 
background information about the production and reception of anti-Japanese dramas 
and films in China is in order. The prevalence of anti-Japanese television dramas and 
films is partly a result of the “complicity between market and state ideology.”55 Such 
complicity underscores the political slogan of the CCP: “Never forget history, and 
take it as a lesson for the future.” The triumphant and glorious discourse of the CCP 
in defeating the “atrocious” Japanese imperialists presented in television dramas and 
films serves to legitimize the CCP regime; also, it strengthens nationalism by 
“imput[ing] all wrongs and sins”56 to the Japanese and emphasizing a homogeneous 
Japan as an evil Other.  Moreover, the triumphant discourse of the CCP in defeating 
the “little Japanese” caters to the audience’s psychological satisfaction in taking 
revenge on the Japanese for the plight they inflicted on “us”, an imagined 
homogeneous Chinese community; such discourse serves the purpose 
of compensating for the trauma of the Sino-Japanese War, which continues to affect 
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the young generation today (who experience imagined or secondhand trauma). The 
fight and tension, which are usually entangled with romance in these anti-Japanese 
dramas, are visually and emotionally appealing to the contemporary audience, who 
view the onscreen war as a commodity to be consumed. Such films and television 
dramas “repackage nationalism in the age of post-socialist commercialization”.57 
By mapping the city of Harbin through the films and television dramas from the 
1950s to the present, a trend towards the construction on screen of a modern and 
Europeanized Harbin, as well as of a fashionable and bourgeois imaging of the 
communist heroes, becomes obvious. The movies before 1990 focused on portraying 
unnuanced, heroic characters. In contrast, the films after 1990 show more details of 
the heroes’ personal lives and romance. Apart from the motivation to attract 
audiences, there are more reasons for the altered account of the CCP revolutionary 
history. I explore them by comparing Zhao Yiman (1950) and My Mother Zhao Yiman 
(2005), as well as the two versions of Harbin under the Night Curtain, respectively 
produced in 1984 and 2008. By adopting de Certeau’s method of interrogating urban 
practices in everyday life,58 I examine the urban practices of a particular group of 
Harbiners: the on-screen Chinese communist heroes and Japanese “demons.” 
 
From the Mother of the CCP to that of Ninger 
Zhao Yiman is a black and white film produced by the state-owned Northeast China 
Film Company in 1950. Based on the real story of the anti-Japanese communist 
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martyr, Zhao Yiman, this film highlights her role in leading the workers and farmers 
to fight against the invading Japanese in Harbin and its surrounding area in 1933. My 
Mother Zhao Yiman was directed by Sun Tie and produced by Fujian Film Company 
in 2005. This film retells the story of Zhao Yiman from the point of view of Ninger, 
Zhao’s son, emphasizing Zhao’s affective relation to her son. In the 1950 version, 
Zhao is characterized by “impersonal ascetic heroism,”59 and is presented as devoting 
her life to leading workers and peasants in the fight against the Japanese colonizers. 
Her personal life is not mentioned. The night before she is sentenced to death, Zhao 
tells her young comrade, Han: “Today is July 1st, the ‘birthday’ of the CCP. Please do 
not forget to join the revolution when you are released from prison.”60 Zhao’s 
emphasis on the “birthday” of the CCP before her death suggests her love and 
commitment to the CCP. In contrast, in the 2005 version, on the journey to be 
sentenced to death, Zhao writes a letter to her son, expressing her love and sadness for 
leaving him forever. This contrast between the two portrayals of Zhao before her 
death suggests the changed values of the two eras in which the two films were 
produced. The 1950 version portrays Zhao as a self-sacrificing, motherly figure to the 
CCP, while in the 2005 version she is presented as an individualized mother to her 
beloved son. The grand narrative is revised into an individualized narrative, through 
which Zhao is portrayed not as a larger-than- life communist hero but as a caring 
mother.  
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From “Demon” to “Gentle Demon” 
The representations of Japanese imperialists as demons have been prevalent in 
Chinese films from the 1950s to the present; however, the image of the demonic 
Japanese changes over time. In Zhao Yiman, the Japanese officials are caricaturized 
with buckteeth, moustaches, and thick-frame black glasses, creating an impression of 
slyness and evil. At the beginning of the film, a Japanese man with buckteeth and 
cunning eyes is juxtaposed with the cityscape of Harbin, similar to a predator coveting 
its prey. Caricatures portraying vilified Japanese and anti-Japanese slogans are 
another means of constituting propagandist discourse in this film.61 
In her comparison of the representations of Japanese and Nazi demons in 
American films in the 1940s, Wang argues that the Japanese fascists were presented 
as more evil. While the Nazis wear glasses with metal frames or no frame, the 
Japanese wear thick glasses with black frames. This creates a sense of stupidity and 
ugliness and a metaphor of being “near-sighted both physically and culturally.”62 
Wang states that such difference in the portrayal of the Nazis and the Japanese by the 
Americans in the 1940s is due to racism. Racism is also one of the reasons for the 
Chinese demonization of the Japanese. As Suisheng Zhao argues, a very important 
reason for the intense anti-Japanese nationalism is “the humiliation that China 
experienced as a result of repeated defeats by a former ‘student’ that the Chinese 
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dismissively called dwarfs (wo ren) or little Japan.”63 The double shame felt by the 
Chinese contributes to a mocking and demonizing representation of the “little Japan” 
on screen.  
But why do the demonic Japanese look nicer in recent Chinese films? In My 
Mother Zhao Yiman, the Japanese officials are “gentle demons.” With polite manner, 
tidy suit (sometimes kimono) and handsome face, the top official Ouno Tarou, played 
by Shunsaku Kudô, is presented as a gentleman, despite his evil nature. 
I argue that the representation of the Japanese imperialists as “gentle demons” in 
recent Chinese films is essentially the result of the present perception of the Japanese 
as civilized and courteous people. The perception of the China-Japan relationship as 
master and student fades into history and, with it, the image of the Japanese as 
atrocious imperialists. The rise of Japan after World War Two contributes to a 
modified perception of it by the Chinese. The social and cultural environment, in 
which the film is produced, shapes the filmic representation of history. The traces of 
the present society are embedded in historical films.  
 
Femininity Turn and Western Way of Living in Harbin 
In post-socialist China, where the main ideological narrative on anti-imperialists and 
class struggles has been replaced with the “reform policy” agenda of capitalist 
economic development and diverse cultural entertainment and consumption, cinema 
“offers up-to-date revolutionary myths.”64 Consequently, the former representation of 
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Zhao as an asexualized communist hero gives way to that of Zhao in her full 
femininity, demonstrating, in Rey Chow’s words, the “fetishization of women.”65 In 
My Mother, Zhao dresses like a modern woman of the gentry class: she has permed 
hair, red lips, wears cheongsam and high heels, and reapplies makeup when it is 
necessary. She frequents Western cafes and restaurants. In contrast, in Zhao Yiman, 
Zhao’ simple dresses, plain hairstyle, and face without makeup do not accentuate 
Zhao’s femininity. Before the 1980s, the representation of women in literary works 
was utilized by the Chinese officials for government and nation-building. According 
to Yue Meng, “On the one hand, the state’s political discourse translated itself 
through women into the private context of desire, love, marriage, divorce and familial 
relations, and on the other, it turned woman into an agent politicizing desire, love, and 
family relations by delimiting and repressing sexuality, self and all private 
emotions.”66  
In Lei Wang’s analysis of the changing images of woman figures on the cover of 
Chinese Woman Magazine from 1949 to 2008, she argues, “In the past sixty years, 
the media representation of Chinese women changed from ‘masculine’ to feminine; 
the women figures of this magazine changed from ‘production idol’ to ‘consumption 
idol,’ from socialist producers to consumers.”67 As Xiaoying Wang states, “At no 
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time in the history of PRC cinema have so many female characters appeared so 
uniformly and predictably feminine as they do now.”68 The representation of Zhao as 
quasi-bourgeois illustrates “the projection of postcommunist values onto the 
communist past.”69 Wang argues that such a revisioned characterization of 
communist heroes was gradually brought into being “after the identity of the 
Communist Party was reconceived as no longer representing the working class but 
instead China’s advanced productive forces, China’s advanced culture, and the 
interests of the majority of the Chinese people.”70 If the communist hero’s living a 
bourgeois lifestyle represents advanced productive forces, then China’s advanced 
productive forces might be identified as “capitalism with Chinese characteristics,” 
rather than “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” In Abbas’s words, “What we will 
find will not be two systems (socialist, capitalist) but one system at different stages of 
development – difference in times and speeds.”71  
The 1950 version begins with overlapping images of Harbin’s cityscape and 
Japanese soldiers, the purpose of which is to highlight the Japanese occupation. In 
contrast, the cityscape in the 2005 version highlights the exotic cultural space of 
Harbin, which becomes part of a spectacle to be consumed. For example, in My 
                                                                 
68 Wang, “Time to Remember,” 150. 
69 Ibid., 134. 
70 Ibid., 144. 
71 Abbas, Hong Kong, 6. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” is a complex and contradictory issue. 
According to Lin Chun’s literature review, among the different academic understandings of this system 
are the following: being close to a “market socialism,” a hybrid of state socialism and private capitalism, 
a repressive and pathological adventure of “bureaucratic capitalism” and “market Stalinism,” and “third 
world” capitalism. Lin, The Transformation of Chinese Socialism, 5-6.  
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Mother the meeting between Zhao and her comrade Cao is scheduled first in a church, 
and then, in a Russian café, where there is a feature shot of Zhao, when she speaks 
Russian with the white waitress. An intelligent and fashionable woman in a 
Russianized urban space of Harbin is presented.  
This film also reveals the changed official discourse on religion. In My Mother, 
there are two feature shots of a Bible, into which Zhao puts a photo of Ninger and 
herself. This implies the sacred nature of the mother-son relationship. Moreover, 
before Zhao and Cao leave the church after their first meeting, there is a close-up of 
the choir, who are a group of Chinese youth. It suggests an embrace of Christianity in 
China. There are also Western worshippers. The church is presented as a mixed 
cultural space, suggesting the image of a multiethnic and religion- inclusive Harbin of 
that time.  
 
Romance as a Rebellion against Politics? 
Harbin under the Night Curtain tells the story of a group of underground communists 
and their resistance to the Manchukuo regime in Harbin in 1934. The main character, 
Wang Yimin, is an anti-Japanese leader with a nominal teaching position in Harbin’s 
No. 1 Middle School. Another main character, Ichiro, is the nephew of Yuichi (a cruel 
senior Japanese official in Harbin). He is a Sinologist who engages in promoting the 
cultural communication between the two countries. He is also the Vice-President of 
Harbin No. 1 Middle School. Wang and Ichiro are colleagues. The female heroine in 
the 1984 version is Lu Shujuan, the daughter of Lu Yunqi, the Chair of the Harbin 
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Chamber of Commerce. She falls in love with Wang, although Ichiro has affection for 
Lu as well. In the 2008 version, the female heroine’s name changes into Lu Qiuying. 
She used to study in Japan, and Ichiro was her classmate. They love each other, but 
Lu declines Ichiro’s proposal, due to Lu’s fear of the resentment from her family and 
many other Chinese in the city, who would denounce her as a traitor, should she 
marry a Japanese. In the 1984 version, Ichiro is shot dead by his uncle, as he protects 
Wang from being arrested by the Japanese soldiers. In the 2008 version, Ichiro 
commits suicide. The two major reasons are that he cannot get married to Lu, due to 
the hostility between China and Japan of that time, and that his uncle forces him to 
join the army against his will.  
Romance is a major lens, through which the directors of the 2008 version, Zhao 
Baogang and Wang Ying, tell the story of the Sino-Japanese War. As Zhang states, 
“Human emotions, hitherto a sensitive subject in socialist cinema, were explored to 
the full.”72 This is partly to attract audience. Moreover, the interracial romance in the 
context of Sino-Japanese War showcases Zhao and Wang’s efforts to reinterpret the 
war by delineating an unfixed boundary between friend and enemy, “Us” and Other.  
In Ichiro’s dream, he gets married to Lu in front of St. Sophia Church, a 
landmark of Harbin. The wedding is attended by Lu’s father, Ichiro’s uncle, Wang, 
and the Chinese and Japanese soldiers. All of a sudden, the soldiers and Wang take 
out guns to target the couple, and Wang shoots the couple. The wedding then ends 
with the death of the bride and the groom, suggesting that it is the Sino-Japanese War 
                                                                 
72 Zhang, Chinese National Cinema, 208. 
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that kills the couple. The dream of the bloody wedding is a visualized presentation of 
the political connotation behind the romance between Lu and Ichiro. Nevertheless, by 
presenting the Chinese-Japanese hostility in a dream, directors Zhao and Wang imply 
ambivalence over whether such hostility and its impact on the Chinese-Japanese 
romance is true or not.73 
 
The Symbolic Meaning of the Railway Bridge 
The Railway Bridge on the Songhua River appears several times in this television 
drama. The bridge is an icon of Harbin. Completed in August 1901, its former name 
was the Sungari Railway Bridge, one of the earliest projects of the CER. On the cover 
of Viktor Petrov’s novella, Gorod na Sungari (The city on the Sungari), the author 
juxtaposes St. Nicholas Church and the Sungari Railway Bridge.74 This railway 
bridge stands as one of the signifiers of the city’s origin and a witness of its history. 
When Lu and Ichiro declare their love for each other in front of this bridge, a black 
freight train passes through, with loud noise and wind in the background. The 
frightening atmosphere hints at the barriers that the couple will be faced with. Later, 
when Ichiro plans to go back to Japan, the two say farewell again by the side of the 
                                                                 
73 A parallel to this is a bloody scene at the end of Jiang Wen’s film, Devils on the Doorstep (2000).  
Ma Dasan and his fellow Chinese villagers save the life of a Japanese soldier, Kosaburo Hanaya. 
Instead of appreciating the villagers’ help, Hanaya’s captain orders all the villagers to be killed. Soon 
after that, the war is over, and the Japanese soldiers  become POWs. Ma seeks revenge for his villagers 
by killing many POWs. At the end of the film, at the command of Major Gao, a local commander of the 
Chinese Army, Hanaya executes Ma. As Ma’s head falls to the ground, it rolls nine times, blinks three 
times , and smiles. From the point of view of Ma’s fallen head, the film ends with the shot of a blurry 
and upside-down view of the surrounding, in which the execution is carried out. The final shot and 
Ma’s smile metaphorically suggest the ambivalence and complexity of the friendship and hostility 
between Ma and Hanaya and between China and Japan.  
74 Lahusen, “Manchuria: Conflicting Memories,” 5; also see Viktor Petrov, Gorod na Sungari. Ocherki 
i rasskazy. Washington: Izdanie Russko-Amerikanskogo obshchestva, 1984.  
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railway bridge. The choice of this location implies the different journeys and lives 
they will have.  
It the end, Ichiro commits suicide on this railway bridge, becoming a martyr of 
war and love. Ichiro’s plan to go back to Japan fails, because Yuichi forces him to go 
to battle, as a punishment for disclosing confidential military information to Wang. 
Ichiro does not want to be involved in the war, but he has no choice. The day before 
he is to join the army, he commits suicide by throwing himself in front of a train, 
wearing a Japanese military suit. This military suit suggests one of the reasons behind 
Ichiro’s suicide. Although this television drama showcases its efforts to break the 
homogenized imaging of the Japanese by presenting the humanitarian Ichiro, Ichiro 
fails to bridge the hostility between the two nationalities. The narration of a peace-
loving Ichiro starts with a rebellion against politics and ends with a resubmission to its 
power.75 In his analysis of Kidlat Tahimik’s The Perfumed Nightmare (1977), Fredric 
Jameson understands Tahimik’s use of bridges as conveying a sense of postmodern 
hyper-geography. “Throughout the film reference is made to efforts at ‘bridging’ – 
rural and urban, earth and moon, nature and culture.”76 In Harbin under the Night 
Curtain, the bridge links the past and present of the city, the Chinese and the 
Japanese, politics and affect, life and death. All these links “are then in constant 
                                                                 
75 The concept “rebellion from and resubmission to power” is quoted from Jinhua Dai, Cinema and 
Desire: Feminist Marxism and Cultural Politics in the Work of Dai Jinhua , ed. Jing Wang and Tani E. 
Barlow (London: Verso, 2002), 13-48; also see Zhang, Chinese National Cinema, 237. 
76 Stuart C. Aitken and Deborah P. Dixon, “Imagining Geographies of Film,” Erdkunde 60, no. 4 
(2006): 330-331; Fredrick Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World 
System (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 197-8.  
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decomposition, dissolve[ing] the self-contained character of each locale.”77 A bridge 
is a metaphor for linking and disconnecting, success or failure in filling the gap. The 
death of Ichiro on the railway bridge suggests the failure in bridging the hostility 
between China and Japan. In her analysis of the Fifth Generation Chinese films,78 
Chen argues that they are “dominated by the repugnance for the ideological 
mainstream; anything apolitical was thus turned political, and vice versa.”79 By the 
same token, the romance between Ichiro and Lu showcases Zhao and Wang’s efforts 
to construct an apolitical relationship between the Chinese and the Japanese. 
Nevertheless, this romance turns out to manifest a political message.  
 
The “Authentic” Harbin 
The 2008 Harbin under the Night Curtain not only takes Harbin as a background for 
the anti-Japanese campaign, but it is also a film about Harbin. As the director Zhao 
states, “Roman Holiday reminds people of Rome, Harbin under the Night Curtain is 
designed to be a representative of the city in TV dramas.”80 Nevertheless, Roman 
Holiday is an American movie, and thus an American representation and imagination 
of Rome. By the same token, director Zhao is from Beijing, and thus his creation of 
an “authentic” Harbin turns out to be based on an outsider’ imagination of Harbin. 
                                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 The Fifth Generation refers to a group of Chinese filmmakers who rose in the 1980s. The most 
representatives are Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige. 
79 Xiaoming Chen, “The Mysterious Other: Postpolitics in Chinese Film,” in Postmodernism  
and China, ed. Arif Dirlik and Xudong Zhang (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 227. 
80 Xiaoyue Sun, “Xinban yemuxia de haerbin jinwan yangshi shoubo (The new version of Harbin under 
Night’s Curtain will premiere tonight on China Central Television),” Dongbei Net, August 25, 2008.  
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Indeed, in this television drama, Zhao presents quite a Europeanized Harbin. Among 
the many pieces of European-style architecture and cityscape incorporated into this 
drama are St. Sophia Church, Central Street, Harbin Xiangfang Railway Station, the 
former house of Kowalski – a Polish-Russian businessman – and Harbin Railway 
Bureau. In other words, Zhao equates a Europeanized Harbin with authenticity. By 
claiming the authenticity of Harbin under the Night Curtain in representing Harbin, 
Zhao shapes contemporary audiences’ twice-removed imagination of Harbin’s 
cityscape as Europeanized in the past and at present.  
At the end of this series, Lu’s family plan to leave Harbin due to the oppression of 
the Japanese officials. Lu distributes salaries to her servants before leaving. One of 
the servants is a Russian cook, to whom Lu gives more money than to the other 
Chinese servants. There is a close-up of the money. The friendship between the 
Chinese and the Russian is accentuated to contrast with the hostility between the 
Chinese and the Japanese.  
 
The Japanese Memories of Harbin  
Winter Jasmine versus Harbin under the Night Curtain 
In comparison with the tragic ending in Harbin under the Night Curtain, Yingchun 
hua (Winter Jasmine) expresses a positive message about the Sino-Japanese romance. 
Winter Jasmine is a 1942 film by the Japanese director Yasushi Sasaki, produced by 
the Manchukuo Film Association. This film portrays a peaceful life in Manchukuo as 
well as a harmonious relationship between the Japanese and the Chinese. It supports 
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the Japanese policy of “co-prosperity in Asia” and “the kingly way” in Manchukuo.  
The main plot of Winter Jasmine is a love triangle between a Japanese man, 
Murakawa, a Japanese woman, Yae, and Baili, a Chinese woman who can speak 
Japanese. Murakawa comes to work in the city of Fengtian in Manchukuo. Baili is his 
colleague. Yae is Murakawa’s cousin. Both women have affection for Murakawa, but 
Murakawa loves Baili.  
When Yae finds out that Murakawa loves Baili, she gives up and tries to be the 
matchmaker for Murakawa and Baili. On the other hand, Baili encourages Murakawa 
and Yae to be a couple. In the end, Yae goes back to Japan, and Baili leaves 
Manchukuo for Beijing. Such an ending suggests the mutual concern between Yae 
and Baili for each other. In this sense, Winter Jasmine conveys the friendship between 
Yae and Baili, between the Japanese and the Chinese, a theme rarely seen in Chinese 
films and television dramas.81  
In 1995, the Japanese film historian, Yamaguchi Takeshi, tried to donate his 
newly discovered collection of films of the Manchurian Film Association, including 
Winter Jasmine, to the Chinese government “as an act of ‘goodwill’,” in order to give 
                                                                 
81 Xianglan Li, whose original name is Yamaguchi Yoshiko, stars as Baili in this film. Li is a Japanese 
born in Fushun, Northeast China. The Manchukuo Film Association that Li worked with in her early 
career concealed her Japanese origin. After the Second World War, Li returned to Japan and was known 
as Yamaguchi Yoshiko in Japanese movies, “fail[ing] to continue her wartime success as Li Xianglan.” 
According to Shelley Stephenson, “Yamaguchi’s movement re-inscribes the boundaries between screen 
and off-screen, nation and race, as firmly as these boundaries were once blurred in the elusive career of 
Li Xianglan.” Shelley Stephenson, “A Star by Any Other Name: The (After) Lives of Li Xianglan.” 
Quarterly Review of Film & Video 19 (2002): 12; Yiman Wang, “Between the National and the 
Transnational: Li Xianglan/Yamaguchi Yoshiko and pan-Asianism.” IIAS Newsletter, no.38 
(September 2005): 7.  
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the people in China, who helped make these films a second chance to see them. The 
Chinese government refused to accept the films, for the reason that doing so would 
have appeared to be an official recognition of Japan’s former Manchukuo regime.”82 
These films were denounced as “legal proof of [Japanese] cultural invasion” by 
renmin ribao (The People’s Daily),83 one of the major official newspapers in China. 
“Japan’s difficulty in accurately remembering the past and China’s difficulty in 
forgetting it” produce a ghost of war, haunting the two countries in different ways.84 
 
Harbin as Home 
Kumiko Muraoka was born in Harbin in 1936 and went “back” to Japan in 1946. She 
identifies Harbin as her home place, and Japan as a foreign country, and living in 
Japan as a misunderstanding and a nightmare.85 Kumiko left Japan in 1966 for Paris 
and has stayed there ever since. When Thomas Lahusen interviewed Kumiko in 
September, 2016 for his documentary film Manchurian Sleepwalkers, Kumiko was 
suffering from dementia and staying in a nursing home near Paris. Nevertheless, 
Kumiko had clear memories of Harbin. She said. “Harbin was the most important of 
my life, because [in Harbin] people were together. Here, the others are together, as if I 
                                                                 
82 Tamanoi, Crossed Histories, 121; also see Yamaguchi Takeshi, Aishuu no Manshuu eiga: 
Manshuukoku ni saita katsudoo-ya tachino sekai (Melancholy Manchurian film: the film world that 
flourished in Manshukoku) (Tokyo: Santen Shoboo, 2000), 15. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Zhao, “Beijing’s Japan Dilemma,” 77. Another similar example is Unit 731. In 2011, some Japanese 
civilians donated the Monument of Apology, No War, and Peace to Unit 731. It is positioned in an 
isolated corner on the site of Unit 731. In contrast to the official emphasis on the Japanese atrocities in 
Unit 731, this monument is rarely known to the public. 
85 Lahusen, Manchurian Sleepwalkers. 
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am abandoned. One day, I want to return. I never forget it.”86 When she was asked 
“Is Harbin still your place?” Kumiko replied, “Yes, it is my place, yes.”87 Her love of 
Harbin and resentment for Japan is revealed in her writing L’orme plus grand que la 
maison: “When I was a child, I lived by what I felt with my tongue or by the pleasure 
of sweet smells…”88 “I owned the passport of a country [Japan] for which I did not 
stop feeling, and for which I still feel, at every moment, violently, loathing, revolt, 
rancor and anger, and fear.”89 Kumiko regards her leaving Japan for France as “a 
revenge and a way to heal her pain, but if China’s door was still closed, and I could 
not find Harbin again, curiously, this was not important anymore.”90 
Another former Japanese resident in Harbin, Sugiyama Kimiko, had similar 
memory to that of Kumiko. Sugiyama was born in Harbin in 1928. 
Sugiyama remembers being thoroughly confused in mid-August 1945 
when she was warned by her uncle, an employee at the Japanese 
consulate, that she should leave Harbin for ‘home’ immediately. Harbin 
was home. In the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident, a Chinese man 
helped her father; both men were so far from their native places that 
neither had a clear idea what a country or an ethnicity really was... She, 
of course, knew she was Japanese, but the primary ‘ethnic’ affiliation 
she felt was as a Harbiner; Returning to Japan was a truly perplexing 
experience, because it was alien terrain. Yes, Japan had lost the war, 
Manzhouguo had dissolved, and Japanese had to withdraw to their 
‘mother’ country, but what, she still wondered, did any of that have to 
do with her.91 
Politics and ethnic difference are not the concern of Kumiko and Sugiyama. For 
them, Harbin means “togetherness.” Fogel’s argument that “[s]ince there was no 
                                                                 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Fogel, “Integrating into Chinese Society,” 62; Sugiyama, “Harubin no ki,” 3-20. 
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population ‘native’ to Harbin, everyone was a pioneer and shared common 
difficulties”92 might partly explain the reason for this kind of “genuine friendship of 
the peoples”93 that was exclusive to Harbin, not even present in Shanghai.94 
 
The Japanese Romantics and Victims 
In Manchurian Sleepwalkers, one of the three Japanese interviewees, Yuzawa-san, 
says that he was a fourteen-year-old member of the Volunteer Agricultural Corps, 
when he went to Manchuria in 1944, and stayed for one year in Harbin before 
returning to Japan. Manchuria had been a fantasy of Yuzawa. This originated from his 
reading of the novel, Three Hundred Miles behind Enemy Lines, by Minetaro 
Yamanaka, when he was ten years old. He kept feeling for his whole life that 
Manchuria was a large and wonderful place. He felt excited and his blood danced in 
the veins at hearing the name “Manchuria.”95 According to Yuzawa-san, many of the 
Volunteer Corps died miserably in Manchuria. They did not have parents or brothers 
around them. Due to the cold weather in winter, their corpses could not be buried and 
were even stripped of all clothes by the local poor people.96 
Kubota-san was a fourteen-year-old member of the Kanaka Village Separate 
Village Group who went to Manchuria in 1944 and returned to Japan at the end of 
                                                                 
92 Ibid. 
93 Lahusen, “Manchuria: Conflicting Memories,” 4. 
94 Fogel compares Harbin to a melting pot, whereas Shanghai could be compared to a mosaic society, 
where the inter-ethnic connections were not as dense as that in Harbin. For more comparison between 
Harbin and Shanghai in terms of inter-ethnic relationship, see Fogel, “Integrating into Chinese 
Society,” 45-69. In Manchurian Sleepwalkers, several other former residents of Harbin, including the 
Russians, Poles, Germans, expressed their happy memories of and even nostalgia for Harbin.  
95 Lausen, Manchurian Sleepwalkers, 2017. 
96 Ibid. 
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1945. Kubota-san has painful memories of Manchuria, because he killed many 
Japanese during the mass suicide. He does not feel like visiting Manchuria when he 
thinks of his fear and terror.97 Unlike the Chinese official discourse, which represents 
the Japanese as a homogeneous victimizer, Yuzawa-san and Kubota-san’s memories 
show that many innocent Japanese commoners were also the “victims of empire.”98 
Yuzawa-san’s romanticized imagination of Manchuria illustrates one of the many 
reasons that the Japanese came to Manchuria. As Mitter argues, “Certainly the period 
1932 and 1945, when the Northeast was occupied by the Japanese, is now firmly 
situated in mainstream Chinese historiography as a time when China’s national 
territorial sovereignty was most egregiously violated. This view is by no means 
inaccurate, but it is becoming increasingly clear that it is incomplete.”99 This flip side 
of the story, i.e., the complex motivations for the Japanese to go to Manchuria, could 
probably never be seen in the Chinese official discourse.  
While Chinese official discourse conveys such ideological silence, some 
Harbiners have positive memories of the Japanese immigrants. For example, in the 
memoir of Zhang, a Harbiner who was born in 1933, he recalled a harmonious 
relationship with his Japanese neighbours in the early 1940s. In 1942, Zhang and his 
family moved into a house inside the courtyard of a Japanese business at the 
intersection of Jingwei Fifth Street and Anguo Street. The Japanese household had a 
                                                                 
97 Ibid. 
98 Lahusen, “Manchuria: Conflicting Memories,” 16; also see Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: 
Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 
409-411. 
99 Tamanoi, Crossed Histories, 25. 
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dog, and they were afraid that their dog might harm Zhang, so they invited Zhang to 
feed the dog with them. The dog later became Zhang’s friend. On the other hand, 
Zhang hated Russian and Korean children, so he trained the dog to bark at those 
children. Zhang also recorded that the Japanese neighbours and Zhang’s family 
greeted each other when they met. Another old Harbiner, Wang, recalled that in 1939 
when he was a child playing in the street, he hurt his feet. A Japanese soldier wrapped 
his wound and gave him one thousand yen to get him to see a doctor. Such positive 
memories of the Japanese are rarely seen in Chinese films and dramas due to 
censorship. As Braester argues, filmmakers in China should “think professionally and 
act politically at the same time.”100 In order to escape censorship, filmmakers have to 
present a seemingly nationalist history, though they might try to introduce a more 
nuanced picture.  
 
Conclusion 
Historical films and television dramas in contemporary China tend to turn into 
ethnography, exoticism, femininity, and romance. A major motivation behind this 
trend is the culture of consumption and commercialization. The political nature of 
Chinese films in the 1950s seems to have given place to market-oriented films. 
Nevertheless, as it turns out, politics is always there. It is a bit frustrating to find out 
that the heterogeneous images of the Russians and the Japanese are still, in the end, 
overshadowed by a nationalist discourse, as illustrated by the death of Ichiro. The film 
                                                                 
100 Braester, Painting the City Red, 6. 
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producers are caught between “rebellion from and resubmission to power.”101 These 
politicized onscreen representations of the demonized Japanese are even more 
shocking, when the stories of Kumiko, Sugiyama, Zhang, and Wang are taken into 
consideration.  
 In the context of Harbin’s cultural space, the prevalence of nationalist discourse 
in films and television dramas implies the CCP’s efforts to reclaim the territory of 
history. As Braester argues, “Since the dominant ideology was communism, the 
productions may be said to have painted the city red.”102 Nevertheless, why is the 
Europeanized cityscape and the non-Chinese culture of Harbin emphasized on screen, 
if the purpose is to claim the city as Chinese? What is the suggested meaning of 
shooting a nationalist film in a “foreign” city? There is a tension between the CCP, 
who wants to Sinicize the history of Harbin, and local patriots who resist a collective 
Chinese memory, and want to promote a unique identity of Harbin by glorifying its 
non-Chinese history.  
St. Sophia Church is an indispensable image for almost all the films and 
television dramas shot in Harbin. The exotic Modern Hotel and the international 
Harbin itself are selling points for The Gunshot at the Modern Hotel and other similar 
cinematic works. Zhao Yiman, the once asexualized communist hero, is portrayed as a 
modern lady who frequents church and café, and speaks Russian. Many film 
producers, whose works I discussed above, are pragmatists, if not local patriots. That 
is to say, they promote and sell a Europeanized Harbin in the name of telling 
                                                                 
101 Zhang, Chinese National Cinema, 237; also see Dai, Cinema and Desire, 13-48. 
102 Braester, Painting the City Red, 7. Emphasis original. 
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nationalist stories. In order to disguise their purpose of reconstructing a non-Chinese 
history of Harbin,103 these producers have to portray a hostile Other to ensure the 
political correctness of the dramas, so that they can pass censorship. Unfortunately, 
the Japanese become the scapegoat. The demonization of the Japanese military on the 
Chinese screen not only becomes an emotional catharsis for many Chinese audiences, 
who experience retrospective (imagined) trauma and humiliation inflicted by the 
Imperial Japanese Army, but it also becomes a shield against censorship. Under such 
political camouflage, an exotic Harbin is brought to light on the screen, contributing 
to the audience’s imagination of both a Chinese and non-Chinese cultural space of the 
city. 
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Conclusion 
The city of Harbin, as the encompassing local lieu de mémoire and part of the lieux 
de mémoire of all of China, embodies fragmented yet consistent memories of its 
Russian, Japanese, and Chinese cultural histories among urban planners, architects, 
writers, film producers, and residents. Individual memories of the city in diverse 
forms constitute a collective memory of a both exotic and nationalist Harbin. At the 
same time, these individual memories challenge collective memory. “Harbiness” per 
se is plural and unsettled, filled with paradox and ambivalence in relation to Chinese 
nationalism and Chineseness. 
 
Harbin — A City of Ambivalence and Paradox 
The ambivalence of Harbiners, oscillating between nationalism and exoticism, is 
illustrated in various art forms, including architecture, literature, and film and 
television dramas; and such ambivalence – and even contradiction – is not something 
new. It is an ongoing historical process.  
The city experienced a circular process of development – repressing certain 
memories and later revealing the repressed. This is illustrated by the demolition of St. 
Nicholas Cathedral during the Cultural Revolution and the (re)construction of various 
replicas of this church in recent years. However, the process of reviving and 
revitalizing the repressed is full of tensions between the conservative officials and the 
progressive ones, and between the public who cares about the cultural value of the 
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church and those who focus on its political connotation. What to remember and 
forget, to some extent, is a political decision in Harbin and China at large. 
The ideological contestation between the Chinese and non-Chinese Harbin is 
demonstrated in urban spatial practices. The Sunshine Hall (built in 1997) and Harbin 
Station 2018 suggest distinctive official attitudes towards the European and Russian 
histories of the city: While the Sunshine Hall mainly memorializes the city’s history 
from 1946 when the Chinese administration of the city started, the new Harbin 
Station, located only 800 meters apart from the hall, conveys an official effort to go 
back to the Russian roots of the city. The last twenty years from the late 1990s to the 
present witnessed a change in the official ideology from one, which primarily 
highlighted the Chinese history of Harbin, to another, which has reinvigorated its 
foreign/international history through spatial practices.   
This ideological ambivalence is common not only among local officials but also 
among the public. For example, the distinctive interpretation of “the exotic Harbin” 
involves a sense of pride or a feeling of humiliation. The debate over whether to 
prioritize the reconstruction of St. Nicholas Cathedral, rather than Dao-
taifu, continues the competition between the Russian and Chinese traditions of the 
city. Evidence of these opposing ideals is further found in the revitalization of St. 
Sophia Church in the 1990s, in contrast to the Confucian Temple built in the 
1920s. The city’s dilemma between claiming Chinese and non-Chinese tradition is a 
historical process, continuing into the present. Indeed, it is the competition and 
cooperation between the two ideologies and two forms of urban practices that 
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characterize the city’s identity. Such identity cannot be reduced to either Chinese or 
Russian/European. In fact, this ambivalence suggests that Harbin is essentially a 
hybrid, battling and balancing in-between Chinese and Russian/ European.   
The contested nature of Harbin’s identity is not only manifested in the physical 
urban space but also in literature, films, and television dramas. Xiao Hong is 
the epitome of the contradictory Harbiner, caught in-between exoticism and 
nationalism: she both embraced Russian culture and was repulsed by the Russian 
colonization. The case of Xiao Hong suggests the historical continuity of the city’s 
struggle in defining its ethnic and cultural identity. The reconstruction in the Golden 
Era of the 1930s’ Harbin as a vernacular, Chinese-dominated living-space contrasts 
with the romanticized, Europeanized cultural space of Harbin in Falling Flowers. 
These two films speak a cinematic language of paradox in representing the cultural 
space of Old Harbin, and constitute a parallel with the ideological ambivalence shown 
in the architectural debates mentioned above.  
Romance is another lens through which the paradox and ambivalence between 
exoticism and nationalism is seen. For example, the nationalist discourse in Fire 
Saves City in Danger is blurred by presenting the romance between Wu and Lisa. This 
romance signifies both the triumph of Chinese masculinity over Russian woman and 
the breaking of ethnic boundaries by love. Harbin under the Night Curtain expresses 
a similar message by applying the love between Ichiro and Lu to bridge the hostility 
between China and Japan, though the suicide of Ichiro symbolizes the failure of such 
affective bridging. The ambivalence between the construction and deconstruction of 
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ethnic boundaries on the screen demonstrates Chinese film producers’ consent to and 
dissent from the nationalist agenda. They essentially construct a nuanced (a)political 
narrative of inter-ethnic relationship and promote a multi-cultural and Europeanized 
cityscape of Harbin, disguised as nationalist history. 
The exotic and modernist representation of Harbin’s historical cityscape also has 
to do with the film producers’ concern for economic profit and audience expectation. 
In the last five decades, the cinematic representation of nationalism in Harbin and 
China at large has experienced a turn to the feminization of nationalist heroines, and 
to the modernization and Westernization of the cityscapes, in which the stories are 
narrated. For example, in Zhao Yiman (1950), the cityscape functions as a 
background, in which the importance of an asexualized, communist hero, Zhao 
Yiman, is accentuated. In contrast, in My Mother Zhao Yiman (2005), the cityscape is 
represented as modern and exotic, and becomes part of the spectacle to be consumed. 
Moreover, Zhao is represented as a modern bourgeois woman, living a Western way 
of life in Harbin. The juxtaposition of an exotic cityscape and Communist heroes’ 
Western way of living suggests the film producers’ desire to reconstruct a unique 
cultural space of Harbin both for visual consumption as well as for city imaging.  
Architecture, literature, film, and television dramas cooperatively reflect and 
produce the ambivalence and paradoxes of Harbin’s cultural identity in the past and at 
present. It is the ambivalence and paradox that contribute to the simultaneous 
production of both local particularism and local internationalism, by means of which 
the city adapt to, as well as confront, globalization and its potential side-effect of 
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homogenizing cultures. 
 
Harbin — A Site of Power Contestation 
Harbin has witnessed a power contest between Russians, Japanese, Chinese, and 
Koreans for the hegemony and counter-hegemony over the city. This is illustrated by 
the historical evolution of the Harbin Station Square. Harbin Station used to be the 
symbolic power center of the city, and administrators had a penchant for displaying 
their power there. For example, the assassination of Ito Hirobumi by Ahn Jung-geun, 
occurred there in 1909, and the Manchukuo Monument (1932), the Soviet Red Army 
Monument (1945), and the Ahn Jung-geun Memorial Museum (2014) were 
respectively established on the Harbin Station Square, each to replace its predecessor. 
When I consulted a middle-aged Harbiner about the reason for the disappearance of 
the Soviet Red Army Monument in the early 1990s, he replied, “Please forget that 
monument. Harbin Station has been a sensitive place. The Korean assassinated the 
Japanese colonial official there; the Japanese and the Soviets claimed their authority 
over the city there. It only seemed to have nothing to do with us Chinese.” His 
intentional forgetting of the foreign history of Harbin Station partly answers my 
question about the mysterious disappearance of the Soviet Red Army Monument. 
Through the perennial process of establishing and erasing monuments, the Harbin 
Station Square signifies a site of political and ideological contest among foreign and 
local powers.  
Old Harbin as a site of power contest is manifested not only in physical urban 
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space but also in historical films and television dramas. Fire Saves the City in Danger 
represents the plague of 1910 as an arena for the Chinese, Russian, and Japanese to 
compete for the leadership of Harbin. The Gunshot and Fareast 1932 reconstruct 
Harbin as a contact zone, where the allies of Chinese and Soviet Communists and the 
International communities resist the Imperial Japanese Army. In this way, Harbin is 
portrayed as an inclusive, cosmopolitan city, with the demonized Japanese falling into 
a different category.  
Apart from political contention, Harbin is a site of economic power contest. Take 
the preservation and gentrification of the Chinese Baroque neighborhood in Daowai 
as an example. The original residents were priced out and forced to move out to the 
modern buildings in the suburbs. Being the former Chinese neighborhood outside of 
the Russian controlled Railway Zone a century ago, Old Daowai witnessed the 
segregation between whites and Chinese. Now, racial colonization has been 
transformed into economic colonization of the poor during the gentrification of Old 
Daowai. This phenomenon involves the recolonization of the once colonized in terms 
of economy. In contrast, the resurrection of the Russian-built Harbin Station in 2018 
symbolizes a decolonization of the decolonized in terms of politics. Contemporary 
Harbin officials strategically “forget” the colonial history and reinterpret the Russian 
and European architectural heritage as cultural capital that Harbiners should be proud 
of. Such strategic reinterpretation of the colonial heritage implies the official attempt 
to commercialize the city’s colonial cultural heritage.  
Moreover, another form of power contention is that between the local official 
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establishment and the public. The latter uses memories of Old Harbin to criticize 
present social problems and to problematize the homogeneous, nationalist memory 
constructed by the Chinese officials. Firstly, many contemporary Harbiners’ strong 
nostalgia for St. Nicholas Cathedral and Old Daowai signify their displaced criticism 
of the featureless modern city, the bureaucracy and corruption of local officials, and 
the market economy, which has changed a lived space of memory into a tourist site for 
consumption. Such criticism is also revealed in contemporary writers Ji Hongzhen 
and Qiu Subin’s nostalgia for Xiao Hong and “her” Harbin of the 1930s. In this sense, 
St. Nicholas Cathedral, Old Daowai, Xiao Hong and her literary works are similar 
signifiers of Old Harbin. These ghosts, either taking architectural or literary form, 
haunt the city and contribute to the social production of the present Harbin in its battle 
between different versions of tradition and modernization, and between memory and 
amnesia. They pull the city back to its old days, in order for it to dive into the future. 
 Secondly, against the nationalist conceptualization of Harbin by Chinese 
official discourse, there are heterogeneous memories by the public that suggest a more 
nuanced definition of Harbin’s cultural space. For instance, the tension between the 
official labeling of the Modern Hotel as a site for patriotic education contradicts the 
public’s affective memories of this hotel as a former Jewish property and a landmark 
that they feel intimate with. Moreover, the demonization of the Japanese army in 
official discourses is problematized, when old Harbiner Wang recalls his memory of 
obtaining help from a Japanese soldier in 1939. Similarly, Zhang’s memoir recalls the 
days when he became friends with his Japanese neighbors in the early 1940s. The 
285 
 
politicization of the memories concerning the Japanese in Chinese official discourses 
is further problematized by the fact that many former Japanese residents of Harbin felt 
nostalgia for the cosmopolitan Harbin. Such contrasting memories of Harbin might 
confuse contemporary people’s understanding of the ethnic relationship in Old 
Harbin, revealing the city’s contested history and its equally contentious and 
ambivalent cultural identity at present. 
 
Remediating the Approach of Intertextuality  
This dissertation adopts interdisciplinary and inter-medial approaches to map the 
discursive yet consistent memories and memorialization of Harbin through 
architecture, literature, film, and TV drama. The necessity of applying an inter-medial 
approach in examining le lieu de mémoire of Harbin is clearly stated by Erll and 
Rigney, who argue that “particular media offerings become agenda-setters for 
collective remembrance and it is then through the inter-medial reiteration of the story 
across different platforms in the public arena that the topic takes root in 
community.”104 The layered mediation of memories is also implied by Jay David 
Bolter and Richard Grusin, who highlight the concept of “remediation”, or “the 
mediation of mediation”.105 The two authors argue that media have continually been 
“commenting on, reproducing, and replacing each other and this process is integral to 
media.”106 In this dissertation I examined the remediation among architecture, 
                                                                 
104 Erll and Rigney, Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory, 2009, 3.  
105 Bolter and Grusin describe the logic of new media refashion prior media forms. Understanding 
New Media, 1999, 273. 
106 Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney, ed., Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory  
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literature, film, and television drama, and their complement for or challenge to each 
other. These media work cooperatively and competitively to produce the social space 
of Harbin as a lieu de mémoire.  
Among the most popular images of Harbin seen in historical films and dramas 
are St. Sophia Church, the Modern Hotel, the Railway Bridge, Central Street, the 
Old/new Chinese Baroque neighborhood, and the city in the snow. These images 
contribute to the representation and social production of a Europeanized Harbin, 
embellished with some Chinese vernacular flavour of Old Daowai. As Braester 
argues, “It is rather films – in direct interaction with political decisions and 
architectural blueprints – that forge an urban contract and create the material city and 
its ideological constructs.”107 
With regard to the inter-medial dialogues between the seven lieux de mémoire 
that I examined in the seven chapters of this dissertation, the replica of St. Nicholas 
Cathedral is shown in Falling Flowers as a background for Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun 
to sing and dance in celebration of Xiao Jun’s successful job-hunting. The original 
cathedral is mediated first by its replica and then, by this cinematic representation. 
Presenting the new cathedral in the constructed cinematic time of the 1930s to its 
contemporary audiences erases (imaginatively) and reiterates (in actuality) the 
historical fact that the original church was demolished during the Cultural Revolution. 
It also signifies a symbolic resurrection of the demolished church in the cinematic 
                                                                 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 3; also see Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation, 
Understanding New Media (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 55. 
107 Braester, Painting the City Red, 13. 
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space.  
In Harbin under the Night Curtain, the surviving Xiangfang Railway Station is 
used as a prop to refer to the Harbin Station of 1904, because the former is a Russian-
style building and somewhat similar to the latter. Despite a cinematic 
“misrepresentation” of the old Harbin Station, the Xiangfang Station in this television 
drama functions as a general, symbolic signifier that evokes the audience’s 
imagination of the Russianized Harbin. By the same token, instead of shooting on the 
site of Unit 731, The Gunshot uses a “lab” and a “prison” to refer to Unit 731, in 
which the arrested Chinese Communist, Sun Bowen, is tortured. Through this filmic 
mediation, Unit 731 is presented as a symbol of Japanese atrocities. Such a simplified 
representation both complements and limits the audience’s imagination of the history 
of Unit 731.  
The memorialization of Xiao Hong constitutes an inter-medial dialogue between 
contemporary writers, film producers, and local officials of Harbin. Local officials’ 
branding of Harbin as the home city of Xiao Hong is complemented by the film, 
Falling Flowers. On the other hand, Qiu Subin’s writing suggests her criticism of the 
officials’ commercialization of Xiao Hong. Moreover, in the Golden Era many shots 
were taken in Old Daowai. Such a choice conveys the director’s nostalgia for Xiao 
Hong and the bygone era, as suggested by the title of this film. Xu’s filmic nostalgia 
for Xiao Hong finds a parallel with the photographs, paintings, memoirs, and news 
reports that commemorate the disappearing Old Daowai in the process of 
gentrification. Together with many other cultural productions, the Golden Era stands 
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as a “monument” to the loss of Old Daowai and a denunciation of its gentrification. It 
is by the remediation in and through architecture, literature, film, and television drama 
that the both real and imagined Harbin is produced.  
 
Translation of the Past and the Other 
In the metaphorical translation of the Russian, Chinese, and Japanese heritage into the 
present Harbin, Russians are interpreted as ideologically ambivalent and even friends 
of the Chinese, whereas the Japanese are presented as demons. The (mis)translation of 
history is a process of empowerment and disempowerment. On the one hand, the 
promotion of the Russian and European heritage signifies an empowering 
retranslation of the once-downplayed history of the cosmopolitan Harbin. On the 
other hand, the (mis)translation that emphasizes the atrocities of the Imperial Japanese 
Army witnesses, and simultaneously brings about, a disempowerment of the former 
Japanese residents, who contributed to the economic and cultural development of the 
city.  
Moreover, le lieu de mémoire of Harbin is in a dynamic process of changing: 
since the 1980s, the once “forgotten” memories of the Japanese atrocities have been 
aroused; since the 1990s, the foreign past, repressed during the Cultural Revolution, 
has been resurrected and promoted. Through the dynamic process of selective 
translation, (mis)interpretation, and (re)imagination, le lieu de mémoire of Harbin 
embodies both nationalism and exoticism, provokes memory as much as amnesia. It 
reveals the historical, political, and economic context, in which memories of the past 
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are constructed rather than the past, per se.  
The interdisciplinary and inter-medial examination of Harbin as an 
encompassing lieu de mémoire presents the city as overlapping territories between the 
temporal and the spatial, between the real (practiced and lived) and the imagined 
(abstract, conceptualized, and represented), and between the Self and Other in terms 
of ethnicity. Like a palimpsest, the city’s contested past overlaps with its present, 
persistently haunting and shaping the city while experiencing metamorphosis and 
resurrection in the present. Overshadowed by the real-and-imagined ghosts of the 
past, Harbin continues to function as a contested contact zone and frontier that de-
territorializes China’s homogeneous cultural identity, from the periphery, and re-
territorializes itself, describing a future-oriented reinvigoration of its cosmopolitan 
past in the current context of globalization. 
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